Opinion
3:23-cv-58-M-BN
04-05-2023
EZEKIEL I. TAYLOR, SR., Dall. Cnty. Bookin No. 22049385, Plaintiff, v. CLAY COOLEY AUTO GROUP, ET AL., Defendants.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DAVID L. HORAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Ezekiel I. Taylor, Sr., then an inmate at the Dallas County jail, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two businesses and two individuals, alleging that they violated his civil rights and the Sherman Act.
United States District Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn referred the complaint to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
And, after reviewing the complaint, the undersigned questions whether there is subject matter jurisdiction and, given the circumstances of this case, enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
These findings and conclusions provide Taylor notice as to the jurisdictional deficiencies. And the ability to file objections to the undersigned's recommendation that this case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (further explained below) offers Taylor an opportunity to establish (if possible) that the Court does indeed have subject matter jurisdiction.
Legal Standards
“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,' possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.'” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)); see also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007) (“Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider.”); Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.”).
They must therefore “presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). Correspondingly, all federal courts have an independent duty to examine their own subject matter jurisdiction. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 58384 (1999) (“Subject-matter limitations ... keep the federal courts within the bounds the Constitution and Congress have prescribed. Accordingly, subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level.” (citations omitted)).
Taylor chose to file this lawsuit in federal court and, by doing so, undertook the burden to establish federal jurisdiction. See Butler v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 762 Fed.Appx. 193, 194 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“[A]ssertions [that] are conclusory [ ] are insufficient to support [an] attempt to establish subject-matter jurisdiction.” (citing Evans v. Dillard Univ., 672 Fed.Appx. 505, 505-06 (5th Cir. 2017) (per cuiam); Jeanmarie v. United States, 242 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2001))).
And, if Taylor does not, this lawsuit must be dismissed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
Because federal jurisdiction is not assumed, “the basis upon which jurisdiction depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly and cannot be established argumentatively or by mere inference.” Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.A., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 636 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Because federal courts have limited jurisdiction, parties must make ‘clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations' in their pleadings.” (quoting Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1259)).
Under their limited jurisdiction, federal courts generally may only hear a case if it involves a question of federal law or where diversity of citizenship exists between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
In cases invoking jurisdiction under Section 1332, each plaintiff's citizenship must be diverse from each defendant's citizenship, and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (b).
This amount “is determined by the amount of damages or the value of the property that is the subject of the action.” Celestine v. TransWood, Inc., 467 Fed.Appx. 317, 319 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977)).
And “[f]or diversity purposes, state citizenship is synonymous with domicile. A change in domicile requires: ‘(1) physical presence at the new location and (2) an intention to remain there indefinitely.'” Dos Santos v. Belmere Ltd. P'ship, 516 Fed.Appx. 401, 403 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem'l Med. Ctr., 485 F.3d 793, 797-98 (5th Cir. 2007) (“In determining diversity jurisdiction, the state where someone establishes his domicile serves a dual function as his state of citizenship.... Domicile requires the demonstration of two factors: residence and the intention to remain.” (citing Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954))).
“The basis for diversity jurisdiction must be ‘distinctly and affirmatively alleged.'” Dos Santos, 516 Fed.Appx. at 403 (quoting Mullins v. TestAmerica, Inc., 564 F.3d 386, 397 (5th Cir. 2009)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has therefore held “that a ‘failure to adequately allege the basis for diversity jurisdiction mandates dismissal.'” Id. (quoting Stafford v. Mobil Oil Corp., 945 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1991)).
Under Section 1331, federal question jurisdiction “exists when ‘a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.'” Borden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)); see also In re Hot-Hed Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2007) (“A federal question exists ‘if there appears on the face of the complaint some substantial, disputed question of federal law.'” (quoting Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1995))).
