Opinion
C/A No. 3:20-1275-JFA-PJG
10-22-2020
Carolyn Yvonne Murphy Taylor, Plaintiff, v. City of Columbia; Teresa Wilson, City Manager; David Hatcher, Chief Code Enforcement Officer; Stacy Harris, Code Enforcement Officer, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Carolyn Yvonne Murphy Taylor filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 18.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if she failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion. (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 39.) Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court recommends that the defendants' motion be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff paid the filing fee in this action.
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are taken as true for purposes of resolving the defendants' motion to dismiss. On April 4, 2018, Plaintiff was served by City of Columbia Code Enforcement Officer Stacy Harris with summonses for five violations of City of Columbia ordinances related to the upkeep of Plaintiff's property. At her initial court appearance, Plaintiff requested a jury trial for all five charges, which was scheduled for September 25, 2018 in the City of Columbia Municipal Court. On the morning of the trial, Harris inspected Plaintiff's property and found that Plaintiff had abated three of five the purported violations, which were nolle prosequied. A fourth violation for failure to maintain exterior property in a clean and sanitary condition was nolle prosequied in court before the trial started. The remaining violation was for Plaintiff's 1976 Chevy van that was parked on Plaintiff's property. See International Property Maintenance Code ("IPMC") § 302.8 (as adopted by City of Columbia Code of Ordinances § 5-15). Harris asked Plaintiff if she wanted more time to move the van, but Plaintiff refused because she believed the ordinance making its presence illegal was unconstitutional.
See International Property Maintenance Code ("IPMC") § 302.1.
At trial, Harris was called as a witness for the prosecution and Plaintiff did not present a defense because she believed the ordinance was unconstitutional. The jury found Plaintiff guilty of violating the ordinance and the court sentenced Plaintiff to thirty days' imprisonment suspended upon Plaintiff's removing the van from Plaintiff's property before October 12, 2018. Plaintiff returned to court on October 12, 2018 and informed the court that she moved the van from her front yard to her backyard. However, the court informed Plaintiff that she was instructed to remove the van from the property. The court sentenced Plaintiff to thirty days' imprisonment. Plaintiff was booked in the Alvin S. Glen Detention Center that day and was released early on October 28, 2018 based on good behavior. Plaintiff filed a direct appeal in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas but the court dismissed the appeal as untimely on June 21, 2019. See C/A No. 2019-CP-40-1162.
Plaintiff filed this action on April 2, 2020. The court authorized service, construing claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The defendants now file this motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) & (6).
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Standards
Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) examines whether the complaint fails to state facts upon which jurisdiction can be founded. It is the plaintiff's burden to prove jurisdiction, and the court is to "regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991).
To resolve a jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider undisputed facts and any jurisdictional facts that it determines. The court may dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any of the following bases: "(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court "may also consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic." Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).
Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Erickson, 551 U.S. 89, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. The Defendants' Motion
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The defendants argue the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court disagrees.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state court judgments. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (noting that the United States Supreme Court retains exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from state court judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The doctrine is narrow, confined only to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284. If a federal plaintiff presents an independent claim, that the same or a related question was earlier aired between the parties in state court does not implicate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011) (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 292-93.) The doctrine is jurisdictional. Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court. We regard the doctrine as jurisdictional.").
Here, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because Plaintiff is not asking the court to review and reject the judgment of the City of Columbia Municipal Court that found Plaintiff was guilty of violating IPMC § 302.8. Rather, Plaintiff brings an independent action for damages against the City and individuals for enforcing the statute and seeks prospective injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of the statute in the future. Because the judgment of the municipal court was a criminal sanction, Plaintiff's claims for damages and prospective injunctive relief pursuant to § 1983 are not a direct challenge to the municipal court judgment, which could only be brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See generally Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
Notably, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus that challenge a state court judgment are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the lower federal courts are granted jurisdiction over such claims by federal statute. See Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 733 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that because the plaintiffs' action challenging the constitutionality of a state statute was cognizable as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the claims were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
The defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are "inextricably intertwined" with issues that were actually raised or could have been raised to the municipal court, and therefore, Plaintiff cannot relitigate those issues here. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 18 at 7.) However, the defendants' argument speaks to issues of preclusion rather than the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 293 ("If a federal plaintiff presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party, then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.") (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles Cty., Md., 827 F.3d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 2016) ("Preclusion principles are designed to address the tension between two concurrent, independent suits that results when the two suits address the same subject matter, claims, and legal principles. Whereas the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, by contrast, assesses only whether the process for appealing a state court judgment to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) has been sidetracked by an action filed in a district court specifically to review that state court judgment."). Because Plaintiff does not challenge the municipal court's judgment in this case, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply, even if the court will have to address issues that were addressed or could have been addressed by the municipal court. Accordingly, the court does not lack jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine over Plaintiff's claims.
2. Failure to State a Claim
a. Municipal Liability
The defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege facts that could support a claim for municipal liability against the City of Columbia. Specifically, the defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege facts that would plausibly show that the violation of Plaintiff's rights can be attributed to the enforcement of a municipal policy.
A plaintiff who seeks to assert a § 1983 claim against a municipality for acts done by a municipal official or employee must show that a municipal policy or custom caused the plaintiff's injury. See Semple v. City of Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 712 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 1994)). "[M]unicipalities are not liable pursuant to respondeat superior principles for all constitutional violations of their employees simply because of the employment relationship." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692-94). "Instead, municipal liability results only 'when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.' " Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). "Because municipal liability results only when the municipality itself can be directly charged with fault for a constitutional violation, it results only when policy or custom . . . is (1) fairly attributable to the municipality as its own, and is (2) the moving force behind the particular constitutional violation." Id. at 1386-87 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). " 'Policy' in this context implies most obviously and narrowly a 'course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives' respecting basic governmental functions, as opposed to episodic exercises of discretion in the operational details of government." Spell, 824 F.2d at 1386 (quoting City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985)).
