See, e.g., BellSouth , 293 Ga. App. at 250 (2), 666 S.E.2d 699 ; Hernandez v. Schumacher Group Healthcare Consulting , 352 Ga. App. 838, 847-848, 835 S.E.2d 787 (2019) ; Summerville v. Innovative Images , 349 Ga. App. 592 (2) (b), 826 S.E.2d 391 (2019) ; Samadi v. Fed. Home Loan Mtg. Corp. , 344 Ga. App. 111 (1) (b), 809 S.E.2d 69 (2017) ; In re Estate of Loyd , 328 Ga. App. 287 (3), 761 S.E.2d 833 (2014) ; Sierra-Corral Homes v. Pourreza , 308 Ga. App. 543 (1), 708 S.E.2d 17 (2011) ; Herringv. Harvey , 300 Ga. App. 560 (1), 685 S.E.2d 460 (2009) ; NorthPoint Group Holdings v. Morris , 300 Ga. App. 491 (1), 685 S.E.2d 436 (2009) ; Vibratech, Inc. v. Frost , 291 Ga. App. 133 (2), 661 S.E.2d 185 (2008) ; Sidwell v. Sidwell , 237 Ga. App. 716 (1), 515 S.E.2d 634 (1999) ; Tauber v. Community Centers Two , 235 Ga. App. 705 (3), 509 S.E.2d 662 (1998) ; First Union Nat. Bank of Ga. v. Floyd , 198 Ga. App. 99 (2), 400 S.E.2d 393 (1990) ; Early Co. v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works , 131 Ga. App. 775, 206 S.E.2d 612 (1974). It has been a great day at the State.
Accordingly, because Mt. Nebo failed to answer the dispossessory suit within seven days as required by OCGA § 44-7-53 (a), the trial court properly granted Abbey Lending a default judgment. See Tauber v. Community Centers Two, LLC., 235 Ga. App. 705, 706 (2), 509 S.E.2d 662 (1998), disapproved on other grounds by Bowen v. Savoy, 308 Ga. 204, 209 n. 7, 839 S.E.2d 546 (2020); Harper, 305 Ga. App. at 538 (1), 699 S.E.2d 854. 2. Mt. Nebo contends that the trial court should have used its discretion to open the default.
In his brief, Strader criticizes our decision in Nelson, characterizing the “hands off approach” taken in that opinion as being inconsistent with other decisions of this Court, the vast majority of which resulted in this Court affirming the trial court's exercise of its discretion to grant or deny a motion to open default. See Sierra–Corral Homes, LLC v. Pourreza, 308 Ga.App. 543, 543–45(1), 708 S.E.2d 17 (2011); NorthPoint Group Holdings, LLC, 300 Ga.App. at 493(1)(a), 685 S.E.2d 436; Herring v. Harvey, 300 Ga.App. 560, 560–62(1), 685 S.E.2d 460 (2009); Henderson, 260 Ga.App. at 680–81(1), 580 S.E.2d 542; Tauber v. Cmty. Ctrs. Two, LLC, 235 Ga.App. 705, 706(3), 509 S.E.2d 662 (1998); First Union Nat'l Bank of Ga. v. Floyd, 198 Ga.App. 99, 100–01(2), 400 S.E.2d 393 (1990) (physical precedent only). Suffice it to say, Strader's reliance on these decisions is badly misplaced.
Shuler v. Hicks, Massey Gardner, LLP, 280 Ga. App. 738, 742 (2) ( 634 SE2d 786) (2006). See Tauber v. Community Centers Two, 235 Ga. App. 705, 706 (1) ( 509 SE2d 662) (1998). See 28 USC § 1446 (d) (providing that after removal "the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded").
Whatever that injustice might be, it may be avoided and the default opened under the "proper case" analysis only where a reasonable explanation for the failure to timely answer exists. See Sidwell v. Sidwell, 237 Ga. App. 716, 717-718 (1) ( 515 SE2d 634) (1999) ("a proper case" does not vest a court with unbridled discretion to open a default for reasons falling short of a reasonable excuse for failure to answer; defendant's desire to avoid causing the plaintiff, his dying father, emotional pain held unreasonable explanation for untimely answer); Tauber v. Community Centers Two, 235 Ga. App. 705 ( 509 SE2d 662) (1998) (accord); First Union Nat. Bank c. v. Floyd, 198 Ga. App. 99, 101 (2) ( 400 SE2d 393) (1990) (physical precedent only) (accord). Requiring a reasonable excuse or explanation for opening the default on this ground is necessary, otherwise the trial court would not be acting "[with]in its discretion" as required by OCGA § 9-11-55 (b).
See John Deere Co. v. Haralson, 278 Ga. 192, 195, n. 3 ( 599 SE2d 164) (2004). Id.; see also Tauber v. Community Centers Two, 235 Ga. App. 705, 706-707 (3) ( 509 SE2d 662) (1998) (unconditional guarantee rendered guarantor liable for rent of tenant holding over). No case cited by Hood mandates a contrary result.
The trial court found that the sole reason for default was the negligence of the movant, so that there was no providential cause, excusable neglect, or a proper case. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55 (b); Tauber v. Community Ctrs. Two, 235 Ga. App. 705, 706-707 (3) ( 509 S.E.2d 662) (1998); Patel v. Gupta, 234 Ga. App. 441 ( 507 S.E.2d 763) (1998). 4. Winn-Dixie set forth that the trial court erred under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60 (d) (3) and failed to exercise its discretion within term to set aside the default judgment.