TAUB v. BOWLES

13 Citing cases

  1. Blumenthal v. United States

    332 U.S. 539 (1947)   Cited 607 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that whiskey salesmen conspired with the original, but unknown, owner of the whiskey when they knew themselves to be aiding "a single over-all comprehensive plan"

    Conviction under the general conspiracy statute requires more than mere agreement, namely, the commission of an overt act. See also Taub v. Bowles, 149 F.2d 817; H.R. Rep. No. 827, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8. The judgment is

  2. Tanners Hides Inc. of Texas v. Kendall

    219 F.2d 710 (Fed. Cir. 1955)   Cited 1 times

    Limiting the complaint, as we must, to the specific objections raised by complainant in its application for leave to file, the issues growing out of its objections to the first sentence of the headnote of Table II and to Note 4 are properly before us for decision and respondent's motion must be denied. Complainant attempts, however, to raise objections to certain provisions of Table I. These objections are clearly beyond the scope of the issues preserved by its application to the enforcement court and the order granting leave to file and, therefore, are not properly before us. Accordingly, we do not consider them. Taub v. Bowles, Em.App., 149 F.2d 817; Fournace v. Bowles, Em.App., 148 F.2d 97. Before we reach the question of validity of the regulation, we shall consider respondent's contention that there is no evidence before us that the particular shipments of hides in question were of standard packer selections but that, on the contrary, they were heterogeneous lots, the price of which is governed by Table I prices for unselected hides, and that complainant has not sustained its burden to prove that the transactions are within the provisions of the Table II scale for selected hides.

  3. Superior Packing Co. v. Clark

    164 F.2d 343 (Fed. Cir. 1947)   Cited 10 times

    Section 3(e) of the Act in its original statutory form and as it read all during the period now in question was as follows: "(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this or any other law, no action shall be taken under this Act by the Administrator or any other person with respect to any agricultural commodity without the prior approval of the Secretary of Agriculture; except that the Administrator may take such action as may be necessary under section 202 and section 205(a) and (b) to enforce compliance with any regulation, order, price schedule or other requirement with respect to an agricultural commodity which has been previously approved by the Secretary of Agriculture." As we pointed out in Taub v. Bowles, Em.App., 1945, 149 F.2d 817, 823, certiorari denied, 1945, 326 U.S. 732, 66 S.Ct. 39, 90 L.Ed. 435, the phrase "agricultural commodity" in § 3(e) was in obvious contrast with the language of § 3(c): "(c) No maximum price shall be established or maintained for any commodity processed or manufactured in whole or substantial part from any agricultural commodity below a price which will reflect to producers of such agricultural commodity a price for such agricultural commodity equal to the highest price therefor specified in subsection (a)." A live steer is an "agricultural commodity", produced on a farm and sold by a farmer in its raw, natural or unprocessed state.

  4. Chippewa County Co-op. Dairy v. Clark

    163 F.2d 753 (Fed. Cir. 1947)   Cited 3 times

    Complainant attacks the regulation as violative of Section 2(a) for the further reason, as it contends, that the Administrator failed to consult with representative members of the industry prior to the issuance of the regulation on the merits. We are without authority to pass upon the objection, for it was included in neither the complaint nor complainant's application for leave to file a complaint in this court. Under such circumstances complainant is precluded from urging it now. Fournace v. Bowles, Em.App., 148 F.2d 97, certiorari denied 325 U.S. 884, 65 S.Ct. 1573, 89 L.Ed. 1999; Taub v. Bowles, Em.App., 149 F.2d 817, certiorari denied 326 U.S. 732, 66 S. Ct. 39, 90 L.Ed. 435. Complainant urges that the Administrator violated Section 3(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act in that he did not secure the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture prior to institution of treble-damage action under Section 205(e), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 925(e), and, collaterally to this contention, complainant urges that the Secretary of Agriculture did not investigate and proclaim that the maximum price for concentrated skim milk would reflect parity to milk producers as required by the National War Agencies Appropriations Act of 1943 and the Second Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 597. Section 3(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act as amended provides that no action shall be taken by the Administrator with respect to any agricultural commodity without the prior approval of the Secretary of Agriculture; except, however, that the Administrator may take such action as may be necessary under Section 202,

