Opinion
Civil Action 1:20-cv-327
02-04-2021
WILLIAM TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. KIADA NELSON, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, William Taylor, is a state prisoner who is serving a life sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. He has filed a civil rights Complaint (ECF No. 9) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he brings claims against Kiada Nelson, who was one of his co-defendants in his state criminal case. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss this action prior to service of the Complaint and without leave to amend in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
II. REPORT
The following background is from the facts alleged in the Complaint and attached Exhibits, including Exhibit A, which is the memorandum opinion and order of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County issued on August 25, 2020 in Plaintiff's most recent state collateral proceeding under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq. Additionally, an up-to-date version of the docket sheet for Plaintiff's state criminal case (docket number CP-22- CR-3352-2006) is available to the public online at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us and the Court takes judicial notice of it.
Plaintiff was convicted in 2008 in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and related firearm counts and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment on the first-degree murder conviction. (ECF No. 9, ¶¶ 6-8; Ex. A at 1-2). He is serving his sentence at SCI Smithfield, which is located in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. (Id., ¶ 3).
Defendant Nelson was one of Plaintiff's co-defendants in his state criminal case. She resides in Erie, Pennsylvania. (Id., ¶ 4; Ex. A at 3-5).
Plaintiff has challenged his judgment of sentence in state court on direct appeal and in subsequent collateral proceedings under the PCRA. None of his challenges have been successful. (Id., ¶¶ 9-13; Ex. A at 2).
Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that Defendant Nelson is withholding evidence of his innocence. He contends that he first learned of that fact during telephone conversations he had with her on February 10, 2020 and February 12, 2020. (Id., ¶¶ 15-17, 21). According to allegations in the Complaint, Defendant Nelson told Plaintiff “[t]hat he should not be in jail. That he did nothing wrong” (id., ¶ 21) and that he had “nothing to do with the criminal case in which [she] is a co-defendant” (id., ¶ 15).
On July 29, 2020 Plaintiff filed his most recent PCRA petition in state court. (Id., ¶ 18; Ex. A at 3). He asserted that his convictions were invalid because during his telephone conversations with Nelson on February 10, 2020 and February 12, 2020, she informed him for the first time that she pled guilty in 2007 to firearm charges in her criminal case. Plaintiff argued “that her pleading guilty proves that he is innocent of the crimes for which he stands convicted.” (Id., Ex. A at 3).
On August 25, 2020 the Court of Common Pleas issued a memorandum opinion and order advising Plaintiff of its intent to dismiss his PCRA petition because he filed it outside of the applicable one-year statute of limitations and “failed to plead and prove the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA” because he “should have been aware of the disposition of Ms. Nelson's case prior to the start of his trial.” (Id. at 4-5). The docket sheet for Plaintiff's state case indicates that the Court of Common Pleas issued its final order dismissing his PCRA petition on December 9, 2020.
Plaintiff initiated the instant civil rights action with this Court in November 2020 by filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1). He did not submit the required supporting documents and, therefore, the Court issued an order directing him to correct the deficiency. (ECF No. 2). Plaintiff subsequently filed the required documents in support of his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court granted that motion (ECF No. 8), and the Clerk of Court filed the Complaint (ECF No. 9).
Plaintiff asserts in the Complaint that his causes of action against Defendant Nelson, the sole defendant in this case, are authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343(a). (Id., ¶¶ 1, 4-5). He alleges that she is withholding evidence of his innocence and that, as a result, she is responsible for his wrongful imprisonment. He brings claims against Defendant Nelson for emotional distress (Count 1) and false imprisonment (Count 2). (Id., ¶¶ 20-37). As relief, Plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory damages (id., ¶¶ 26, 33), a declaration that Nelson's “acts and omissions” “violated his rights under the Constitution and law of the United States” (id., ¶ 34), injunctive relief directing that she give a written statement to the state court that contains the information she disclosed to him during their February 2020 telephone conversations (id., ¶ 32), and “[a]ny additional relief the Court deem[s] just, proper, and equitable” (id., ¶ 37).
B. Standard of Review
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), courts are required to screen complaints where, as is the case here, the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). It requires the Court to dismiss a complaint that, among other things, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint under the PLRA for failure to state a claim is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
During the screening the Court also shall consider jurisdictional-related questions and should dismiss the case if it determines that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed, in whole or in part, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). While “accept[ing] all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, ” the court “may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-11.
To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Though ‘detailed factual allegations' are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'” Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, the plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has substantive plausibility.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10 (2014).
To assess the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a court must take three steps: (1) outline the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief; (2) peel away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth; (3) look for well-pled factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). The court's plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfully pleaded, ” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant.
C. Discussion
“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state actors who violate an individual's rights under federal law.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 380 (2012) (emphasis added). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (emphasis added).
The allegations in the Complaint do not support a § 1983 claim against Defendant Nelson, who is a private citizen. Although Plaintiff alleges that she “acted under the color of state law” (id., ¶ 5), the Court may disregard that legal conclusion. None of the factual allegations in the Complaint permit the reasonable inference that she was acting under color of state law or that she is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents. See, e.g., West, 487 U.S. at 50 (“The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980); David W. Lee, Handbook of Section 1983 Litigation, § 1:04, Westlaw (database updated 2021). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under § 1983 against Defendant Nelson.
Additionally, the only discernable claims in the Complaint are state law claims for emotional distress and false imprisonment. The Court does not have jurisdiction over these claims because there is no diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and no other independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court dismiss the Complaint without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a state court action raising his state law claims against Defendant Nelson if he chooses to do so. However, the Court should not provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint in this federal action because it would be futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (when a deficient complaint is dismissed, the court must permit a curative amendment unless it would be futile).
III. CONCLUSION
It is respectfully recommended that this Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint without leave to amend. Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Plaintiff is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).