Pt. 4, 7, Taylor v. Elkins Home Show, Inc., 558 S.E.2d 611, 613 (W.Va. 2001).

This Court has previously held that "a trial court has plenary power to reconsider, revise, alter, or amend an interlocutory order. . . ." Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Taylor v. Elkins Home Show, Inc., 210 W. Va. 612, 558 S.E.2d 611 (2001). Thus, when pertaining to interlocutory orders, motions to reconsider "`do not necessarily fall within any specific . . . Rule.

. . . [A] trial court has plenary power to reconsider, revise, alter, or amend an interlocutory order. . . ." Syl. pt. 2, in part, Taylor v. Elkins Home Show, Inc., 210 W. Va. 612, 558 S.E.2d 611 (2001). Therefore, State Farm Mutual's and State Farm Indemnity's "motion[s] may best be `viewed as a routine request for reconsideration of an interlocutory . . . decision Such requests do not necessarily fall within any specific . . . Rule.

However, the question of whether an order granting a new trial was appealable was not before this Court. In the case of Taylor v. Elkins Home Show, Inc., 210 W. Va. 612, 558 S.E.2d 611 (No. 28891, Oct. 30, 2001), the plaintiff had won a jury verdict on August 18, 1999, and the defendant (Elkins Home Show, Inc.) filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. On October, 18, 1999, the circuit court denied that motion, but instead granted the defendant a new trial.

56 . Syllabus Point 2, in part, Taylor v. Elkins Home Show, Inc., 210 W.Va. 612 , 558 S.E.2d 611 (2001).

We note that the circuit court retains plenary power to reconsider, alter, or amend a non-final order, such as its August 26, 2013, order determining that the will's residuary clause does not create a trust. See Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Taylor v. Elkins Home Show, Inc., 210 W.Va. 612, 614, 558 S.E.2d 611, 613 (2001). Thus, we find that petitioner is free to continue to argue that her interpretation of the residuary clause should be accorded deference as long as that interpretation is neither inconsistent with the clause's language nor contrary to law.

’ Syllabus Point 4, in part, Sammons Bros. Const. Co. v. Elk Creek Coal Co., 135 W.Va. 656, 65 S.E.2d 94 (1951).” Taylor v. Elkins Home Show, Inc., 210 W.Va. 612, 619, 558 S.E.2d 611, 618 (2001). The petitioners' counsel made this same representation during the summary judgment hearing.

As to petitioner's argument that the family court had earlier determined in a June 9, 2009 order that he had only a moral obligation to assist in paying the funeral expenses, the Court notes that nothing in the 2009 order indicates that it was a final order and, therefore, the family court had plenary authority to reconsider its decision in the May 18, 2012 order. See Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Taylor v. Elkins Home Show, Inc., 210 W.Va. 612, 558 S.E.2d 611 (2001) ("[A] trial court has plenary power to reconsider, revise, alter, or amend an interlocutory order[.]"). After careful consideration, this Court concludes that petitioner's appeal is wholly without merit.

Notwithstanding all the above, it is further noted that Mr. Hill's claims would also likely fail simply because of the extreme difficulty of proof, both as to whether election fraud activities changed the outcome of an election held ten years prior to such suit being filed and whether Mr. Hill sustained any damages as a result of Mr. Stowers's alleged vote-buying activities. "`The general rule with regard to proof of damages is that such proof cannot be sustained by mere speculation or conjecture.' Syllabus Point 1, Spencer v. Steinbrecher, 152 W. Va. 490, 164 S.E.2d 710 (1968)." Syllabus Point 6, Taylor v. Elkins Home Show, Inc., 210 W. Va. 612, 558 S.E.2d 611 (2001). In this case, Mr. Hill is claiming that he is entitled to the salary and benefits he would have received had he won the 1996 election for the Circuit Clerk of Lincoln County.

We may reverse the denial of such a motion only if reasonable persons could not have reached the conclusion that the jury embraced."). Cf Taylor v. Elkins Home Show, Inc., 210 W. Va. 612, 616, 558 S.E.2d 611, 615 (2001) ("`We apply a de novo standard of review to the grant . . . of a . . . post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law. After considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant party, we will sustain the granting or denial of a . . . post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law when only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict can be reached.'") (quoting Gillingham v. Stephenson, 209 W. Va. 741, 745, 551 S.E.2d 663, 667 (2001)).