1939 PA 135, subsequently amended and re-enacted as 1961 PA 236, MCLA 600.6419; MSA 27A.6419.Taylor v Auditor General, 360 Mich. 146, 149-150; 103 N.W.2d 769 (1960); Mead v Michigan Public Service Commission, supra, 170; Manion v State Highway Commissioner, supra, 20-21.See for example McDowell v Warden of Reformatory, supra. (Suit against a state prison warden brought under authority of 1897 CL 2091.
A previous Michigan Supreme Court case has held that the Court of Claims cannot issue such judgments. Taylor v Auditor General, 360 Mich. 146; 103 N.W.2d 769 (1960). See also Dorfman v State Highway Dep't, 66 Mich. App. 1; 238 N.W.2d 395 (1975).
MCLA 600.6419; MSA 27A.6419. The Michigan Supreme Court in Taylor v Auditor General, 360 Mich. 146, 149-150; 103 N.W.2d 769 (1960), describes the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims as follows: "The court of claims is a court of legislative creation.
We find that this case can be resolved by statutory interpretation, which is reviewed de novo on appeal.Taylor v Auditor Gen, 360 Mich 146, 154; 103 NW2d 769 (1960), overruled in part on other grounds 468 Mich 763 (2003). Title Office, Inc v Van Buren Co Treasurer, 469 Mich 516, 519; 676 NW2d 207 (2004).
AuSable ManisteeAction Council, Inc. v. Michigan, 182 Mich. App. 596, 598; 452 N.W.2d 832 (1989) (citations omitted). This interpretation was first set forth in Taylor v. Auditor General, 360 Mich. 146, 151; 103 N.W.2d 769 (1960), which was decided before the 1984 amendment, when this Court, noting that the Court of Claims was created as a court of limited jurisdiction having "no `equity side' as that term is employed in respect of the jurisdiction of Michigan courts," concluded that the Court of Claims did not possess jurisdiction over declaratory-judgment actions. Relying on Taylor, Michigan courts have since adhered to the view that the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over a claim that is solely for declaratory relief.
We have stated previously, "there exists a general presumption by this Court that we will not reach constitutional issues that are not necessary to resolve a case." Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 444 Mich. 211, 234; 507 N.W.2d 422 (1993); see also Taylor v. Auditor General, 360 Mich. 146, 154; 103 N.W.2d 769 (1960). Because resolution on statutory grounds alone would suffice, I would not reach the constitutional issue.
See Const 1963, art 1, § 10. However, longstanding considerations of self-restraint dictate that we not address such possible grounds for resolution when this case is fairly resolved on a narrower basis. See Taylor v Auditor General, 360 Mich. 146, 154; 103 N.W.2d 769 (1960). C
We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals decision and reinstate the trial court's order granting summary disposition for defendant. See Taylor v. Auditor General, 360 Mich. 146, 154; 103 N.W.2d 769 (1960). I
However, I would not reach the constitutional issue because, as we have stated previously, "there exists a general presumption by this Court that we will not reach constitutional issues that are not necessary to resolve a case." Booth Newspapers, Inc v. Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich. 211, 234; 507 N.W.2d 422 (1993); Taylor v. Auditor General, 360 Mich. 146, 154; 103 N.W.2d 769 (1960). Additionally, I write separately to note that because the majority remands the case on the dual-agency theory, we have not addressed plaintiff's concerns regarding informed consent.
As we have repeatedly stated, "there exists a general presumption by this Court that we will not reach constitutional issues that are not necessary to resolve a case." Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich. 211, 234; 507 N.W.2d 422 (1993); Taylor v Auditor General, 360 Mich. 146, 154; 103 N.W.2d 769 (1960). Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.