Taylor v. Vezzani

3 Citing cases

  1. Robeson v. International Indem. Co.

    248 Ga. 306 (Ga. 1981)   Cited 36 times
    In Robeson v. International Indemnity Co., 248 Ga. 306 (282 S.E.2d 896) (1981), the Supreme Court upheld the common-law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity pointing out the traditional policy reasons behind barring such suits, including the belief that truly adversarial suits between spouses would disrupt marital harmony, and the fear that nonadversarial suits between spouses would be fraudulent, collusive, or frivolous.

    Carmichael v. Carmichael, 53 Ga. App. 663, supra; Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287 ( 44 N.E. 462); Orr v. Orr, 36 N.J. 236 ( 176 A.2d 241, 91 ALR2d 906)." Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga. App. 167 (1) ( 135 S.E.2d 522) (1964). Therefore, it is clear that the claim presently being asserted by the plaintiff is barred by application of the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity.

  2. Byington v. Lee

    258 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 4 times
    In Byington v. Lee, 150 Ga. App. 393 (258 S.E.2d 6) (1979), this court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff husband on defendant's counterclaim for contribution should defendant be found liable for co-plaintiff wife's injuries, on the ground that the claim for contribution was not barred by interspousal immunity since, as in the case now before us, the plaintiffs married after the date of the automobile collision out of which the action arose.

    It is also clear that the marriage extinguished whatever right of action Mrs. Lee may have had against Mr. Lee as a result of his negligence in causing the collision. See Carmichael v. Carmichael, 53 Ga. App. 663 ( 187 S.E. 116) (1936); Wallach v. Wallach, 94 Ga. App. 576 ( 95 S.E.2d 750) (1956); Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga. App. 167 ( 135 S.E.2d 522) (1964). However, the issue of whether the marriage also extinguished the right of third persons to seek contribution against Mr. Lee for his alleged negligence in injuring his wife prior to the marriage presents an issue of first impression in this state.

  3. Locklair v. Locklair

    256 F. Supp. 530 (D.S.C. 1966)   Cited 3 times

    The interpretation of this statute to which plaintiff thus refers is that the Georgia Supreme Court and Appellate Courts have interpreted this statute in numerous decisions to the effect that since the Georgia Legislature has created no right of action in favor of one spouse for personal injuries inflicted by the other, whether wilfully or negligently inflicted, one spouse has no right of action against the other for a personal tort not involving a property right, even though the tort be negligently or even maliciously inflicted. The Georgia authorities are clear that, under the facts alleged in the complaint in the case at bar, plaintiff has no cause of action against her husband, defendant J.W. Locklair. Among the numerous Georgia cases on point are Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga. App. 167, 135 S.E.2d 522 (1964); Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634, 92 S.E. 25 (1917); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 53 Ga. App. 663, 187 S.E. 116 (1936); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Cheney, 20 Ga. App. 393, 93 S.E. 42 (1917); Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766, 189 S.E. 833, 109 A.L.R. 877 (1937). In fact the Georgia decisions go somewhat further than plaintiff admits and hold that it is not a question of Mrs. Locklair having a cause of action which is suspended or not enforced during coverture due to the public policy of promoting family harmony, but they hold that no cause of action arises in her favor against her husband from the facts alleged in her complaint.