Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 01-2228-GTV.
October 23, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Steven Taylor brings this action alleging that defendants Cramer, Inc. ("Cramer"), Bette Choate ("Choate"), Gary Rubin ("Rubin") and Linda Collins ("Collins") discriminated against him based on his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). The matter is before the court on defendants' motions to dismiss (Docs. 8, 18.). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motions are granted in part and denied in part.
Defendant Cramer filed its motion to dismiss on June 8, 2001 (Doc. 8). Defendants Choate, Rubin and Collins collectively filed their motion to dismiss on July 30, 2001 (Doc. 18) after plaintiff verified to the court that he was in fact naming Choate, Rubin and Collins as defendants in this action. Despite their different filing dates, the substance of the two motions is identical.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was terminated from his employment at Cramer on January 11, 2001, after a female co-worker, defendant Choate, accused him of sexual harassment. Plaintiff claims that defendant Choate's accusations were false, but that plaintiff's supervisors, defendants Rubin and Collins, accepted Choate's allegations as true without conducting an investigation and without giving plaintiff an opportunity to defend himself. Plaintiff alleges that the actions taken against him, including the termination of his employment, were impermissibly based on his race, African-American, in violation of Title VII.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARDS
Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will be granted only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is unable to prove any set of facts entitling him to relief under his theory of recovery. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). "All well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken as true." Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). The court must view all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and the pleadings must be liberally construed. Id. (citation omitted). The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether the plaintiff may offer evidence to support his claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court affords him more leniency in construing his complaint. See Asselin v. Shawnee Mission Med. Ctr., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1479, 1484 (D.Kan. 1995) (citation omitted). The court may not, however, assume the role of advocate for plaintiff simply because he is proceeding pro se. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Although not required to precisely state each and every element of his claim, plaintiff must at least advance minimal factual allegations on the material elements of his claim to survive defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Miller v. Brungardt, 904 F. Supp. 1215, 1217 (D.Kan. 1995) (citing Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants advance two arguments in support of their motions to dismiss. First, defendants argue that plaintiff's claims against defendants Choate, Rubin and Collins should be dismissed because Title VII does not provide for individual liability against co-workers and supervisors. Second, defendants argue that plaintiff's race discrimination claim should be dismissed against all defendants because plaintiff failed to properly plead "intentional discrimination" in his complaint.
A. Individual Liability Under Title VII
First, defendants argue that because Title VII does not provide for individual liability, plaintiff's claims against defendants Choate, Rubin and Collins should be dismissed. The court agrees.
The Tenth Circuit shares the majority view that suits against individuals are inappropriate under Title VII. Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir. 1996). According to the Haynes court, "statutory liability is appropriately borne by employers, not individual supervisors." Id. at 901 (emphasis added). Therefore, because plaintiff cannot state a claim under Title VII against his supervisors or co-workers, plaintiff's claims against defendants Choate, Rubin, and Collins are dismissed.
B. Sufficiency of Title VII Allegations
Second, defendants argue that plaintiff's race discrimination claim should be dismissed against all defendants because plaintiff failed to properly plead "intentional discrimination" in his complaint. The court disagrees.
Because the court has already dismissed plaintiff's claims against defendants Choate, Rubin and Collins, the court considers defendants' second argument only with respect to defendant Cramer.
As noted, Rule 12(b)(6) requires the court to accept plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as true and view all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Swanson, 750 F.2d at 813 (citation omitted). In this case, plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he was disparately treated because of his race in violation of Title VII when, after failing to conduct a proper investigation into a sexual harassment complaint lodged against plaintiff, defendant Cramer terminated plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff elaborates on this allegation in his response to defendants' motions to dismiss (Doc. 19) by further alleging that defendant Cramer violated its employment policies by terminating his employment without first giving him a warning and that defendant Cramer did not deal with other employees in such a "punitive" fashion. Accepting plaintiff's allegations as true, the court finds plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The court therefore denies defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's race discrimination claim against defendant Cramer.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court typically limits its review to the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint alone. However, the court is permitted to consider representations made in a pro se plaintiff's brief to clarify allegations contained in his complaint. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 230 n. 10 (2000).
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that defendants' motions to dismiss (Docs. 8, 18) are granted in part and denied in part. The court grants defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's claims against defendants Choate, Rubin and Collins. The court denies defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's race discrimination claim against defendant Cramer.
Copies of this order shall be transmitted to pro se plaintiff Steven Taylor and counsel of record for defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.