The plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment upon these findings. The foregoing questions, or questions in all respects like them, were considered and decided in Taylor v. Blake, 64 N.H. 392, although it does not so appear in the report of the case. The reserved case (see 159 Briefs and Cases 55) shows that the plaintiffs were tenants of the owner of the property now owned by the plaintiffs in this case, and that the defendant was the owner of a tract of land on the south side of the river above the main dam, together with the water rights reserved by Bartlett in his deed to Favor.
An intent that the soil in the river and street shall be owned by a person who does not own the abutting land is so improbable that it would require an express exception in the grant, or some clear and unequivocal declaration, or certain and immemorial usage, to limit the title of the grantee to the edge of the street and the edge of the river. 3 Kent 428; Wallace's note in Dovaston v. Payne, 2 Sin. L. C. (4th Am. ed.) 189; Dissenting opinion of Redfield, J., in Buck v. Squiers, 22 Vt. 484, 494; Norcross v. Griffiths, 65 Wis. 599; Claremont v. Carlton, 2 N.H. 369, 371; State v. Gilmanton, 9 N.H. 461, 463; Greenleaf v. Kilton 11 N.H. 530, 533; State v. Canterbury, 28 N.H. 195, 216; Woodman v. Spencer, 54 N.H. 507, 512, 514, 516; Sleeper v. Laconia, 60 N.H. 201, 202; Taylor v. Blake, 64 N.H. 392; Kent v. Taylor, 64 N.H. 489, 490; Capron v. Kingman, 64 N.H. 571. Such a limitation in the case of a street would be contrary to universal practice (3 Kent 433), and the presumed intent is the same whether the boundary is a street or a fresh water river. On the question of fact whether certain phrases or circumstances are sufficient evidence of a different intent (Gould v. Railroad, 142 Mass. 85, 89; Gaylord v. King, 142 Mass. 495, 503; Holloway v. Southmayd, 139 N.Y. 390, 401, 412; Tied. R. P., ss. 833, 837), there has not been a unanimity of opinion in all jurisdictions; but the presumption is regarded as an established rule; and in this state it is settled (in cases before cited) that such terms as those used in Cross's reservation do not prove an intent to sever the channel of the river from the riparian estate of which it is presumed to be a part.