" (Footnotes omitted.) Taylor v. State , 259 Ga. App. 457, 460 (2), 576 S.E.2d 916 (2003). OCGA § 5-5-20 authorizes the trial court to grant a new trial "[i]n any case when the verdict of the jury is found contrary to evidence and strongly against the weight of the evidence and the principles of justicy and equity[,]" and OCGA § 5-5-21 empowers the trial court to grant a new trial "where the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence even though there may appear to be some slight evidence in favor of the finding."
A "deviation below the minimum requirements of OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (b) results in a void sentence." Taylor v. State , 259 Ga. App. 457, 461 (3), 576 S.E.2d 916 (2003) ; accord Bryant v. State , 229 Ga. App. 534, 535-536 (1), 494 S.E.2d 353 (1997) (a sentence not in compliance with OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (b) is void). Consequently, Jarvis's 20-year prison sentence for Count 19 also is void.
“The grant or denial of a motion for new trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to authorize it.” (Footnote omitted.) Taylor v. State, 259 Ga.App. 457, 460(2), 576 S.E.2d 916 (2003); see also Souder v. State, 301 Ga.App. 348, 352(3), 687 S.E.2d 594 (2009) (“A trial judge's denial of a motion for new trial on evidentiary grounds will be reversed on appeal only if there is no evidence to support the verdict.”) (citations and punctuation omitted).
(Footnote omitted.) Taylor v. State, 259 Ga.App. 457, 460(2), 576 S.E.2d 916 (2003). “Notably, where a defendant raises a claim under OCGA §§ 5–5–20 and 5–5–21 in his motion for new trial, the law imposes upon the trial court an affirmative duty to exercise its discretion and weigh the evidence to determine whether a new trial is warranted.”
We conclude that the evidence adduced during the pre-trial motion to suppress hearing "supports the trial court's findings that [Bernal's] statements were freely and voluntarily made, under noncustodial circumstances." Sams , 239 Ga. App. at 717 (2), 521 S.E.2d 848 ; see also Beaudoin , 311 Ga. App. at 94 (3), 714 S.E.2d 624 ; Bass v. State , 282 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2), 637 S.E.2d 863 (2006) ; Taylor v. State , 259 Ga. App. 457, 459 (1), 576 S.E.2d 916 (2003). (ii) Accuracy of Transcript of Statement.
Generally, “[t]he grant or denial of a motion for new trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court[.]” Taylor v. State, 259 Ga.App. 457, 460(2), 576 S.E.2d 916 (2003). Cf. O'Neal v. State, 285 Ga. 361, 363, 677 S.E.2d 90 (2009) (if a grant of new trial is on special ground involving questions of law, the questions of law are reviewed de novo).
“The grant or denial of a motion for new trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to authorize it.” (Footnote omitted.) Taylor v. State, 259 Ga.App. 457, 460(2), 576 S.E.2d 916 (2003); see also Souder v. State, 301 Ga.App. 348, 352(3), 687 S.E.2d 594 (2009) (“A trial judge's denial of a motion for new trial on evidentiary grounds will be reversed on appeal only if there is no evidence to support the verdict.”) (citations and punctuation omitted).
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Taylor v. State, 259 Ga. App. 457, 460-461 (2) ( 576 SE2d 916) (2003). 2. Damerow further contends that the trial court erred in failing to give the complete pattern jury charge on witness credibility.
Because high school students are vulnerable to sexual assault by teachers they trust, we conclude that the sentence range provided by the legislature, and the sentence imposed by the trial court in this case, contribute to accepted goals of punishment and deterrence, and are not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime, and thus do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See Flores, supra at 214-215 (5); Taylor v. State, 259 Ga. App. 457, 462 (3) ( 576 SE2d 916) (2003) (mandatory minimum sentence for aggravated sexual battery was .not cruel and unusual punishment, even though victim had engaged in sexual intercourse with defendant many times over the decade prior to the sexual encounter at issue). Whitehead relies on Fleming and Humphrey v. Wilson in asserting that the sentence imposed was unconstitutionally excessive.
Moreover, the written statement was merely duplicative of Copeland's oral statements, about which Copeland makes no complaint. See Taylor v. State, 259 Ga. App. 457, 459-460 (1) ( 576 SE2d 916) (2003). BERNES, Judge.