Opinion
23-cv-03776-TSH
08-07-2023
JACQUELINE TAUSCHER, Plaintiff, v. ERIC A. HANSHEW, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS S. HIXSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jacqueline Tauscher, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 1, 3. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the application but finds the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). As not all parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the Court requests this case be reassigned to a district judge for disposition. The undersigned RECOMMENDS the complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
II. BACKGROUND
Tauscher brings this case against her former husband, Eric Hanshew, related to divorce proceedings in Arizona. She brings two claims: (1) violation of the Respect for Marriage Act, alleging Hanshew “and other agents of the court, acting under color of State law in Arizona, failed to give Full Faith Credit to a California Marriage Contract. This violated the Respect for Marriage Act”; and (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging Hanshew “obstructed [her] civil right to make and enforce her own contracts independently of Mr. Hanshew when he forced her to give up her marital property which was a benefit and privilege of the marriage contract.” Compl. at 11-12, ECF No. 1. Tauscher also appears to bring related allegations against other parties that are not named in the caption or “Parties” sections of her complaint but are listed elsewhere, including Judge Gerald Porter, who presided over the divorce proceedings and, Tauscher alleges, “allowed [her] equal rights to be impaired by sex discrimination under the color of his legal authority. Porter did not allow [her] original California marriage contract to be give ‘Full Faith and Credit.'” Id. at 11, 13. In her Demand for Relief, Tauscher seeks the following:
- Expedited and immediate legal and physical custody of minor daughter, who is not safe from human rights violations while in Arizona under Mr. Hanshew's custody[.]
- Prohibit Mr. Hanshew from using a false claim of a “certified” Dissolution of Marriage to cause prejudice and risk to the economic and financial rights of Ms. Tauscher. There is no “certification.”
- Prohibit Mr. Hanshew from claiming the rights and privileges of marriage to cause economic and financial harm to Ms. Tauscher. He is using this right and privilege to acquire private information about her, family and friends which further exploits and coerces. This is a violation of his f[i]duciary obligation to Ms. Tauscher[.]
- Prohibit Mr. Hanshew from using legal proceeding(s) to enable others under color of law to commit human rights violations.Id. at 14.
III. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION
A district court may authorize the start of a civil action in forma pauperis if the court is satisfied the would-be plaintiff cannot pay the filling fees required to pursue the lawsuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Tauscher submitted the required documentation demonstrating an inability to pay the costs of this action, and it is evident from the application that her assets and income are insufficient to enable payment of the fees. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Tauscher's application.
IV. SUA SPONTE SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
A. Legal Standard
A court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service of process if it is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or contains a complete defense to the action on its face. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Section 1915(e)(2) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) regarding dismissals for failure to state a claim. See id.; see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000). As such, the complaint must allege facts that plausibly establish each defendant's liability. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
A complaint must also comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires the complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The failure to comply with Rule 8 is a basis for dismissal that is not dependent on whether the complaint is without merit. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, even claims which are not on their face subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may still be dismissed for violating Rule 8(a). Id.
Plaintiff is proceeding without representation by a lawyer. While the Court must construe the complaint liberally, see Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1984), it may not add to the factual allegations in the complaint, see Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). Litigants unrepresented by a lawyer remain bound by the Federal Rules and Local Rules of this District. See N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 3-9(a).
B. Application
1. Claim Preclusion
As a preliminary matter, the undersigned notes Tauscher previously brought these claims in the District of Arizona, where they were dismissed without leave to amend, with judgment entered accordingly. See Tauscher v. Donison, 2021 WL 3565738, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2021), appeal dismissed as frivolous, 2021 WL 7209749 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 2822 (June 13, 2022). Claim preclusion bars re-litigation of any claims that were raised or could have been raised in an earlier action. W. Radio Servs. Co., Inc. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Application of the claim preclusion doctrine “relieve[s] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage[s] reliance on adjudication.” Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). As the claims in this lawsuit were raised or could have been raised in the District of Arizona action, it is improper for Tauscher to reallege them here.
Even considering the claims on their merits, the undersigned finds they should be dismissed.
