A material issue of fact thus remained in the case as to whether or not the former client had rescinded the purchase agreement. Taylor v. Taylor, 243 Ga. 506 ( 255 S.E.2d 32) (1979); Crosby v. Jones, 241 Ga. 558 ( 246 S.E.2d 677) (1978); Ham v. Ham, 230 Ga. 43 ( 195 S.E.2d 429) (1973). Accordingly, the trial court erred in treating the case as one in which the former client sought to retain a part of the land, or the proceeds from the sale of a part of the land, while suing for the purchase price of the entire tract plus certain expenses.

"Whether a man and a woman have entered into a common law marriage is a question of fact." Taylor v. Taylor, 243 Ga. 506, 508 ( 255 SE2d 32) (1979). "`(T)he . . . fact of cohabitation is treated as essential, if not the main factor in establishing in this State a common-law marriage.'"

"Whether a man and a woman have entered into a common law marriage is a question of fact." Taylor v. Taylor, 243 Ga. 506, 508 ( 255 S.E.2d 32) (1979). "`[T]he . . . fact of cohabitation is treated as essential, if not the main factor in establishing in this State a common-law marriage.'"

The Georgia Supreme Court has consistently held that Rule 56 (c) of the CPA requires a party moving for summary judgment to negate all material allegations made by the respondent, even those as to which the respondent would have the burden of proof at trial. See, e.g., Burnette Ford, Inc. v. Hayes, 227 Ga. 551, 552 ( 181 S.E.2d 866) (1971); Ham v. Ham, 230 Ga. 43, 45 ( 195 S.E.2d 429) (1973); Taylor v. Taylor, 243 Ga. 506, 508 ( 255 S.E.2d 32) (1979); Nalley v. Karr, 242 Ga. 16, 17 ( 247 S.E.2d 755) (1978). We further note that even if the Celotex decision controlled our interpretation of CPA Rule 56 (c), it would not require a different result in the present case.

1. "Whether a man and a woman have entered into a common law marriage is a question of fact." Taylor v. Taylor, 243 Ga. 506, 508 ( 255 S.E.2d 32) (1979). OCGA § 19-3-1 establishes the three essential elements of a marriage in this state, all of which must be met during one period of time in order to prove a common law marriage.

Combs v. Adair Mtg. Co., 245 Ga. 296 ( 264 S.E.2d 226) (1980). And it includes the burden resting upon the movant of establishing the nonexistence, as well as the existence, of any pertinent issue of material fact. Taylor v. Taylor, 243 Ga. 506 ( 255 S.E.2d 32) (1979). Thus, the burden is on the movant to establish that the opposite party was capable of contracting if such becomes relevant to the question at issue.

It is well settled in the Georgia cases interpreting such statute, and the parties do not contend otherwise, that a husband's legal obligation to pay alimony automatically terminates upon the remarriage of his former wife unless otherwise provided in the decree. Woodward v. Woodward, 245 Ga. 550, 266 S.E.2d 170, 171 (1980); Taylor v. Taylor, 243 Ga. 506, 255 S.E.2d 32, 33 (1979); Wiley v. Wiley, 243 Ga. 271, 253 S.E.2d 750, 751 (1979); Vereen v. Arp, supra. Mrs. Henry remarried in 1975; therefore, under Georgia law, Mr. Strealdorf had no legal obligation to continue making alimony payments to her unless the divorce decree "otherwise provided."