Opinion
Civil Action No. 2: 19-cv-1015
01-14-2020
DONTE TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
Senior United States District Judge David S. Cercone REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by Petitioner, Donte Taylor, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It is further recommended the Taylor's Motion to Produce Record (ECF No. 35) and Motion for Supplemental Pleading (ECF No. 36) be denied.
II. REPORT
Pro se petitioner Donte Taylor is currently awaiting trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on charges of possession with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base, and quantities of mixtures and substances containing detectable amounts of cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, and marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§841(a)(1)(, 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), 841(b)(1)(C), and 841(b)(1)(D), or aiding and abetting this offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2. See United States v. Taylor, Criminal No. 18-0242, Indictment (ECF No. 3). The criminal case against Taylor is active and Taylor is represented by counsel. Despite being represented by counsel, Taylor has filed numerous pro se motions, including requests to dismiss the charges for speedy trial violations and for release from custody. Trial is scheduled to begin on January 29, 2020. Petitioner is being held in the Allegheny County Jail pending his trial.
On August 15, 2019, Taylor filed in this case a Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and attached to the motion a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. After some intervening proceedings regarding the payment of the filing fee, Taylor paid the $5.00 filing fee on September 20, 2019 (ECF No. 6), and his Petition was formally filed that day. (ECF No. 7). On October 1, 2019, Taylor filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF Nos. 10 and 11). He claims that the criminal charges filed against him are baseless and violate his "due process" rights. See ECF No. 11, at 8. He requests that he be released from pretrial detention, that the criminal indictment filed against him be dismissed, and that his property be returned to him. Respondent filed a Response to the Petition on December 11, 2019, in which it argues that the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF No. 25).
The law in this Circuit is clear that federal defendants who seek pretrial release should do so through the means authorized by the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150, not through a separate §2241 action. Reese v. Warden Philadelphia FDC, 904 F.3d 244, 247 (3d Cir. 2018). The presumptive means to challenge a federal conviction or sentence is the filing of a motion to vacate sentence under §2255 in the district which imposed the sentence in question. See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. §2255(a). Because Taylor has not yet been sentenced, however, relief under §2255 is not yet available, and he could only acquire habeas relief prior to the issuance of his sentence and any appeal by pursuing his claims as part of a habeas petition instead filed pursuant to §2241. Although §2241 has the capability of providing a jurisdictional basis for a challenge to confinement in violation of the Constitution prior to trial or a sentence, it does not follow that the habeas statute may be used as an end-run around criminal motion practice or appeal. See Reese, 904 F.3d at 246. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained,
[E]ven in cases where the habeas court has the authority to grant relief, it must consider "whether this be a case in which that power ought to be exercised." [Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008).]
. . .
Courts have consistently refused to exercise their habeas authority in cases where federal prisoners have sought relief before standing trial. Instead, courts have long stressed that defendants should pursue the remedies available within the criminal action. See, e.g., Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391 (1918) ("It is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedures should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of a trial."); Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547, 551 (1905) (vacating order granting habeas relief to federal pretrial detainees because there was "nothing in this record to disclose that there were any special circumstances which justified a departure from the regular course of judicial procedure" of pretrial motions and, if necessary, appeal); see also Medina v. Choate, 875 F.3d 1025, 1029 (10th Cir. 2017) (adopting "the general rule that §2241 is not a proper avenue for relief for federal prisoners awaiting federal trial").
Funneling requests for pretrial relief through the criminal action encourages an orderly, efficient resolution of the issues, maintains respect for the appellate process and prevents duplication of judicial work and judge-shopping See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n. 10 (1979) (explaining that "the writ of habeas corpus should not do service for an appeal," and that "[t]his rule must be strictly observed if orderly appellate procedure is to be maintained"); see also Medina, 875 F.3d at 1029-29 (identifying similar interests.)
We relied on this rationale in Government of Virgin Islands v. Bolones, 427 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam), to affirm the District Court's denial of pretrial habeas petitions filed by federal defendants. We rejected the defendants' challenges to their arrest and interrogation on the ground that a pretrial motion in the criminal case, "rather than their petition for writs of habeas corpus, provides the appropriate avenue of relief before trial." Id. at 1136. We similarly held that the defendants' claim that they had been denied a speedy trial should be resolved "on an appropriate pretrial motion." Id. Accordingly, insofar as Reese sought to
challenge the charges against him or the conduct of law-enforcement officers during arrest or interrogation, he was required to do so through pretrial motions in his criminal case, not via a pretrial §2241 petition. See id.Reese, 904 F.3d at 246-47.
Section 2241 is likewise not the proper vehicle for Reese to challenge his detention pending trial. The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§3141 - 3150, provides a comprehensive scheme governing pretrial-release decisions. See generally, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742-43 (1987). . . .
Thus, it is clear that under the controlling law of this Circuit, Taylor has used the wrong vehicle to challenge the validity and nature of his pretrial detention. He should seek pretrial relief through the filing of pretrial motions in his criminal case. Reese, 904 F.3d at 245. As such, the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241 should be dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
Interestingly, Taylor admits to being aware that using a §2241 petition for his challenges is not proper. See ECF No. 11 at 9. In his Amended Petition, he states, "[a]ssigned lawyer would not raise any issue I asked to be raised, nor would he file this Habeas Corpus, in fact he told Petitioner you could only have a Habeas Corpus if you were sentenced . . . . " Id.
Because it is recommended that the petition be dismissed, it is recommended that Taylor's Motion to Produce Record (ECF No. 35) and Motion for Supplemental Pleading (ECF No. 36) likewise be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that that Taylor's Motion to Produce Record (ECF No. 35) and Motion for Supplemental Pleading (ECF No. 36) be denied. To the extent one would be needed, a Certificate of Appealability should be denied because jurists of reason would not find the foregoing debatable.
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Petitioner, because his a non-electronically registered party, may file written objections to this Report and Recommendation by January 31, 2020, and Respondent, because it is an electronically registered party, may file written objections by January 28, 2020. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe "will waive the right to appeal." Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Dated: January 14, 2020
s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
Chief United States Magistrate Judge cc: DONTE TAYLOR
16155
Allegheny County Jail
950 Second Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
(via U.S. First Class Mail)
Kezia Taylor
United States Attorney's Office
(via ECF electronic notification)