Opinion
CIVIL NO: 1:19-CV-00660
06-04-2019
HANNA LAURIE TAYLOR, Petitioner v. MAUREEN BEIRNE, Respondent
(Judge Brann) () REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction.
After reviewing the petition, we concluded that petitioner Hanna Laurie Taylor had not exhausted state remedies. We ordered Taylor to show cause, if there is any, why her habeas corpus petition should not be dismissed without prejudice because she failed to exhaust state remedies. Taylor has failed to show cause; therefore, we recommend that her case be dismissed without prejudice.
II. Factual Background and Procedural History.
On April 17, 2019, Taylor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc 1. In accordance with Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, we reviewed the petition to determine whether it plainly appears from the petition that Taylor is not entitled to relief. Because it appeared from the petition that Taylor had not exhausted state remedies, we ordered Taylor on April 25, 2019, to show cause, if there is any, why her habeas corpus petition should not be dismissed without prejudice because she failed to exhaust state remedies. Doc. 4. In the order to show cause, we recommended Taylor file a petition under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541, et seq.
Since that order, we have received four letters from Taylor. Each letter generally states the actions Taylor has taken such as calling and mailing the Bradford County Public Defender's Office (See, e.g., docs 5, 6, 7, 8). One letter also shows dates relevant to her sentence. Doc. 7 at 3-9. Taylor also includes various correspondence, in relation to her sentence, between her public defender, Patrick Lee Beirne, Esq., and President Judge Maureen T. Beirne. Doc. 5 at 3-8. In her last letter dated May 3, 2019, Taylor states that she is no longer with counsel and that her previous public defender last filed a "motion 'PCRA.'" Doc. 8 at 1.
III. State prisoners must ordinarily exhaust state remedies before bringing a federal habeas corpus petition.
"Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner's conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism." Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012). One of those rules is that a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies before filing a petition for habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c).
The exhaustion requirement serves the interests of comity between the federal and state systems by allowing the state an initial opportunity to determine and correct any violations of a prisoner's federal rights. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). "The exhaustion rule also serves the secondary purpose of facilitating the creation of a complete factual record to aid the federal courts in their review." Walker v. Vaughn, 53 F.3d 609, 614 (3d Cir. 1995). A habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that she has exhausted state remedies. O'Halloran v Ryan, 835 F.2d 506, 508 (3d Cir. 1987).
The petitioner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. To exhaust state remedies for federal habeas corpus purposes, a petitioner must show that she fairly presented her federal claim to the state courts. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971). The fair-presentation requirement provides the State the opportunity to consider and correct an alleged violation of a prisoner's federal rights. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364-65 (1995). "If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution." Id. at 365-66. "It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts, or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made." Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citations omitted). Rather, for a claim to have been fairly presented to the state courts, both the legal theory and the facts supporting the claim must have been presented to the state courts. O'Halloran, 835 F.2d at 508.
"[T]he exhaustion requirement may be excused where the opportunity to obtain relief in state court was lacking or if the corrective process was so clearly deficient as to render futile any effort to obtain relief." McGurl v. Pennsylvania, No. 3:18-CV-2176, 2019 WL 294558, at *2, n. 2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2019); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B) (providing that exhaustion is required unless "there is an absence of available State corrective process; or . . . circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant").
In certain circumstances, a stay may be appropriate while a habeas petitioner exhausts state remedies. In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982), the Supreme Court held that because a total-exhaustion rule promotes comity and does not unreasonably impair a prisoner's right to relief, a district court must dismiss mixed habeas petitions, i.e., petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims. Later, however, the habeas statute was amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) by, among other things, imposing a one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions. The limitations period is tolled during the time a "properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" is pending, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), but the statute is not tolled by the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001).
In Rhines v. Weber, the Supreme Court recognized that "[a]s a result of the interplay between AEDPA's 1-year statute of limitations and Lundy's dismissal requirement, petitioners who come to federal court with 'mixed' petitions run the risk of forever losing their opportunity for any federal review of their unexhausted claims." 544 U.S. 269, 275 (2005). "If a petitioner files a timely but mixed petition in federal district court, and the district court dismisses it under Lundy after the limitations period has expired, this will likely mean the termination of any federal review." Id. The Court held that district courts have discretion to stay a petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims to allow the petitioner to present her unexhausted claims to the state court in the first instance and then to return to federal court for review of her perfected petition. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit later held that the stay-and-abeyance procedure approved in Rhines also applies to petitions that contain only unexhausted claims. Heleva v. Brooks, 581 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2009).
While a court has authority to grant a stay, it should stay a habeas petition presenting unexhausted claims only in limited circumstances. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. "Because granting a stay effectively excuses a petitioner's failure to present [her] claims first to the state courts, stay and abeyance is only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust [her] claims first in state court." Id. "Moreover, even if a petitioner had good cause for that failure, the district court would abuse its discretion if it were to grant [her] a stay when [her] unexhausted claims are plainly meritless." Id. "On the other hand, it likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a stay and to dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner had good cause for [her] failure to exhaust, [her] unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics." Id. at 278. In such circumstances, the petitioner's interest in obtaining federal review of her claims outweighs the competing interests in finality and speedy resolution of federal petitions and the district court should stay the mixed petition. Id. In sum, a stay is appropriate only where the petitioner meets three requirements: (1) she has good cause for her failure to exhaust; (2) she has potentially meritorious unexhausted claims; and (3) and she has not engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Heleva, 581 F.3d at 190.
IV. Discussion.
Here, Taylor asserts that she is challenging a conviction and sentence that she received on February 25, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County, Pennsylvania. From the petition, Taylor has not exhausted her claims in the state courts. She admits that her habeas petition is the first step she has taken in presenting her claims. But as set forth above, except in limited circumstances, Taylor must exhaust her claims in state court before bringing a federal habeas corpus petition.
We note that Taylor asserts that she does not know how to proceed and that she has not been able to obtain "adequate" assistance from counsel or other organizations. According to Taylor, her public defender has since filed a petition under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541, et seq. But Taylor has yet to exhaust her claims in state court. Taylor was ordered to show cause as to why her petition for a writ of habeas corpus should not be dismissed without prejudice because she failed to exhaust state remedies, but she failed to do so.
V. Recommendation.
We, therefore, recommend that Taylor's petition for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed without prejudice because she failed to exhaust state remedies. The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrates judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearings only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witness or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 4th day of June, 2019.
S/Susan E . Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
Chief United States Magistrate Judge