Carmichael v. Carmichael, 53 Ga. App. 663, supra; Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287 ( 44 N.E. 462); Orr v. Orr, 36 N.J. 236 ( 176 A.2d 241, 91 ALR2d 906)." Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga. App. 167 (1) ( 135 S.E.2d 522) (1964). Therefore, it is clear that the claim presently being asserted by the plaintiff is barred by application of the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity.
It is also clear that the marriage extinguished whatever right of action Mrs. Lee may have had against Mr. Lee as a result of his negligence in causing the collision. See Carmichael v. Carmichael, 53 Ga. App. 663 ( 187 S.E. 116) (1936); Wallach v. Wallach, 94 Ga. App. 576 ( 95 S.E.2d 750) (1956); Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga. App. 167 ( 135 S.E.2d 522) (1964). However, the issue of whether the marriage also extinguished the right of third persons to seek contribution against Mr. Lee for his alleged negligence in injuring his wife prior to the marriage presents an issue of first impression in this state.
The interpretation of this statute to which plaintiff thus refers is that the Georgia Supreme Court and Appellate Courts have interpreted this statute in numerous decisions to the effect that since the Georgia Legislature has created no right of action in favor of one spouse for personal injuries inflicted by the other, whether wilfully or negligently inflicted, one spouse has no right of action against the other for a personal tort not involving a property right, even though the tort be negligently or even maliciously inflicted. The Georgia authorities are clear that, under the facts alleged in the complaint in the case at bar, plaintiff has no cause of action against her husband, defendant J.W. Locklair. Among the numerous Georgia cases on point are Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga. App. 167, 135 S.E.2d 522 (1964); Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634, 92 S.E. 25 (1917); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 53 Ga. App. 663, 187 S.E. 116 (1936); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Cheney, 20 Ga. App. 393, 93 S.E. 42 (1917); Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766, 189 S.E. 833, 109 A.L.R. 877 (1937). In fact the Georgia decisions go somewhat further than plaintiff admits and hold that it is not a question of Mrs. Locklair having a cause of action which is suspended or not enforced during coverture due to the public policy of promoting family harmony, but they hold that no cause of action arises in her favor against her husband from the facts alleged in her complaint.