Although there is earlier authority to the contrary; see, e.g., Anderson v. Len, 175 Conn. 545, 554 n. 8, 400 A.2d 712 (1978); Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 571-72 n. 4, 362 A.2d 871 (1975); in recent years we have repeatedly approved references to testimony before legislative committees in order to shed light on legislative intent. See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Code, 187 Conn. 386, 392 n. 6, 395-96, 446 A.2d 1059 (1982); Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, 173 Conn. 232, 245, 377 A.2d 305 (1977); Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 290-91, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041, 96 S.Ct. 763, 46 L.Ed.2d 631 (1976); see also Board of Education v. Bridgeport Education Assn., 9 Conn. App. 199, 204 n. 3, 518 A.2d 394 (1986), cert. denied, 202 Conn. 802, 519 A.2d 1206 (1987). This is fully consistent with the general principle of statutory construction that we look, in part, to the problem or issue which the legislature sought to resolve, and the purpose it sought to serve, in enacting a statute.

"Statements of purpose, committee reports, and floor debate are all legitimate sources of legislative intent. See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, 187 Conn. 386, 391 n. 5, 446 A.2d 1059 (1982) (floor debate); Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, supra, [ 173 Conn. 232, 246,] 244-45, [ 377 A.2d 305 (1977)] (statement of purpose); Connecticut Rural Roads Improvement Assn. v. Hurley, 124 Conn. 20, 26, 197 A. 90 (1938) (committee reports)." Burge v. Stonington, 219 Conn. 581, 594-95, 594 A.2d 945 (1991).

"Statements of purpose, committee reports, and floor debate are all legitimate sources of legislative intent. See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, 187 Conn. 386, 391 n. 5, 446 A.2d 1059 (1982) (floor debate); Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, supra, [ 173 Conn. 232, 246,] 244-45, [ 377 A.2d 305 (1977)] (statement of purpose); Connecticut Rural Roads Improvement Assn. v. Hurley, 124 Conn. 20, 26, 197 A. 90 (1938) (committee reports)." Burge v. Stonington, 219 Conn. 581, 594-95, 594 A.2d 945 (1991).

Even though such floor debates on a statute under consideration are not controlling on statutory interpretation, the Court may take judicial notice of such legislative debate. Iovieno v. Comm'r, 222 Conn. 254, 608 A.2d 1174 (1992), Tax Comm'r v. Estate of Bissell, 173 Conn. 232, 377 A.2d 305 (1977). REP. WEBBER (92nd): "Thank you. If one were to use this service at a supermarket, [sic] at the check-out counter, would that individual be charged a fee for the use of that service?"

"According to well established principles of statutory construction, an amendment that construes and clarifies a prior statute operates as the legislature's declaration of the meaning of the original act." Id., 717; accord Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, 173 Conn. 232, 246, 377 A.2d 305 (1977). "Where an amendment is intended to clarify the original intent of an earlier statute, it necessarily has retroactive effect."

ld, however, that it is as much within the legislative power as the judicial power — subject, of course, to constitutional limits other than the separation of powers — for the legislature to declare what its intent was in enacting previous legislation. See State v. Magnano, supra, 204 Conn. 284 ("[e]ven though the legislative clarification was prompted by a judicial decision that the legislature deemed mistaken, such a clarification does not constitute an invasion of judicial authority"); see generally State v. One 1977 Buick Automobile, 196 Conn. 471, 479, 493 A.2d 874 (1985); Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc. v. Fay, 195 Conn. 534, 540, 489 A.2d 363 (1985); Neyland v. Board of Education, 195 Conn. 174, 180, 487 A.2d 181 (1985); Shelton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 193 Conn. 506, 514-15, 479 A.2d 208 (1984); Lee v. Board of Education, 181 Conn. 69, 75, 434 A.2d 333 (1980), on appeal after remand sub nom. Halpern v. Board of Education, 231 Conn. 308, 649 A.2d 534 (1994); Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, 173 Conn. 232, 246, 377 A.2d 305 (1977); 1A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1984) §§ 22.31 and 22.35. Implicit in those holdings was the recognition that pending cases could be affected thereby.

"[I]n recent years we have repeatedly approved references to testimony before legislative committees in order to shed light on legislative intent. See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, 187 Conn. 386, 392 n. 6, 395-96, 446 A.2d 1059 (1982); Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, 173 Conn. 232, 245, 377 A.2d 305 (1977); Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 290-91, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041, 96 S.Ct. 763, 46 L.Ed.2d 631 (1976); see also Board of Education v. Bridgeport Education Assn., 9 Conn. App. 199, 204 n. 3, 518 A.2d 394 (1986), cert. denied, 202 Conn. 802, 519 A.2d 1206 (1987). This is fully consistent with the general principle of statutory construction that we look, in part, to the problem or issue that the legislature sought to resolve, and the purpose it sought to serve, in enacting a statute.

The legislature has the power to make evident to us that it never intended to provide a litigant with the rights that we previously had interpreted a statute to confer. Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc. v. Fay, [ 195 Conn. 534, 540-41, 489 A.2d 363 (1985)]; Neyland v. Board of Education, [ 195 Conn. 174, 180-85, 487 A.2d 181 (1985)]; Lee v. Board of Education, [ 181 Conn. 69, 75, 434 A.2d 333 (1980)]; Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, [ 173 Conn. 232, 245, 377 A.2d 305 (1977)]. State v. Blasko, supra, [202 Conn.] 558.

A clarifying act "in effect construes and clarifies a prior statute [and] must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of the original act." Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, 173 Conn. 232, 246, 377 A.2d 305 (1977); State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 559, 522 A.2d 753 (1987); see State v. One 1977 Buick Automobile, 196 Conn. 471, 479, 493 A.2d 874 (1985); Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc. v. Fay, 195 Conn. 534, 540, 489 A.2d 363 (1985); Neyland v. Board of Education, 195 Conn. 174, 180, 487 A.2d 181 (1985); Lee v. Board of Education, 181 Conn. 69, 75, 434 A.2d 333 (1980). Here there is no indication, either from the language of P.A. 93-246 or its legislative history, that the legislature intended it to be a clarifying act.

Thus, "[a] clarifying act, which `in effect construes and clarifies a prior statute must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of the original act.'" State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 557, 522 A.2d 753 (1987), quoting Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, 173 Conn. 232, 246, 377 A.2d 305 (1977). The legislative history unquestionably indicates that 3 and 19 of No. 88-357 of the 1988 Public Acts, which became effective on October 1, 1988, after the employee was injured and incurred hospital costs, were intended to clarify the ambiguity created when the legislature enacted General Statutes 19a-165f (a) without explicitly repealing the conflicting provisions of 31-294.