Opinion
C. A. 22-1012-TLW-PJG
03-30-2022
Thomas Leon Taylor, Plaintiff, v. Daily, Captain; Hinson, Sgt.; K. Burnham, Doctor; Pucket, Nurse; Serenty, Classification Caseworker; Ms. Amason, Notary Republic, Admis. Asst; Wright, Law Librarian; Elaine Miller, Grievance Coordinator, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This civil action was severed from Civil Action No. 0:22-256-TLW-PJG. Plaintiff Thomas Leon Taylor, a self-represented state prisoner, brings claims against the defendants listed in the caption above pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that this action should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff is an inmate in the Kershaw Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). SCDC officials imposed disciplinary sanctions on Plaintiff that included placing him in the Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”) on September 28, 2021.
Defendants Daily and Hinson are the officials who oversee the RHU. Plaintiff claims Daily conspired to retaliate against Plaintiff by depriving him of access to the law library on two different occasions. Plaintiff alleges that on one occasion, Daily provided Plaintiff an uncharged tablet, which prevented Plaintiff from performing legal research or accessing institutional policies or records. Plaintiff alleges Hinson is responsible for ensuring that the tablets are charged. Plaintiff also alleges that Daily regularly failed to provide Plaintiff with forms that Plaintiff requested. Plaintiff further alleges that Hinson retaliated against him by not allowing Plaintiff to utilize the law library. Plaintiff also claims Daily allowed an inmate worker to tamper with Plaintiff's food. (Compl., ECF No. 2 at 25-26.)
Plaintiff suffers from numerous but unidentified aches, pains, and ailments and has submitted numerous requests to the medical staff. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Burnham, the prison doctor, has only visited him once in the RHU and ordered medication for Plaintiff that never arrived. Plaintiff also indicates that he is scheduled to see the doctor again in the future. Plaintiff claims Defendant Pucket, a nurse, refused to take his vital signs when he was feeling ill on the second day of his five-day hunger strike or when he was placed on suicide watch on the third day of the strike. (Compl., ECF No. 2 at 27, 56-57.)
Plaintiff claims Defendant Serenty, the RHU classification case worker, failed to provide Plaintiff a hearing on protective custody measures despite knowing that Plaintiff was a victim of sexual assault by staff. Plaintiff claims that Serenty instead scheduled a hearing about Plaintiff's security classification. Plaintiff claims that prison policy requires that protective measures be used in his situation, though SCDC determined that Plaintiff's assertions of sexual assault were unfounded (to which Plaintiff disagrees). Plaintiff alleges that Serenty never provided Plaintiff with a review of his classification or provided documents explaining how his classification was decided. (Compl., ECF No. 2 at 51-52.)
Plaintiff claims Defendant Amason, an administrative assistant in the prison, did not notarize his legal documents for three weeks, delaying Plaintiff's attempt to mail the documents to legal aid organizations. Plaintiff also claims that Amason prevented his staff request forms from reaching the proper staff members and she returned the forms to him with a label stating that the forms were rejected. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Wright, the law librarian, was supposed to make copies of legal documents for Plaintiff but never returned the documents to him, denying Plaintiff access to the courts. (Compl., ECF No. 2 at 28, 60-61).
Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Miller, the grievance coordinator, returned twenty grievances to Plaintiff without processing them in a conspiracy hide the purported abuses of SCDC staff. (Compl., ECF No. 2 at 58-59).
Plaintiff brings this action against the defendants for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff raises numerous causes of action, but most notably, he claims the defendants failed to protect him from sexual harassment and were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, denied him access to the courts in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and retaliated against him for complaining about sexual harassment.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff lists numerous claims against each defendant, though most are clearly not cognizable or they are unsupported by his own allegations. Therefore, in light of the court's duty to liberally construe pro se pleadings, but remaining faithful to actual causes of action raised by Plaintiff, the court construes the Complaint as asserting claims of failure to protect and deliberate indifference to medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, denial of access to courts in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and retaliation.
For instance, Plaintiff lists state law tort claims against most of the defendants, but those claims would have to be brought pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, see S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a), which must be brought originally in state court. See, e.g., Gaskins v. South Carolina, C/A No. 8:15-4456-JMC-JDA, 2016 WL 8677201, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2016) (observing that a claim sought to be filed initially in federal court under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act “is not permitted in this federal court because of the Eleventh Amendment”), adopted by 2016 WL 3207855 (D.S.C. June 10, 2016); cf Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 622 (2002) (holding that a State that voluntarily invokes the jurisdiction of the federal court by removing a case waives immunity for claims in which it has consented to suit in its own courts). As another example, Plaintiff lists claims of conspiracy and discrimination, but Plaintiff does not make any allegations that could plausibly show that the defendants violated Plaintiff's rights by conspiring or discriminating against him. See generally A Soc'y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011) (“We have specifically rejected section 1985 claims whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory manner, in the absence of concrete supporting facts.”) (quoting Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995)); and Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 653-54 (4th Cir. 2001) (“To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.”). Therefore, as to any claims Plaintiff lists that are not addressed by this Report and Recommendation, the court concludes that Plaintiff fails to allege facts that could plausibly state a claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
1. Failure to Protect
Plaintiff claims Defendants Daily, Hinson, and Serenty failed to protect him from other inmates and staff members. Plaintiff claims Daily and Hinson allowed an inmate worker to tamper with Plaintiff's food. Plaintiff also claims that Serenty failed to provide him with protective custody measures following Plaintiff's claim that a staff member sexually assaulted him.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To proceed with his claim under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) objectively, the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted was “sufficiently serious,” and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). “These requirements spring from the text of the amendment itself; absent intentionality, a condition imposed on an inmate cannot properly be called ‘punishment,' and absent severity, such punishment cannot be called ‘cruel and unusual.' ” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1991)). “What must be established with regard to each component ‘varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.' ” Williams, 77 F.3d at 761 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)).
