Opinion
No. 05-10-00824-CR
Opinion Filed November 15, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F10-54180-V.
Before Justices O'NEILL, RICHTER, and LANG-MIERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Justin Slade Taylor waived a jury, pleaded guilty to unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.07(a) (West 2003). After finding appellant guilty and the enhancement paragraphs true, the trial court assessed punishment at six years' imprisonment. In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to imprisonment. We affirm. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing him to a six-year prison term because the sentence is not necessary to prevent the recurrence of his criminal behavior. Appellant asserts he has a longstanding drug addiction and should have received the drug treatment that he had asked for in the trial court. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review and, alternatively, the record does not show the sentence violated the objectives of the penal code. Appellant did not complain about the sentence either at the time it was imposed or in a motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion). After sentencing, appellant neither objected to the sentence nor filed a motion for new trial. Thus, appellant has not preserved his issues for our review. Even if appellant had preserved error, however, his argument still fails because the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory range for the offense. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 12.34, 31.07(b) (West 2003); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the six-year sentence. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal). We overrule appellant's sole point of error.