Opinion
No. 3-04-CV-1554-BD.
April 6, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment in this sex discrimination case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. As grounds for their motion, defendants contend they have articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for demoting plaintiff and there is no evidence of pretext. The issues have been fully briefed by the parties and the motion is ripe for determination.
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A summary judgment movant who does not have the burden of proof at trial must point to the absence of a genuine fact issue. Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1995). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment is not proper. Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1992). The parties may satisfy their respective burdens by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence. Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 82 (1992). All evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff, an employee of Budget Suites of America, alleges that she was twice demoted by defendants after becoming pregnant. ( See Plf. First Am. Pet. at 1, ¶ 5). The first incident occurred on May 27, 2003, when plaintiff was demoted from Regional Manager, with responsibility over two hotels in Grand Prairie and Fort Worth, Texas, to General Manager of the Grand Prairie hotel. The second occurred five weeks later on July 2, 2003, when plaintiff was demoted to Assistant General Manager of a different hotel. Defendants concede that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination. ( See Def. MSJ at 18, ¶ 43). Nevertheless, they maintain that plaintiff was demoted due to her unsatisfactory job performance.
In order to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position she lost, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) she was replaced by an employee who was not a member of the protected class. See Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 579 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2003).
In support of this argument, defendants point to low occupancy rates and low audit scores at the Grand Prairie hotel from February 12, 2003 to May 27, 2003 while plaintiff served as Regional Manager. However, during that short period, occupancy rates at the hotel exhibited an upward trend and were significantly higher than rates for the previous two years. ( See Plf. MSJ Resp., Exh. B-5; Def. MSJ App. 1 at 29). Moreover, the hotel scored 94%, 91%, 89%, and 94% in audits conducted on February 13, 2003, March 10, 2003, April 21, 2003, and May 22, 2003, respectively. ( See Plf. MSJ Resp., Exh. B-6) On June 16, 2003, while plaintiff was serving as General Manager, the hotel received an audit score of 95%. ( Id.). Although defendants insist that a score of 95% or lower is unsatisfactory, the testimony of Peggy Bradshaw-Tobin, a former auditor, suggests otherwise. Bradshaw-Tobin testified that the "goal" was 95% and any score below 90% became a "concern of overall management of the property." ( Id. at Exh. D-19). In addition, the summary judgment evidence shows that a hotel managed by a male employee routinely received audit scores below 95%, yet he never suffered any adverse employment consequences. ( See id. at Exh. D-8, 13, 21). This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for demoting her was pretextual. See Ratliff v. City of Gainesville, Texas, 256 F.3d 355, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing cases) (where a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, she may survive summary judgment merely by showing that explanation proffered by defendant for its employment decision is false).
The court also notes the highly inappropriate remarks made by plaintiff's supervisor, Richard J. Clouse, Jr., which border on direct evidence of discrimination. When plaintiff told Clouse she was pregnant on May 23, 2003, he threw up his hands and exclaimed "he didn't do it" and "it wasn't his." (Plf. MSJ. Resp., Exh. A-7). Clouse proceeded to tell plaintiff about another pregnant employee who had her baby during the lunch hour and returned to work immediately. ( Id., Exh. A-8). He then asked plaintiff about her intentions with respect to maternity leave. ( Id.). Not surprisingly, this outburst upset plaintiff. ( Id., Exh. A-10, 11, 12). Clouse also appeared to be upset by the news of plaintiff's pregnancy. ( Id., Exh. A-11). Four days later, on May 27, 2003, plaintiff was demoted from Regional Manager to General Manager. Plaintiff was demoted again on July 2, 2003. The substance and timing of Clouse's remarks are sufficient to raise a fact issue as to discriminatory intent. See Krystek v. University of Southern Mississippi, 164 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1999) (stray remarks may be sufficient evidence of discrimination if the comments are: (1) related to the protected class of persons of which plaintiff is a member, (2) proximate in time to the adverse employment action, (3) made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue, and (4) related to the employment decision).
For these reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied. The court will set this case for trial by separate order.
SO ORDERED.