ucing her expert's assessment of the fair market value of Keil's Pools. Plaintiff argues that because her expert had already factored into his conclusions a reduced multiple accounting for, among other things, defendant's key role in the business, there was no basis upon which the court could further reduce the value of the business on that same ground. "`[T]he valuation of [a] business for equitable distribution purposes [is] an exercise [properly] within Supreme Court's fact-finding power to be guided by expert testimony'" ( Nissen v Nissen, 17 AD3d 819, 821, quoting Hiatt v Tremper-Hiatt, 6 AD3d 1014, 1015; see Sieger v Sieger, 51 AD3d 1004, 1004, appeal dismissed 14 NY3d 750, lv denied 14 NY3d 711). Furthermore, "[w]here the determination as to the value of a business is within the range of the testimony presented, it will not be disturbed on appeal if it rests primarily on the credibility of expert witnesses and their valuation techniques" ( Sieger v Sieger, 51 AD3d at 1004; see Tayar v Tayar, 250 AD2d 757, 757-758). Here, plaintiffs expert testified regarding different valuation methods, arriving at a value for the business of $437,000 as of April 12, 2006, the commencement date.
In light of factors such as the disparity in income between the parties and the defendant's conduct which, among other things, delayed the proceedings, the Supreme Court properly directed the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of $30,000 in attorney's fees (see Domestic Relations Law ยง 237 ; Lubrano v. Lubrano, 122 A.D.3d 807, 808, 995 N.Y.S.2d 741 ; Cohen v. Cohen, 73 A.D.3d 832, 834, 900 N.Y.S.2d 460 ; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 A.D.3d 61, 62, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667 ; McCully v. McCully, 306 A.D.2d 329, 330, 760 N.Y.S.2d 686 ; Morrissey v. Morrissey, 259 A.D.2d 472, 473, 686 N.Y.S.2d 71 ; Tayar v. Tayar, 250 A.D.2d 757, 673 N.Y.S.2d 179 ; see also O'Shea v. O'Shea, 93 N.Y.2d 187, 190, 689 N.Y.S.2d 8, 711 N.E.2d 193 ).
Given the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiff the sum of $112,166.76 in attorney's fees and disbursements, which represented 40% of the amount of legal fees the plaintiff incurred (see Domestic Relations Law ยง 237; Cohen v Cohen, 73 AD3d 832, 834; Ciampa v Ciampa, 47 AD3d 745, 748; Prichep v Prichep, 52 AD3d 61, 64; Morrissey v Morrissey, 259 AD2d 472, 473; Tayar v Tayar, 250 AD2d 757; see also Raynor v Raynor, 68 AD3d 835, 839; Litvak v Litvak, 63 AD3d 691, 693).
Considering the parties' relative financial positions, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the defendant an attorney's fee in the sum of $40,000, and directing the parties to share equally the payment of the remaining expert fees ( see Domestic Relations Law ยง 237 [a]; O'Brien v O'Brien, 66 NY2d at 590; Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710; Tayar v Tayar, 250 AD2d 757). Furthermore, the plaintiff waived his right to a hearing to determine the amount of the attorney's fee, since he never requested a hearing, the parties' finances were explored at trial, and they agreed that the issue would be determined upon the submission of papers ( see Schwartz v Schwartz, 54 AD3d 400; Messinger v Messinger, 24 AD3d 631; Mancuso v Mancuso, 178 AD2d 584).
Nevertheless, since some of the fees are attributable to her request for an increase in child support ( id.), and the Supreme Court must hold a hearing with respect to that issue, the denial of that branch of her motion which was for an award of counsel fees is modified to make it without prejudice to renewal at the conclusion of that hearing. The court should consider the equities of the case, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the relative merits of their respective positions in determining whether and to what extent such an award is appropriate ( see Popelaski v Popelaski, 22 AD3d 735; Tayar v Tayar, 250 AD2d 757; Leabo v Leabo, 203 AD2d 254).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of an attorney's fee ( see Miklos v. Miklos, 21 AD3d 353, 354; DeJesus v. DeJesus, 264 AD2d 436). However, given the equities and circumstances of this case, the relative merits of the parties' positions, their respective financial circumstances, and the delay in the discovery process attributable to the defendant, an award of an attorney's fee to the plaintiff in the sum of $25,000 is appropriate ( see Domestic Relations Law ยง 237 [a], [d]; DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879, 881; Morrissey v. Morrissey, 259 AD2d 472, 473; Walker v. Walker, 255 AD2d 375, 376; Tayar v. Tayar, 250 AD2d 757). The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.
The award of a reasonable attorney's fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court ( see DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879). Factors to consider in determining whether an award is appropriate, and, if appropriate, the amount to be awarded, are the equities and circumstances of each case, and the relative merits of the parties' positions and their respective financial circumstances ( see Domestic Relations Law ยง 237 [a]; Tayar v. Tayar, 250 AD2d 757; Linda R. v. Richard E., 176 AD2d 312, 313). Considering all of the circumstances, including that this litigation resulted from the defendant's abuse of the parties' children and that court-ordered therapeutic supervised visitation with the defendant and the children failed three times due to the defendant's behavior, the court providently exercised its discretion in its award of an attorney's fee ( see Walker v. Walker, 255 AD2d 375, 376; Rados v. Rados, 133 AD2d 536; cf. Havell v. Islam, 301 AD2d 339, 347).
An award of a reasonable attorney's fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court ( see DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879, 881; Morrissey v. Morrissey, 259 AD2d 472, 473). Contrary to the contentions of the parties, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the defendant to pay a portion of the plaintiff's attorney's fee and expert fees ( see Klisivitch v. Klisivitch, 291 AD2d 433; Mitzner v. Mitzner, 271 AD2d 513; Tayar v. Tayar, 250 AD2d 757, 758; Feeney v. Feeney, 241 AD2d 510; Reehill v. Reehill, 181 AD2d 725, 726). Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant was properly permitted to pay the attorney's fee in installments ( see Romano v. Romano, 139 AD2d 979, 980; Allen v. Allen, 77 AD2d 558, 559).
"Rather, perceived inequities in pendente lite orders are best addressed via a speedy trial at which the parties' economic circumstances may be thoroughly explored" ( Campanaro v. Campanaro, supra at 331). Contrary to the husband's contention, given the financial circumstances of the parties, the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in directing him to pay one half of the wife's counsel fees ( see Tayar v. Tayar, 250 AD2d 757). The wife was not required to exhaust her own capital in order to qualify for an interim counsel fee award ( see Mitzner v. Mitzner, 228 AD2d 483; Lieberman v. Lieberman, 187 AD2d 567).
Considering the brevity of the parties' marriage and their relatively young age, as well as the defendant's master's degree in computer science, her good health, and her employment in the computer software field earning an annual income of approximately $45,000, the maintenance award was a provident exercise of the trial court's discretion (see Domestic Relations Law ยง 236[B][6][a]; Greenfield v. Greenfield, 234 A.D.2d 60). The denial of the defendant's application for an attorney's fee was a provident exercise of discretion, taking into consideration, inter alia, the relative merit of the parties' positions and actions during the litigation (see DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881; Walker v. Walker, 255 A.D.2d 375; Tayar v. Tayar, 250 A.D.2d 757), and the failure of the defendant's attorney to substantially comply with 22 NYCRR 1400.3 (see Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 285 A.D.2d 587). The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.