Taylor v. Coburn

4 Citing cases

  1. Stepson v. Brand

    58 So. 2d 18 (Miss. 1952)   Cited 11 times
    In Stepson v. Brand, 213 Miss. 826, 58 So.2d 18 (1952), it was held that a policy of life insurance may be made the subject of a valid parol gift provided all of the essential elements of a gift are present and, moreover, the power to change the beneficiary may itself be the subject of a gift.

    s. 527, 62 L.R.A. 982, 99 Am. St. Rep. 1004, 95 N.W. 948; Security Life Ins. Co. v. Brunson, 170 So. 824; Comfort v. Smith, 21 So.2d 584; Thompson v. Thompson, 2nd How. Reports 737; Pace v. Pace, 65 So. 273; Carradine v. Collins, 7 S. M. 428; Harmon v. McFarlane, 99 So. 566; Johnson v. Guice, 106 So. 271; Carradine v. Carradine, 58 Miss. 286; Wheatly v. Abbott, 32 Miss. 343; McWillie v. Omen Van Vacter, 35 Miss. 428; Kellog v. King, 75 So. 134; Garner v. Townes, 100 So. 20; McDonald et al. v. McDonald, 102 So. 38, 110 So. 291; Phillips v. Phillips, 198 So. 132; Jennings v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 22 So.2d 319; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 51 So.2d 13; West End Savings Bank v. Goodwin, 135 So. 167; Miller v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 3 So.2d 519, 12 So.2d 127; Shannahan v. Shannahan, 173 So. 902; First National Bank of Cumberland v. Liberty Trust Co., 134 A. 210, 47 A.L.R. 730; Thompson v. Thompson, 226 S.W. 350; Peel v. Raibel, 286 N.W. 345; Koch v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 5 P.2d 313; Taylor v. Coburn, 162 S.E. 748; Brassell v. Estate, 63 Pa. Super. 545; Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Sailor, 47 F.2d 911; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Haggerty, 109 N.J. Eq. 663, 158 A. 524; Nashville Trust Co. v. Williams, 15 Tenn. App. 445; Crittenden v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Mich. 442, 2 N.W. 657; McEwen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 P. 373; Shoudy v. Shoudy, 203 P. 433; 37 C.J., Sec. 146, p. 435, Sec. 345, p. 579, Sec. 349, p. 579; Couch on Insurance, Book 6, Sec. 1458; 29 Am. Jur., Secs. 508, 509, 511; 47 A.L.R. 738. Matthew Harper, Jr., for appellee.

  2. State v. Weinstein

    224 N.C. 645 (N.C. 1944)   Cited 39 times
    In S. v. Weinstein (1944), 224 N.C. 645, 31 S.E.2d 920, 156 A.L.R. 625; certiorari denied, 324 U.S. 849, 89 L.Ed. 1410, 65 S.Ct. 689, the defendant was indicted for larceny and for receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen.

    Newman v. Bost, 122 N.C. 524, 29 S.E. 848; Bynum v. Bank, 219 N.C. 109, 12 S.E.2d 898; Bynum v. Bank, 221 N.C. 101, 19 S.E.2d 121. While the delivery may be actual or constructive, the donor's surrender of the property must be complete and his control relinquished. Parker v. Mott, 181 N.C. 435, 107 S.E. 500; Taylor v. Coburn, 202 N.C. 324, 162 S.E. 748; 24 Am. Jur., 742. Applying these principles, we think the evidence here, in the light most favorable for the State, tends to show relinquishment of possession and control of the property by the donors, with intent to give, by placing it off the donors' premises on the street where designated by the donee, and that this was for the purpose of completing the gift and delivering possession of the property to the Junior Chamber of Commerce. Under these circumstances we think this would evidence a divesting of the title to the property on the part of the donors, and vesting title thereto in the donee. Nor would acceptance by the donee have to be manifested by immediate possession if a later time therefor had been fixed and agreed upon by the parties.

  3. Redden v. Prudential Life Insurance Co.

    258 N.W. 300 (Minn. 1935)   Cited 7 times

    In the instant case the complete and absolute surrender of all power and dominion over the policy is clearly shown by the delivery of the key to the receptacle containing the policy, with the "pass book" and rent receipts for the box; and the intention of the insured to part absolutely with all title to the policy is not only inferable from the facts just stated but also from his subsequent conduct in not paying the subsequent weekly premiums on the policy or the subsequent annual rent for the safe deposit box. To the authorities already cited may be added Prudential Ins. Co. v. Deyerberg, 101 N.J. Eq. 90, 137 A. 785; Taylor v. Coburn, 202 N.C. 324, 162 S.E. 748; McGlynn v. Curry, 82 App. Div. 431, 81 N.Y. S. 855; Opitz v. Karel, 118 Wis. 527, 95 N.W. 948, 62 L.R.A. 982, 99 A.S.R. 1004; Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Dunne (D.C.) 2 F. Supp. 165. That there was a consideration received for the policy should not make the transfer thereof less effective than if a pure gift. Defendant cites Steele v. Gatlin, 115 Ga. 929, 42 S.E. 253, 59 L.R.A. 129, where the court places the decision on the ground that the Georgia code requires an assignment of a life insurance policy to be in writing. Weaver v. Weaver, 182 Ill. 287, 55 N.E. 338, 74 A.S.R. 173, was decided upon a fact not present in the case at bar.

  4. Huskins v. Huskins

    517 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that decedent's mailing of the combinations to a safe to a third person with a letter stating that the contents of the safe should go to decedent's wife did not constitute adequate delivery prior to the decedent's death

    Courts v. Annie Penn Memorial Hospital, 111 N.C. App. 134, 138-39, 431 S.E.2d 864, 866 (1993) (citations omitted). Delivery of a gift may be "actual, constructive, or symbolic," therefore, there is no absolute rule as to the sufficiency of a delivery which is applicable to all cases. Taylor v. Coburn, 202 N.C. 324, 326, 162 S.E. 748, 749 (1932). Indeed, "[t]he delivery must be as perfect and as complete as the nature of the property and attendant circumstances will permit. . . . If actual delivery is impracticable, then there must be some act equivalent to it; it is not necessary that there be a manual delivery, or an actual tradition from hand to hand. . . ."