The “‘creation' test ... accounts for the vast bulk of suits under federal law.” Gunn, 568 U.S. at 257 (citation omitted). But
“a federal court [is also] able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.” That is to say, “federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”Perez v. Se. SNF, L.L.C., No. 21-50399, 2022 WL 987187, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2022) (per curiam) (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005), then Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258).
Discussion
Taylor fails to adequately allege a basis for diversity jurisdiction under Section 1332, and the complaint reflects that all defendants are likely Texas residents.
Turning to Section 1331, no facts alleged raise a substantial, disputed question of federal law. Nor do the well-pleaded allegations reflect that there is federal jurisdiction over a state law claim.
“The applicable test for determining jurisdiction on the face of the pleadings is not whether the plaintiffs could actually recover, but whether the federal claim alleged is so patently without merit as to justify the district court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction.” Suthoff v. Yazoo Cnty. Indus. Dev. Corp., 637 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978)). Put another way, “[s]ome claims are ‘so insubstantial, implausible, ... or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.'” Atakapa Indian de Creole Nation v. Louisiana, 943 F.3d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty., 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)).
And “a complaint that alleges the existence of a frivolous or insubstantial federal question is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction in a federal court.” Raymon v. Alvord Indep. Sch. Dist., 639 F.2d 257, 257 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) (citing Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir. 1977); Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1974)); see also Southpark Square Ltd. v. City of Jackson, Miss., 565 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (a claim “must be more than frivolous to support federal question jurisdiction”).
In the context of Section 1983, federal question jurisdiction cannot be obtained by merely citing the statute, particularly where the facts alleged fail to reveal how a private individual or entity (such as a car dealer) acted under color of law.
That is, “[a] plaintiff makes out a § 1983 claim if he ‘shows a violation of the Constitution or of federal law, and then shows that the violation was committed by someone acting under color of state law.'” Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 293-94 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up; quoting Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2008)). “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'” Gomez v. Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting, in turn, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941))).
So, where a complaint cites Section 1983 but a plaintiff's facts do not demonstrate that a defendant acted under color of state law, a plaintiff cannot establish subject matter jurisdiction under Section 1331. See Mitchell v. Clinkscales, 253 Fed.Appx. 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[A]lthough Mitchell argues that Clinkscales is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mitchell does not allege facts demonstrating that Clinkscales acted under color of state law; thus, Mitchell failed to plead and establish subject-matter jurisdiction based on the existence of a federal question. The district court was required to dismiss the complaint.” (citation omitted)); see also Harrington v. City of Shiner, Tex., No. 6:20-cv-00039, 2021 WL 4503013, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2021) (“Harrington failed, not in stating conclusory or vague facts to support his Section 1983 claim, but in showing that the Section 1983 claim was not frivolous, insubstantial, or patently without merit given the facts that he did allege. Thus, the district court concluded that the claim did not raise a federal question given the lack of a foundation for the Section 1983 claim - that is, an alleged constitutional rights violation - as well as the lack of any factual allegations that could even imply the applicability of the statute.” (discussing prior dismissal by the court; citations omitted)). Cf. Smith v. U.S. Air Force, 566 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“Nowhere in his complaint, or elsewhere in the record, did appellant allege discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, a prerequisite to relief under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. Accordingly, this statute did not furnish the court below with subject matter jurisdiction.”).
And, insofar as the citation to the Sherman Act is more than a throw away, Taylor's complaint lacks facts to invoke federal question jurisdiction under that statute:
[J]urisdiction may not be invoked under that statute unless the relevant aspect of interstate commerce is identified; it is not sufficient merely to rely on identification of a relevant local activity and to presume an interrelationship with some unspecified aspect of interstate commerce. To establish jurisdiction a plaintiff must allege the critical relationship in the pleadings and if these allegations are controverted must proceed to demonstrate by submission of evidence beyond the pleadings either that the defendants' activity is itself in interstate commerce or, if it is local in nature, that it has an effect on some other appreciable activity demonstrably in interstate commerce.McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980) (citations omitted).
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).