Opinion
No. 15, 1999.
Decided: May 4, 1999.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, C.A. No. 98A-11-009.
AFFIRMED.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
HUBERT L. TAYLOR, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. ROBERT E. SNYDER, WARDEN, LT. BRUCE BURTON, LT. EDWARD WALLACH, LT. RAMON TAYLOR, STANLEY TAYLOR, COMMISSIONER, Defendants Below, Appellees. No. 15, 1999. Supreme Court of Delaware. Submitted: April 12, 1999. Decided: May 4, 1999.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, C.A. No. 98A-11-009.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and BERGER, Justices.
ORDER
This 4th day of May 1999, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Hubert L. Taylor, is an inmate incarcerated at the Delaware Correctional Center ("DCC"). Taylor has filed an opening brief challenging an order of the Superior Court that affirmed a decision of the Court of Common Pleas. Taylor has also filed a document entitled "Motion to Reserve Federal Constitutional Claims Related to State Law Claims Raised in the Present Proceedings." The appellees have filed a response to Taylor's motion "to reserve" and have filed a motion to affirm the Superior Court's judgment.
(2) This case began as a Justice of the Peace Court replevin action brought by Taylor against the Commissioner of the Department of Correction, the Warden of DCC, and three DCC employees. Taylor sought to recover two television sets and legal materials that he claimed were wrongfully taken by DCC in two shake-downs of his cell. In the alternative, Taylor sought reimbursement of the alleged monetary value of the items.
(3) Prior to trial in the Justice of the Peace Court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The motion was supported by affidavits and thus was treated as a motion for summary judgment. By order dated August 31, 1998, the court granted the defendants' motion, finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b).
Taylor v. Snyder, et al., Del. JP, C.A. No. JP9-PDCC-98C0003, Maybee, J. (Aug. 31, 1998). See also Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
(4) Taylor filed an appeal de novo to the Court of Common Pleas and sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis. By order dated October 21, 1998, the Court of Common Pleas denied Taylor's in forma pauperis motion and dismissed the appeal on the basis that the claims were legally frivolous. Specifically, the court determined that Taylor had provided insufficient evidence to support recovery in replevin and that the defendants had set forth substantial evidence that Taylor's possession of the seized items violated DCC's rules and regulations. The court determined that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred an award of monetary damages to Taylor.
Taylor v. Snyder, et al., Del. C.CP, C.A. No. JP9-PDCC-98C0003, Smalls, C.J. (Oct. 21, 1998). See also 10 Del. C. § 8803.
Taylor v. Snyder, et al., Del. C.CP, C.A. No. JP9-PDCC-98C0003, Smalls, C.J. (Oct. 21, 1998).
Id. See also 10 Del. C. § 4011(a).
(5) Taylor filed an appeal to the Superior Court. By order dated December 15, 1998, the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Common Pleas. This appeal followed.
Taylor v. Snyder, et al., Del. Super., C.A. No. 98A-11-009, Goldstein, J. 1998 WL 960754 (Dec. 15, 1998) (ORDER).
(6) In his opening brief on appeal, Taylor contends that the Court of Common Pleas judge was disqualified from considering Taylor's case because the judge was a former prosecutor who prosecuted Taylor in a matter unrelated to the action before the court. Taylor further contends that the Court of Common Pleas abused its discretion and committed error of law when it denied Taylor's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his appeal as legally frivolous. Taylor also alleges that the Justice of the Peace Court, Court of Common Pleas, and Superior Court deprived him of various rights under the federal and state constitutions.
(7) We have reviewed the record and well-settled Delaware law and are satisfied that there was no reason to question the impartiality of the Court of Common Pleas judge. A judge who served as a lawyer in a matter involving a litigant is not automatically disqualified from presiding as a judge over another unrelated matter involving the same litigant.
In re Wittrock, Del. Supr., 649 A.2d 1053 (1994). See also Del. Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3C(1) (1993).
(8) We also are satisfied that Taylor's appeal was properly dismissed as legally frivolous by the Court of Common Pleas. Replevin is a form of action for the recovery of personal property which has been taken or withheld from the owner unlawfully. The record reflects that the items seized from Taylor's cell were confiscated as non-dangerous contraband. Taylor's possession of the items was in violation of DCC's rules and regulations. Indeed, it appears from the record that, as to one television set and the books, Taylor pleaded guilty to the prison's disciplinary charges stemming from the shake-downs. As to the other television set, Taylor conceded that the set belonged to another inmate.
Harlan Hollingsworth Corp. v. McBride, et al., Del. Supr., 69 A.2d 9 (1949).
Taylor could not prove ownership of the television set. The "legal materials" that were allegedly confiscated were actually non-legal hardback books that exceeded the number of books authorized by the prison authorities.
Inmate housing rules prohibit inmates from exchanging, trading or bartering their personal property.
(9) As to all of Taylor's arguments on appeal, the Court has concluded that, to the extent the errors alleged on appeal are attributed to an abuse of discretion, the record does not support those assertions. To the extent the issues raised on appeal are legal, they are controlled by Delaware law, which was properly applied.
(10) Taylor's "Motion to Reserve Federal Constitutional Claims Related to State Law Claims Raised in the Present Proceedings" appears to be an inappropriate attempt by Taylor to avail himself of the procedure that entitles a litigant to reserve federal issues for decision in federal court. A so-called "England reservation" is typically available to litigants who are in state court involuntarily as a result of a remand by a federal court. An England reservation has no apparent applicability in this case.
See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, et al., 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Taylor's "Motion to Reserve Federal Constitutional Claims Related to State Law Claims Raised in the Present Proceedings" is DENIED. The appellees' motion to affirm is GRANTED. The decision of the Superior Court affirming the well-reasoned decision of the Court of Common Pleas, is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. NORMAN VEASEY
Chief Justice