Here, Plaintiff clearly asserts that the enforcement of two City of Columbia ordinances is unconstitutional. Because Plaintiff's claims are based on the purported unlawfulness of the City's own ordinances, Plaintiff has plausibly asserted a basis for municipal liability under § 1983. See Spell, 824 F.2d 1385 (stating that municipal policy is "found most obviously in municipal ordinances, regulations and the like which directly command or authorize constitutional violations.") (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692-94).
b. Official Capacity Claims Against Wilson, Hatcher, and Harris
The defendants argue that Plaintiff's official capacity claims against the individually named defendants are redundant because official capacity suits against individual government officials is just another way of naming the municipality. The court agrees. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) ("There is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell, local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.") (internal citation omitted). Therefore, Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Teresa Wilson, David Hatcher, and Stacy Harris should be dismissed.
c. Individual Capacity Claims Against Wilson, Hatcher, and Harris
The defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege any facts about the individual capacity defendants that would plausibly show that they violated Plaintiff's rights. Specifically, the defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege facts that would show that Wilson or Hatcher played any role in Plaintiff's conviction. They also argue that Plaintiff fails to "challenge any individual action taken by Harris" or plausibly allege that Harris's action caused a deprivation of Plaintiff's rights.
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts about Defendants Wilson and Hatcher that would show that they had any involvement in the purported constitutional violations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) ("In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be 'affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.' ") (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)). Because Plaintiff does not explain how Wilson and Hatcher were involved in the purported violation of Plaintiff's rights, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against them. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support). Therefore, Plaintiff's individual capacity claims against Wilson and Hatcher should be dismissed.
However, Plaintiff has plainly stated facts that would show that Harris was personally involved in the purported deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. As previously stated, Plaintiff claims that Harris was the code enforcement officer who issued the citations against Plaintiff and testified against Plaintiff at trial. Therefore, Plaintiff alleges that Harris was directly involved in the enforcement of a purportedly unlawful statute against Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff's individual capacity claim against Harris should not be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to plead facts showing that Harris caused a deprivation of Plaintiff's rights.
The court makes no findings as to the merits of Plaintiff's claims against Harris.
d. Plaintiff's Claim as to IPMC § 302.1
The defendants argue that Plaintiff's second cause of action, which claims that IPMC § 302.1 is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, should be dismissed because Plaintiff was not convicted under this ordinance, and therefore, she suffered no legally cognizable harm or deprivation of life, liberty, or property.
The United States Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. "One element of the case-or-controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 466 (2001) ("Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which ensures that a suit is a case or controversy appropriate for the exercise of the courts' judicial powers under the Constitution of the United States.") (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)).
The irreducible minimum requirements of Article III standing are: (1) an injury in fact (i.e., a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest); (2) causation (i.e., a fairly . . . traceable connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and (3) redressability (i.e., it is likely and not merely speculative that the plaintiff's injury will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit).David v. Alphin, 704 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sprint Commc'ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273-74 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The court concludes that the defendants have failed to meet their burden on this issue and whether Plaintiff has standing to mount a facial challenge to this statute is unclear on the record before the court. Initially, the court notes that the defendants fail to analyze this issue with the proper authority. Plaintiff cites to Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), which stands for the proposition that injury to a person's reputation arising from an arrest is not a legally cognizable injury under the Due Process Clause. But Plaintiff does not assert such an injury here. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that IPMC § 302.1 is so vague that it is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. See generally Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982); Manning v. Caldwell for City of Roanoke, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019).
The defendants provide the numerical citation for Paul v. Davis but provide the case name for Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), which would not seem to have any application here.
However, Plaintiff indicates that she was originally cited for a violation of IPMC § 302.1 but the charge was nolle prosequied without her having to abate the violation. Therefore, if Plaintiff has standing to challenge the law, she must meet the injury-in-fact requirement by showing that the defendants are threatening imminent enforcement of the statute. As stated by the United States Supreme Court:
One recurring issue in our cases is determining when the threatened enforcement of a law creates an Article III injury. When an individual is subject to such a threat, an actual arrest, prosecution, or other enforcement action is not a prerequisite to challenging the law. Instead, we have permitted pre-enforcement review under circumstances that render the threatened enforcement sufficiently imminent. Specifically, we have held that a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement where he alleges an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158-59 (2014) (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff asserts that she has been charged with a violation of IPMC § 302.1 three times between 2005 and 2018. (Pl.'s Resp. Opp'n, ECF No. 39 at 11 n.1.) She also seeks to prevent enforcement of the statute against her in the future and indicates that she has not abated the purported violation since her last citation was nolle prosequied. However, the parties have not briefed this issue under the appropriate standard, and the record does not clearly indicate whether Plaintiff meets the standing requirement under Article III. Consequently, the defendants' motion to dismiss this claim should be denied without prejudice to challenge Plaintiff's standing on more fully developed briefing.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that the defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the court recommends that Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Teresa Wilson, David Hatcher, and Stacy Harris and individual capacity claims against Wilson and Hatcher be dismissed, but the motion to dismiss should be denied as to the defendants' other grounds. October 22, 2020
Columbia, South Carolina
/s/_________
Paige J. Gossett
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' " Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).