Taylor v. Wallace

3 Citing cases

  1. Zimmerman v. Kallimopoulou

    56 Misc. 2d 828 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967)   Cited 8 times

    However, the quoted words do not impute unchastity to defendant. It has been held that language bearing much stronger implications of unchastity was not libelous or slanderous per se; for example, "She came down here and coaxed my bartender to stay with her all night" ( Taylor v. Wallace, 31 Misc. 393); "You'd do anything for five dollars, so I am told in the village" ( Bolton v. Strawbridge, 156 N.Y.S.2d 722, 724); "I could tell you a few things that went on in that apartment, with her and her boyfriends. * * * That isn't even your own apartment.

  2. Morris v. Stellakis

    27 Misc. 2d 120 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961)   Cited 1 times

    No special damage is alleged. It has been held that the words, "She (meaning plaintiff) came down here and coaxed my bartender to stay with her all night", did not necessarily impute unchastity ( Taylor v. Wallace, 31 Misc. 393); and a like result was reached with respect to the words, "You'd do anything for five dollars, so I am told in the village" ( Bolton v. Strawbridge, 156 N.Y.S.2d 722). If those statements can be said not to impute unchastity to a woman, a different result can hardly be reached upon the words which form the basis of plaintiff's second cause of action.

  3. Lambertini v. Sun Printing Pub. Co.

    47 Misc. 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1905)

    The learned court went further, and held that the word "prison" must be read and understood as "person", thus changing the libel complained of to one not complained of at all; for the complaint was based on the charge of imprisonment only. Moreover, on the question of whether the words, with "prison" changed to "person", impute an abortion, they are certainly equivocal, for they may mean some innocent operation; and it is an every day rule that in the case of equivocal words, i.e., words capable of both a harmless and a defamatory meaning, the plaintiff has to single out and allege the latter meaning in his complaint in order to state a cause of action (Smid v. Bernard, 31 Misc. R. 35; Taylor v. Wallace, 31 Misc. R. 393; Odgers, p. 112). It is not for the defendant to attribute a defamatory meaning to his words, capable of a harmless meaning; it is for the plaintiff to do so by his complaint.