Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BP105749, Reva Goetz, Judge.
Nettie C. Taylor, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Appellant.
Donald L. Scoggins for Objector and Respondent.
ARMSTRONG, J.
Petitioner and appellant Nettie C. Taylor appeals the judgment entered following the probate court's grant of the motion for summary judgment filed by respondent Kim Taylor. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Appellant and respondent are sisters, and the daughters of Clifford Maxine Williams (decedent), the decedent in the underlying probate case. Decedent died on June 30, 2000. On June 21, 1993, seven years before her death, decedent conveyed her residence (the Residence) to herself and respondent as joint tenants.
On January 14, 2010, appellant filed a petition under Probate Code section 850, seeking to divest defendant of the Residence and subject it to the administration of the decedent's probate estate. Appellant alleged that decedent "never intended to make a gift of the subject property [to respondent] to the exclusion of all her other heirs." Appellant sought orders confirming title to the Residence in the probate estate, where it would pass by intestacy to appellant and her siblings as decedent's heirs.
Respondent objected to the Probate Code section 850 petition on the grounds that it was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. Citing Code of Civil Procedure section 318, respondent argued that the Residence had vested solely in her name nearly 10 years before appellant filed her petition, and that any action to attack the 1993 deed by which respondent took title to the real property was required to have been made within five years of appellant or her ancestor (decedent) having had seisin (that is, either physical possession or legal title) of the Residence. Because decedent had not been seized of the property since her death nearly 10 years earlier, and appellant had never been seized of the property, respondent maintained that the deadline to have commenced an action to attack the 1993 deed was June 30, 2005, the five-year anniversary of decedent's death.
On May 10, 2010, appellant filed a supplement to her petition, with the new allegation that respondent held the Residence in constructive trust for the benefit of decedent's heirs. Appellant claimed that all of decedent's children had entered into a trust agreement after decedent's death, whereby respondent agreed to hold the Residence for the benefit of the heirs, and that respondent breached that trust in 2007 by recording an affidavit – death of joint tenant for the property.
As respondent notes, the factual allegations, if true, would result in an express trust, not a constructive trust.
On August 25, 2010, the trial court granted the summary judgment motion; judgment was entered in favor of respondent on September 27, 2010. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) The trial court property grants a motion for summary judgment "if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. "[W]e construe the moving party's affidavits strictly, construe the opponent's affidavits liberally, and resolve doubts about the propriety of granting the motion in favor of the party opposing it." (Szadolci v. Hollywood Park Operating Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 16, 19.) "While resolution of the statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact, where the uncontradicted facts established through discovery are susceptible of only one legitimate inference, summary judgment is proper." (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112; see also FNB Mortgage Corp. v. Pacific General Corp. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1126.)
DISCUSSION
Under Probate Code section 850, the court may issue orders confirming estate ownership of property that was titled in the name of someone other than the decedent at the time of the decedent's death. (Prob. Code, § 850, subd. (a)(2)(D).) A party must bring an action to recover real property within five years after that party, or that party's predecessor, lost possession, or seisin, of the property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 318.)
Here, appellant has never been in possession of the property, while her predecessor, the decedent, has not been seized of the property since her death in June of 2000. Accordingly, the statute of limitations expired on this claim in 2005, well before the filing of the instant petition in 2010.
Appellant alleged that decedent had an express trust agreement with respondent, pursuant to which respondent was obliged to transfer the Residence to decedent's heirs upon her death in 2000. The statute of limitations on that claim has expired as well, as an action to enforce an express trust must be commenced within three years of its breach. (Prob. Code, § 16460, subd. (a)(2).)
Appellant's final theory, that she and her siblings entered into a trust agreement after decedent's death, is not cognizable in a Probate Code section 850 petition. Such a petition must allege that the property is subject to probate administration. The conveyance of respondent's property into an express trust after the decedent's death would not be subject to the administration of the decedent's probate estate.
In sum, respondent obtained title to the property in 1993, in joint tenancy with her mother. Title to the property vested solely in respondent upon her mother's death in June 2000. As appellant was never seized of the property, she was required to file her petition under Probate Code section 850 to have the Residence declared an asset of decedent's estate within five years after decedent's death, or June 30, 2005. This petition, filed on January 14, 2010, is therefore time-barred.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: TURNER, P.J., MOSK, J.