The present case presents us with the question of whether claims arising out of these due process requirements can be waived. "In Taylor v. State, 600 So.2d 1080 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), the appellant alleged that the trial court, in revoking his probation, had failed to comply with the procedures in Rule 27.5 and Rule 27.6, Ala.R.Crim.P. This court stated: "`The appellant, however, failed to present any of these issues [concerning noncompliance with Rule 27.5 and 27.6] to the trial court.

The procedures for probation revocation proceedings set out in Rule 27.5 and Rule 27.6, Ala.R.Crim.P., are intended to comply with the due process requirements of Morrissey and Gagnon. The present case presents us with the question of whether claims arising out of these due process requirements can be waived. In Taylor v. State, 600 So.2d 1080 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), the appellant alleged that the trial court, in revoking his probation, had failed to comply with the procedures in Rule 27.5 and Rule 27.6, Ala.R.Crim.P. This court stated: "The appellant, however, failed to present any of these issues [concerning noncompliance with Rule 27.5 and 27.6] to the trial court.

Naves raises this issue for the first time on appeal. The general rules of preservation apply to probation revocation proceedings. Puckett v. State, 680 So.2d 980, 983 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996), citing Taylor v. State, 600 So.2d 1080, 1081 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992). However, the question of the adequacy of a written revocation order can be raised for the first time on appeal. Owen v. State, 728 So.2d 673, 680 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998).

Durr raises this issue for the first time on appeal. The general rules of preservation apply to probation revocation proceedings. Puckett v. State, 680 So.2d 980, 983 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996), citing Taylor v. State, 600 So.2d 1080, 1081 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992). However, the question of the adequacy of a written order of revocation can be raised for the first time on appeal. Owens v. State, 728 So.2d 673, 680 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998).

Norwood raises this issue for the first time on appeal. The general rules of preservation apply to probation revocation proceedings. Puckett v. State, 680 So.2d 980, 983 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996), citing Taylor v. State, 600 So.2d 1080, 1081 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992). However, the question of the adequacy of a written order of revocation can be raised for the first time on appeal. Owens v. State, 728 So.2d 673, 680 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998).

We note, however, that the appellant failed to present this issue to the trial court. In Taylor v. State, 600 So.2d 1080 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), this court, in addressing the probationer's claim that the trial court had failed to comply with Rules 27.5 and 27.6, Ala.R.Crim.P., stated: "The appellant, however, failed to present any of these issues to the trial court.

See, e.g., Salter v. State, 470 So.2d 1360 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985); Harris v. State, 549 So.2d 520, 523 (Ala.Crim.App. 1989) (on return to remand opinion); Stanley v. State, 579 So.2d 19 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990); Southern v. State, 589 So.2d 811 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991). However, the great weight of authority clearly favors remanding this case for noncompliance with Armstrong. See, e.g., Grimes v. State, 579 So.2d 693 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Heyward v. State, 583 So.2d 1352 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Stanley v. State, 587 So.2d 1258 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Osbourne v. State, 588 So.2d 516 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Womack v. State, 591 So.2d 107 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Bruno v. State, 599 So.2d 635 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992); Taylor v. State, 600 So.2d 1080 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992); Wyatt v. State, 608 So.2d 763 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992). (See also, Judge Taylor's dissent in Southern and Judge McMillan's opinion in Harris remanding the case to the trial court.)

The appellant contends that he was denied due process because, he says, the trial court failed to comply with Rule 27.5(a)(1), (a)(4), and (b); and Rule 27.6(a), (e) and (f), A.R.Cr.P. In Taylor v. State, 600 So.2d 1080 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), this Court held that "the general rules regarding preservation should apply to rights granted to a probationer by Armstrong [v. State, 294 Ala. 100, 312 So.2d 620 (1975)] and Rule 27.5 and 27.6." Here, the appellant failed to raise any of his claims at the trial court level; therefore, consideration of his claims based on Rule 27.5 and 27.6(a) and (e) is procedurally barred on appeal. However, with regard to his claim that the trial court erred in failing to make a written statement as to the reasons for revoking his probation and the evidence it relied upon, as required by Rule 27.6(f), this Court has said that "we may not rely upon procedural bar on this particular issue.

This court recently addressed the failure of an appellant to preserve his issues regarding a trial court's compliance with the provisions of A.R.Cr.P. 27. In Taylor v. State, 600 So.2d 1080 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), this court held as follows: "The appellant, however, failed to present any of these issues to the trial court.

"'"The general rules of preservation apply to probation revocation hearings. Puckett v. State, 680 So.2d 980, 983 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), citing Taylor v. State, 600 So.2d 1080, 1081 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). This Court 'has recognized, in probation revocation proceedings, only two exceptions to the general rule that issues not presented to the trial court are waived on appeal: (1) the requirement that there be an adequate written order of revocation ..., and (2) the requirement that a revocation hearing actually be held.'