Opinion
6-27-1956
Virginia Bell TAYLOR, Charies R. Taylor, and Laurine R. Holibaugh, Plaintiffs, v. A. J. HAWKINSON, Defendant and Respondent. * Virginia Bell Tayior, Appellant. Civ. 21610.
N. E. Youngblood, Beverly Hills, and William R. Grant, Arcadia, for appellant. Wyman & Finell, Saul Grayson, Beverly Hills, for respondent.
Virginia Bell TAYLOR, Charies R. Taylor, and Laurine R. Holibaugh, Plaintiffs,
v.
A. J. HAWKINSON, Defendant and Respondent. *
Virginia Bell Tayior, Appellant.
June 27, 1956.
Hearing Granted Aug. 21, 1956.
N. E. Youngblood, Beverly Hills, and William R. Grant, Arcadia, for appellant.
Wyman & Finell, Saul Grayson, Beverly Hills, for respondent.
WHITE, Presiding Justice.
Appellant, her husband and her friend were the plaintiffs in the instant action growing out of the collision of defendant's automobile with an automobile registered in the name of appellant's husband and driven by a friend.
The trial by jury resulted in a verdict and judgment for all three plaintiffs, but the damages awarded to appellant for her personal injuries were inadequate. She alone moved for a new trial. At the time of the hearing of her motion for new trial, the judgment was not final as to any party. The motion was made on the following grounds: '1. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, in this that the compensation awarded was inadequate. 2. That said verdict and judgment are against the law, in that the compensation awarded was inadequate.' The order thereon is that 'the motion for a new trial as to plaintiff Virginia Bell Taylor only, * * * is granted on the grounds of (1) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict; and (2) the verdict and judgment are contrary to law and the evidence.'
Before the retrial, the judgment awarding to appellant's husband the cost of automobile repairs and to their friend who had been driving at the time of the accident damages for personal injuries became final.
The instant appeal is from a judgment for defendant upon the verdict of the jury on the retrial. It comes before us on an engrossed settled statement, from which the following is quoted:
'At the commencement of the trial of this matter, the plaintiff and appellant, through her counsel, contended that the issue of negligence was res judicata; that the only issue to be determined upon the retrial of this action was the nature and extent of personal injuries and damages sustained by the plaintiff, Virginia Bell Taylor, and the compensation to be awarded to her in connection therewith; that over the objection of the plaintiff and appellant, * * * the issue of negligence was * * * submitted to the jury, and after deliberation the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, A. J. Hawkinson.'
Appellant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict upon the theory of collateral estoppel and res judicata and for a new trial were denied.
Had a judgment in a previous action been in favor of defendant and against appellant's husband for the damage to their automobile, and had appellant's husband failed to appeal, defendant could not have been required to relitigate the issue of liability for the accident, since the Supreme Court, in Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 316, 202 P.2d 73, 74, 6 A.L.R.2d 461, 'concluded that the wife was in privity with her husband in the prior litigation and * * * the determination there is binding on' her.
In the Zaragosa case, supra, some months after the filing of the wife's action, the defendant, with leave of court, filed a supplemental answer alleging that the judgment against the husband had become final, 'constitutes an estoppel, and renders res judicata against plaintiff and in favor of defendant the issues of defendant's negligence, the husband's contributory negligence, and proximate cause, raised by the pleadings in each of the two actions.' The record in the husband's action was introduced over plaintiff's objection, and findings and judgment were for defendant. The reasoning of the Supreme Court there stated is that, the issues being identical, 'the remaining question is whether the wife * * * was a party or in privity with a party to the prior action'. It was then decided, that the wife, even when not named as a party to the action, is in privity with her husband and bound by the judgment against him.
Respondent argues that the facts in the instant action differ from those considered in the Zaragosa case, supra, in the following particulars: (1) The final judgment relied upon by appellant in the instant action is one rendered in the same action, while the Zaragosa case involved a judgment in a separate action filed by the husband about three weeks before the wife filed her action. (2) 'The automobile was the separate property of appellant's husband, as was the recovery of the damages thereto' in the instant action, while, in the Zaragosa case the judgment sought by the husband was community property. (3) Res Judicata and collateral estoppel were not pleaded in the instant action, as they were in the Zaragosa case.
Much of respondent's brief is concerned with the propriety of the granting of a new trial without limiting it to the issue of plaintiff's injuries and the damages to be awarded. Our decision hereafter stated makes it unnecessary to discuss that portion of respondent's brief.
The Engrossed Settled Statement is that 'In the prior trial of this action other plaintiffs procured a judgment against said defendant arising out of the identical collision, which judgment has become and is a final judgment'. Mr. Justice vallee, speaking for the District Court of Appeal, in a similar action, said: 'The two judgments were entered in the same action. There should have been only one judgment.' Briscoe v. Pacific E. Ry. Co., 89 Cal.App.2d 439, 441, 200 P.2d 875, 876. There are certain exceptions to the general rule that there can be but one final judgment in an action. Howe v. Key System Transit Co., 198 Cal. 525, 529, 246 P. 39; Nicholson v. Henderson, 25 Cal.2d 375, 379-380, 153 P.2d 945. However, while considering the instant appeal, because of the settled statement, we shall assume, without deciding, that the judgment in favor of plaintiff's husband and friend has become final.
'By virtue of the doctrine of res judicata, the final determination of a court of competent jurisdiction necessarily affirming the existence of any fact is conclusive evidence of the existence of that fact when it is again in issue in subsequent litigation between the same parties in the same or any other court. The facts decided in the first suit cannot be disputed or relitigated, although the later suit is upon a different cause of action. * * * The doctrine of res judicata has a double aspect. A former judgment operates as a bar against a second action upon the same cause, but, in a later action upon a different claim or cause of action, it operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action * * *'. Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 694-695, 28 P.2d 916, 918. In the last cited case, it was decided that where car damages were sought in the Municipal Court, judgment for defendant in that action was a conclusive adjudication of the questions of negligence and contributory negligence in the collision and an estoppel against recovery for personal injuries in a Superior Court action.
Public policy requires that litigation must come to an end. Therefore, final judgments are conclusive evidence of the facts determined by them. That the judgment is in the same (instead of another and different) action does not weaken its effect. Where the issues of negligence and contributory negligence in a certain collision have been tried and determined by a final judgment between the same parties or their privies, those issues cannot be relitigated.
The causes of action upon which appellant and her husband sought to recover in the instant action are presumed to be community property. Sec. 164, Civil Code. Respondent has pointed out nothing in the record, and by a careful examination we have found nothing therein, tending to overcome the presumption.
When a judgment is relied upon as a complete bar to the maintenance of another action, it should be pleaded. However, without pleading it, a judgment may be offered and should be admitted as conclusive evidence of the issues previously litigated by the parties or their privies.
The judgment relied upon by appellant was part of the record of the instant action, and the judge who was conducting the retrial was bound to take judicial notice of it when 'at the commencement of the trial * * * appellant * * * contended that the issue of negligence was res judicata; that the only issue to be determined upon the retrial * * * was the nature and extent of personal injuries and damages sustained by plaintiff, Virginia Bell Taylor, and the compensation to be awarded to her in connection therewith'.
Since an appeal cannot be taken from the verdict of the jury or the order denying a motion for new trial, the purported appeals from them are dismissed.
The judgment and the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are, and each is, reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial in accordance with the views herein expressed.
DORAN and FOURT, JJ., concur. --------------- * Opinion vacated 306 P.2d 797.