The claims raised by Plaintiff here are generally considered “failure to protect” claims. See Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 97 (4th Cir. 2017) (“The deliberate indifference standard generally applies to cases alleging failures to safeguard the inmate's health and safety, including failing to protect inmates from attack ....”). For such claims, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that an inmate must show that he was subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm and the defendants had actual knowledge of an excessive risk to the inmate's safety or that the risk was obvious. See Raynor v. Pugh, 817 F.3d 123, 128 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The defendant must ‘be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.' ”) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Here, Plaintiff fails to provide any facts that could plausibly show that Daily or Hinson were aware that another inmate might tamper with Plaintiff's food, nor does Plaintiff provide any facts that would explain how another inmate tampering with his food caused a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not provide any explanation about what the other inmate did to his food. As to Serenty, Plaintiff fails to provide any facts that would plausibly show that the staff member who purportedly assaulted him posed a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff in the RHU. Plaintiff alleges the assault happened when the female staff member saw Plaintiff undressed in the shower before he was assigned to RHU, but Plaintiff provides no facts that would show there was a known risk that such an incident could have occurred in the RHU, or that the protective custody measures Serenty could have implemented would have prevented such an incident. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for failure to protect upon which relief can be granted against these defendants.
2. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Plaintiff claims Defendants Burnham and Pucket were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Plaintiff claims Burnham visited him only once in the RHU and ordered medication that did not arrive. Plaintiff claims Pucket did not take his vital signs when he went on a hunger strike and was placed in crisis intervention.
Deliberate indifference by prison personnel to a prisoner's medical needs is actionable under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution under the same deliberate indifference test identified above. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). Therefore, the plaintiff must demonstrate that subjectively, the officer knew of and disregarded an objectively serious medical need. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). Not “every claim by a prisoner [alleging] that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. To establish deliberate indifference, the treatment “must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990). Mere negligence, malpractice, or incorrect diagnosis is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
Here, Plaintiff does not explain what illness he had or what injuries he received as a result of the purported lack of medical treatment from Burnham or Pucket. Therefore, he fails to plausibly allege that he had a serious medical need that, objectively, amounted to a substantial risk of harm. See Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (defining a “serious medical need” as “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”) (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir.1999)). Even assuming Plaintiff can meet the objective component, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that the Burnham disregarded Plaintiff's medical needs. Plaintiff alleges Burnham provided him treatment and prescribed medications, though the medications never arrived. Plaintiff provides no facts that would plausibly show that Burnham was the cause of the medications not arriving. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim upon which relief can be granted against these defendants.
3. Access to Courts
Plaintiff claims Defendants Daily, Hinson, Amason, and Wright denied Plaintiff access to the courts. Plaintiff alleges Daily and Hinson provided him with an uncharged tablet on one occasion, Daily refused to provide him with unidentified forms, Amason delayed his legal mail by not notarizing some documents, and Wright did not return legal papers to him.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment inmates have a “fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts [that] requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 828 (1977). Legal access programs need not include any particular element, and law libraries are only one constitutionally acceptable method, the alternatives to which could include legal service programs, but any program must be evaluated as a whole to ascertain its compliance with constitutional standards. Id. at 832-33. A legal access program need only make available the tools inmates require to attack their sentences and challenge the conditions of their confinement, and any other impairment of their litigating capacity is an incidental consequence of conviction and incarceration. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996).
To raise a claim that a prisoner has been unconstitutionally denied access to the courts, the plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996). Rather, he must show actual injury or prejudice resulting from the official conduct, specifically, that the alleged deficiency in the legal access program hindered his effort to pursue his legal claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Cochran, 73 F.3d at 1317 (citing Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1384 (4th Cir. 1993)).
Here, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege any actual injury or prejudice from the defendants' actions. Plaintiff makes no allegation that any of the defendants' actions prevented him from filing legal documents, contacting legal counsel, or completing necessary legal research. Plaintiff's allegations at most amount to isolated instances of not being able to complete research or send legal mail at his convenience, but they do not plausibly show that his actual access to the court system has been impacted. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for denial of access to the court upon which relief can be granted against these defendants.
4. Retaliation
Plaintiff claims that many of the defendants' actions are in retaliation of Plaintiff's reporting that another SCDC staff member sexually assaulted Plaintiff. To state a colorable retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege he engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the defendant took some action that adversely affected the plaintiff's constitutional right, and there was a causal relationship between his protected activity and the defendant's conduct. Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.23d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2017). “It is not enough to show that an official acted with a retaliatory motive and that the plaintiff was injured-the motive must cause the injury. Specifically, it must be a ‘but-for' cause, meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S.Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019) (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)).
Here, Plaintiff's assertion that the defendants' actions were retaliatory are conclusory and unsupported by specific facts. Plaintiff provides no facts that would establish a connection between the defendants' conduct and Plaintiff s reporting of sexual assault. Cf Martin, 858 F.3d at 250 (finding the plaintiff plausibly stated a retaliation claim by alleging that the defendant took adverse action against him the day after the Plaintiff filed a grievance). Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a retaliation claim upon which relief can be granted.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that this action be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).