(d) Morris claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request additional closing argument after the court, over counsel's objection, recharged the jury on transferred intent. It is within the discretion of the trial court to give unrequested additional instructions when the jury requests a recharge on a particular point, even if the instruction was not part of the original charge, Taylor v. State, 169 Ga. App. 842, 843 (2) ( 315 SE2d 661) (1984), and any argument that an attorney's performance is deficient for failure to seek an opportunity to argue further to the jury after jury recharge, lacks merit. See Igidi v. State, 251 Ga. App. 581, 586 (5) ( 554 SE2d 773) (2001).
It is within the discretion of the trial court to give or not to give unrequested additional instructions when the jury requests a recharge on a particular point, Patterson v. State, 264 Ga. 593 (2) ( 449 S.E.2d 97) (1994), and the discretion includes the giving of unrequested instructions not contained in the trial court's original charge. Taylor v. State, 169 Ga. App. 842 (2) ( 315 S.E.2d 661) (1984). Under the facts of this case, the additional instructions were accurate statements of the law and were authorized by the evidence.
Walter v. State, 256 Ga. 666, 668-669 (2) ( 352 S.E.2d 570) (1987). Because the recharge on murder was authorized by the evidence and legally accurate there was no abuse of discretion and no error. Taylor v. State, 169 Ga. App. 842, 844 (2) ( 315 S.E.2d 661) (1984). A contrary holding is not mandated simply because the recharge was given in a written, rather than verbal, form. Anderson v. State, 262 Ga. 26, 27 (3) ( 413 S.E.2d 732) (1992).
While the court has a duty to recharge any part of the charge at the request of the jury, Welch v. State, 251 Ga. 197 ( 304 S.E.2d 391) (1983), the extent and character of any supplementary instructions are within the discretion of the court. Taylor v. State, 169 Ga. App. 842 ( 315 S.E.2d 661) (1984). In this case, where the jury did not request a recharge on mutual combat, there was no error in the court's failure to give the recharge.
Where a jury requests a charge or recharge on a particular point, it is within the discretion of the judge to also give or not give additional instructions. Taylor v. State, 169 Ga. App. 842, 844 ( 315 S.E.2d 661) (1984). We find the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the jury's inquiry. See Taylor v. State, 169 Ga. App. 842, 844 (2) ( 315 SE2d 661) (1984) ("[T]he necessity, extent, and character of any supplemental instructions to the jury are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court.") (citations omitted). 2.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Taylor v. State, 169 Ga. App. 842, 844 (2) ( 315 SE2d 661) (1984). Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that on recharge, it is not necessary to "cover the subject in toto."
(Citations omitted.) Taylor v. State, 169 Ga. App. 842, 844 (2) ( 315 SE2d 661) (1984). Despite Bolden's claim that the jury was "not asking the court to tell them what [Bolden] was charged with," the jury expressly asked what the charge was, and the trial court properly read the charge in response thereto.
Id. at 626(2).See Taylor v. State, 169 Ga. App. 842, 844(2) ( 315 S.E.2d 661) (1984). 6. Lovelace claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Ross v. State, 231 Ga. App. 506, 508 (2) ( 499 S.E.2d 351) (1998), overruled in part, Vogleson v. State, Case No. A01A0485 (July 13, 2001) (disapproved Ross to the extent that it suggests that it is not reversible error to preclude cross-examination of an accomplice regarding the deal he has reached with the state).Taylor v. State, 169 Ga. App. 842 (2) ( 315 S.E.2d 661) (1984). In Taylor v. State, in response to a question from the jury, the trial court recharged some of the original instructions and also added two additional charges, parties to a crime and prosecution of parties who did not directly commit the crime.