Opinion
No. 79 C 5160
May 14, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Anna Lewis ("Anna") was a member of the successful class of plaintiffs in this action against the City of Chicago ("City") Following this Court's June 1993 issuance of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that granted enforcement of the rights of Anna and other claimants under the Consent Decree that had been entered on April 4, 1983 by this Court's predecessor in the case, Honorable Stanley Roszkowski, this Court issued its Final Judgment and Order for Plaintiff Anna Lewis ("Judgment Order," a photocopy of which is attached as Ex. 1 to this memorandum order).
Lewis was indeed rehired by the City in 1993, and she later went on disability and ultimately died on November 21, 2001. Now her sons Marcus and Martin Lewis (collectively "Lewises") have moved to obtain certain additional relief to which they claim Anna was entitled. Both Lewises and City have submitted memoranda addressing the claims advanced by Lewises for:
City has properly questioned Lewises' standing to proceed here, pointing out that no proper substitution of parties has taken place because of Anna's death. Although no probate estate has been opened for Anna, nor has either Martin or Marcus been appointed to administer her estate, they have currently provided an affidavit of heirship establishing that they are Anna's sole heirs and successors. This Court therefore orders that Lewises be substituted for Anna for all purposes in this action — see Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a).
1. payment of the sum of $7,395, which is equal to all but a minor fraction of the contributions that Anna would have been required to make to the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago ("Fund") if she had been employed by City from October 1, 1988 through August 26, 1993 (although such contributions were never in fact made by Anna herself); and
2. payment of $25,000 in life insurance from Bankers Life Insurance Company ("Bankers Life") — in that respect, see Lewises' Mem. 3 ¶ 6 and their Mem. Ex. E (a copy of which is attached as Ex. 2 to this memorandum order) and City's Mem. 4 n. 6 and its Mem. Ex. C (a copy of which is attached as Ex. 3 to this memorandum order).
This memorandum order addresses both of those claims.
As for the pension-related claim, since the date of Anna's death her sons have already received $23,735.42 as a refund of the portion of her contributions to Fund that amounted to 8% of her salary during the time that she actually paid contributions, plus statutory interest (such a refund was called for by, and made pursuant to, 40 ILCS 5/8-170). But for the period from October 1, 1988 through August 1, 1993 — a period during which Anna was not actually employed — Fund agreed to give Anna personal service credit only if she made her required employee contributions that would have aggregated the $7,395 figure, and nothing in the Judgment Order or in any other document or provision of law has created any greater entitlement on Anna's part. Because Anna had provided Fund with only $1,150 of that amount before her death (in the form of deductions from the payment of her disability benefits after June 30, 2001), that $1,150 amount was also refunded by Fund to Lewises.
Although Anna's total contributions to Fund had actually been made at the rate of 8-1/2% of her salary, the remaining 1/2% was nonrefundable pursuant to 40 ILCS 5/8-137(b).
With Judgment Order ¶ 2 specifying Anna's damages as $87,000, an amount that was concededly paid in full, it would distort the relationship between the parties to require City to pay not only that amount but also Anna's share of any contributions required to be made to Fund.
It is thus difficult to see any even arguably reasoned basis for Lewises' first claim. If Anna had in fact been employed by City during the period at issue, she would have been required to make those contributions — and by definition only those contributions by her could have been the source of a statutory refund. How then can the non-employed Anna serve as the source of a "refund" to the heirs of the non-contributing Anna?
To turn to the $25,000 life insurance claim, even though City did not believe Lewises were still advancing such a claim (see City Mem. 4 n. 6), out of caution it attached the affidavit from Bankers Life that is Ex. 3 to this memorandum order. Paragraphs 3 through 5 of that affidavit, as well as the Bankers Life explanatory letter (Ex. 2 to this memorandum order), have explained that Anna never took the necessary steps to obtain optional life insurance from Bankers Life after she left active service with City.
Because Anna thus had no arguable direct claim to such continued policy coverage (so that Lewises have no arguable direct; claim to any policy proceeds), Lewises have been compelled to argue instead that the $25,000 figure somehow represents damages recoverable "[d]ue to the City's failure to notify [Anna] that she had to continue premium payments on her own" (Lewises' Mem. 3). But quite apart from Lewises' failure to provide any evidence to support that assertion as to lack of notice (a failure that would alone call for denial of Lewises' motion), there is no showing of any obligation on City's part to have given Anna such a notice. In sum, Lewises' second contention is unsuccessful as well.
Anna's situation was not one coming within the purview of COBRA, which provides for the continuation of individual coverage under group health plans established by an employer (see 29 U.S.C. § 1161 and 1163).
This Court expresses its thanks to appointed counsel Joseph Ziccardi for his efforts on Lewises' behalf. Attorney Ziccardi has put the best face possible on the contentions that Lewises had originally advanced pro se, and the failure of those contentions reflected in this memorandum order is for lack of merit and not for lack of effort.