2. Jurisdiction
As courts of limited jurisdiction, “federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011); Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that district courts are “obligated to consider sua sponte whether [they] have subject matter jurisdiction”). To the extent Tauscher challenges any judgment entered in the state court divorce proceedings, the undersigned finds the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal district courts from hearing appeals or de facto appeals from state-court judgments. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). Any request to set aside a state court judgment is an attempt to appeal that judgment. See Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (an action is a de facto appeal when the claimed legal injuries “arise from the state court's purportedly erroneous judgment.”). Thus, any action by this Court could have the effect of reversing the outcome of the superior court proceedings. See Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2005); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003). That Tauscher may seek to bring additional claims for relief based on federal constitutional theories makes no difference. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, 485) (the district court lacks jurisdiction over claims “‘inextricably intertwined' with the state court's decision such that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling.”).
The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction bolsters the conclusion that subject matter jurisdiction in this case is inappropriate. The domestic relations exception “divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (explaining domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction). “Even when a federal question is presented, federal courts decline to hear disputes which would deeply involve them in adjudicating domestic matters.” Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 174 (1988); see also Tree Top v. Smith, 577 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1978) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over habeas petition seeking custody of child who had been adopted by others). In this circuit, federal courts refuse jurisdiction if the primary issue concerns child custody issues or the status of parent and child or husband and wife. See Coats v. Woods, 819 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir. 1987); Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136-37 (9th Cir. 1982).
In Coats, the plaintiff, invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that her ex-husband and others involved in state court proceedings had wrongfully deprived her of custody of her children. 819 F.3 at 236. Defendants included the former husband and his current wife, their attorney, the court-appointed attorney for the children, a court-appointed psychologist, two court commissioners, two superior court judges, the county, the police department, and an organization called United Fathers. Id. Plaintiff specifically alleged that defendants deprived her of child custody, thereby depriving her of a liberty interest, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2), and 1985(3). Id. Because the action at its core implicated domestic relations issues, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. Id. at 237. Like Coats, this case is at its core a domestic relations dispute.
3. Respect for Marriage Act
Tauscher alleges Hanshew “and other agents of the court” are liable under the Respect for Marriage Act because “Arizona does not have an Equal Rights Amendment in the state constitution, and has NOT passed the Federal ERA. Therefore based on ‘sex,' a woman is not equally entitled to rights and privileges associated with a marriage contract, while seeking a dissolution of marriage in Arizona state courts.” Compl. at 11.
The Respect for Marriage Act (1) repeals the Defense of Marriage Act and requires federal and state governments to recognize same-sex marriages that were valid where and when they were entered into, and (2) prohibits states from refusing to recognize marriages that were legally entered into in other states based on sex, race, ethnicity, or national origin. See 1 U.S.C. § 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C; RESPECT FOR MARRIAGE ACT, PL 117-228, December 13, 2022, 136 Stat 2305. Here, there are no allegations that the State of Arizona failed to recognize Tauscher and Hanshew's marriage, let alone based on any of these categories.
Although Tauscher brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, she does not allege a violation of that section, which applies to race or national origin discrimination. See Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 474 (2006) (“Among the many statutes that combat racial discrimination, § 1981, originally § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, has a specific function: It protects the equal right of ‘[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States' to ‘make and enforce contracts' without respect to race.”). Tauscher does not articulate any basis for finding that race or national origin are implicated in this lawsuit. Her claim as to § 1981 therefore fails.
5. Judicial Immunity
To the extent Tauscher brings claims against Judge Porter, they are barred by judicial immunity. The Supreme Court has long held that “judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) (internal quotation omitted). “[T]he scope of the judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly when the issue is the immunity of the judge. A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 356-57 (internal quotation omitted); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice[.]”). Thus, even allegations of a conspiracy between a judge and a party “do[] not pierce the immunity extended to judges .... As long as the judge's ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court's subject matter jurisdiction, immunity applies.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986). Because Tauscher's claims challenge Judge Porter's rulings in a case that was proceeding before him, judicial immunity applies. While Tauscher may complain Judge Porter was incorrect in ruling against her, this is irrelevant: “Ruling against a party, even repeatedly, does not mean that a judge is acting in his or her personal capacity. Judicial immunity ‘applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.'” Drevaleva v. Beeler, 2020 WL 553885, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2020) (quoting Nielsen v. Lunas, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13371, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2016)).
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the analysis above, the Court GRANTS the application to proceed in forma pauperis. As not all parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the Clerk of Court shall REASSIGN this case to a district judge, with the recommendation that the complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, any party may serve and file objections to this Report and Recommendation within 14 days after being served. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's order.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.