Opinion
Case No. 02-3360-KHV
March 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Donnie Lamar Taylor brings suit pro se against Keith Schroeder, District Attorney for Reno County, Kansas, and Thomas Stanton, Assistant District Attorney for Reno County, Kansas. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff claims that defendants violated his constitutional rights by repeatedly charging him with crimes that he did not commit, withholding exculpatory information and refusing to dismiss charges after they learned that he was innocent. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his constitutional rights to (1) speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment; (2) due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) freedom from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants filed charges against him in retaliation for his complaints against them. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages of $1,000,000.00 plus punitive damages. This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Schroeder And Stanton's Motion To Dismiss (Doc. #23) filed October 17, 2003. For reasons stated below, the Court sustains defendants' motion.
In addition, plaintiff sued Jodi Holmes and Troy Hoover, police officers for Hutchinson, Kansas. Plaintiff later agreed to dismiss those claims. See Order (Doc. #19) filed September 12, 2003.
I. Legal Standards
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well pleaded facts in the amended complaint and views them in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990). The Court makes all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, and liberally construes the pleadings. Rule 8(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Lafoy v. HMO Colo., 988 F.2d 97, 98 (10th Cir. 1993). The Court may not dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Jacobs, Visconsi Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, Kan., 927 F.2d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 1991). Although plaintiff need not precisely state each element of his claims, he must plead minimal factual allegations on material elements that must be proved. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
The Court affords a pro se plaintiff some leniency and must liberally construe the complaint Oltremari v. Kan. Soc. Rehab. Serv., 871 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (D. Kan. 1994). While pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers, pro se litigants must follow the same procedural rules as other litigants. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980);Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992). The Court may not assume the role of advocate for uprose litigant.Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
II. Facts
Plaintiff alleges that defendants repeatedly charged him with crimes that he did not commit, did not honor his right to a speedy trial, and refused to dismiss charges after they knew he was innocent. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that defendants charged him with the following crimes:
A. Case No. 01CR897
On November 9, 2000, defendants charged plaintiff with burglary and theft. The person responsible for the crime was already incarcerated. A witness stated that he never saw plaintiff on or near the property. Defendants offered plaintiff a plea bargain which he refused. Eight months later, defendants dismissed the charges against plaintiff.
B. Case No. 01CR402
On May 4, 2001, defendants charged plaintiff with aggravated battery and criminal threat. Plaintiff had merely defended himself against a man who had hit him on the head with an 18-inch pipe. Defendants did not file charges against plaintiff's assailant.
C. Case No. 01CR1289
On December 7, 2001, plaintiff was arrested for rape and aggravated sodomy. Plaintiff agreed to DNA testing which showed a negative match between plaintiff and semen found on the victim's jeans. On December 14, 2001, defendants received the DNA test results, but they did not dismiss the charges against plaintiff. Defendants withheld the DNA test results until April 1, 2002, when the court ordered them released. Defendants subsequently offered plaintiff an unfair plea bargain, which plaintiff refused. On July 15, 2002, defendants agreed to dismiss the charges against plaintiff. Plaintiff remained in jail from December 7 to July 15, 2002. Defendants did not comply with plaintiff's right to a speedy trial.
D. Case No. 01CR1057
On February 4, 2002, plaintiff was arraigned for an incident which occurred on September 18, 2000. Plaintiff did not receive a trial until September 30, 2002, more than 58 days past the maximum time allowed by K.S.A. § 22-3402.
Plaintiff does not describe the incident. See Supplement To Complaint (Doc. #3) filed October 13, 2002.
E. Other Charges
Defendants also charged plaintiff with the following charges which they later dismissed:
(1) stolen guns, August 24, 2000 and October 12, 2000;
(2) disorderly conduct, August 10, 1999;
(3) public intoxication (no date listed);
(4) criminal threat and disorderly conduct, December 3, 1999;
(5) burglary, dismissed December 27, 2001;
(6) disorderly conduct and obstruction of justice (no date listed);
(7) public intoxication, August 24, 2002.
See Doc. #7 filed December 16, 2002.
III. Analysis
Defendants assert that they are entitled to absolute immunity on plaintiff's claims. The Court agrees. The law is well established that prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit under Section 1983 concerning activities which are "intimately associated with the judicial . . . process," such as initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions. Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1489 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409. 430-31 (1976)): see also Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115, 165 P. 663, 663 (1917). All of the acts which plaintiff alleges — that defendants charged him with crimes that he did not commit, withheld exculpatory information and refused to dismiss charges against him — are intimately associated with the judicial process and involve discretionary prosecutorial function. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2003): Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999). As such, defendants are absolutely immune from liability on plaintiff's claims. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Schroeder And Stanton's Motion To Dismiss (Doc. #23) filed October 17, 2003 be and hereby is SUSTAINED. Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants.
Defendants also argue that they were not properly served. Because plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, he is entitled to rely on the U.S. Marshal for service of the summons and complaint. See Rule 4(c)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Therefore, if defendants allege defects that cannot be blamed on plaintiff, as they do in this case, the Court will not dismiss the complaint but rather will instruct the Clerk's office and U.S. Marshal to correct the defects in service without dismissing the action. See Garland v. Kan. Dep't of Rev., No. 93-4241-SAC, 1994 WL 66614, at *1 n. 2 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 1994). The Court does not order re-service in this case because defendants are entitled to absolute immunity on plaintiff's claims.
In light of this ruling, the Court does not address defendants' arguments that (1) plaintiff cannot bring claims against them in their official capacities; (2) defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (3) plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion Requesting Summary Judgment (Amended Renewal) (Doc. #30) filed November 17, 2003 be and hereby is OVERRULED as moot. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Schroeder And Stanton's Second Motion To Strike (Doc. #39) filed December 5, 2003 be and hereby is OVERRULED as moot.
Defendants seek to strike plaintiff's motion for summary judgment for failure to comply with D. Kan. Rule 56.1.