  5. Dowling Bros. Distilling Co. v. United States

    153 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1946)   Cited 25 times
    Upholding federal price regulations under war powers

    The Act does not require it and specifically distinguishes in its provisions between agricultural commodities and commodities processed and manufactured in substantial part from grain. Compare section 3(c) of the Emergency Price Control Act, and see Taub v. Bowles, Em.App., 149 F.2d 817, 823. The principal ground, however, upon which the appellants base their petition for leave to complain in the Emergency Court of Appeals, is that the Emergency Price Control Act is unconstitutional, in view of the Twenty-first Amendment, to the extent that it authorizes the fixing of maximum prices on intoxicating liquors in the State of Kentucky, since that state has invaded the field and completely controls the manufacture and sale of such liquors.

  6. Bowles v. Luster

    153 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1946)   Cited 2 times

    50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 924(e); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834. Taub v. Bowles, Em.App., 149 F.2d 817. United States v. Aronin, D.C., 57 F. Supp. 186.

  7. Collins v. Bowles

    152 F.2d 760 (Fed. Cir. 1946)   Cited 14 times

    Complainants insist that, under the Twenty-First Amendment, the state of Kentucky has exclusive right to regulate liquor and sales thereof and that federal agencies are precluded from fixing maximum prices therefor. We announced in Taub et al. v. Bowles, Em.App., 149 F.2d 817 (ECA) that the amendment works no deprivation of constitutional power of the federal government, including the power to enact emergency price control legislation under the war power. We adhered to that decision in Barnett v. Bowles, Em.App., 151 F.2d 77 and are of the same opinion still.

  8. Idlewild Bon-Voyage Liqour Corp. v. Epstein

    212 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)   Cited 8 times
    Assuming Twenty-first Amendment is otherwise applicable to New York State

    See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 65 S.Ct. 661, 89 L.Ed. 951 (1945) (Sherman Act); Washington Brewers Institute v. United States, 137 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1943) (same); Jameson Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171, 59 S.Ct. 804, 83 L.Ed. 1189 (1939) (Federal Alcohol Administration Act); Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Alexander, 109 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1940) (same). See also Dowling Bros. Distilling Co. v. United States, 153 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1946) (upholding federal price regulations under war powers); Taub v. Bowles, 149 F.2d 817 (U.S. Emergency Ct.App. 1945) (same). "It is enough that Virginia could conclude, in the absence of contrary federal legislation, that she could not safely permit the transportation of liquor through her territory by those who concededly mean to break federal laws and the laws of a neighboring state."

  9. Porter v. Sunshine Packing Corporation

    81 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Pa. 1948)   Cited 3 times
    In Porter v. Sunshine Packing Corporation of Pennsylvania, D.C., 81 F. Supp. 566, it was held that where the jury returned a general verdict, and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was duly filed, entry of judgment on the verdict before passing on the motion of judgment n.o.v. was premature, and it would be set aside.

    The phrase "agricultural commodity" in section 3(e) was in obvious contrast with the language of section 3(c): "(c) No maximum price shall be established or maintained for any commodity processed or manufactured in whole or substantial part from any agricultural commodity below a price which will reflect to producers of such agricultural commodity a price for such agricultural commodity equal to the highest price therefor specified in subsection (a)". Taub v. Bowles, Em.App., 149 F.2d 817, 823, certiorari denied 326 U.S. 732, 66 S.Ct. 39, 90 L.Ed. 435. Since the items involved in the instant case would fall within the category of foods processed or manufactured in whole or substantial part from agricultural commodities, the lack of approval of the regulations by the Secretary of Agriculture is without legal significance.

  10. United States v. National City Lines

    80 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1948)   Cited 38 times
    In United States v. National City Lines, 80 F. Supp. 734, 738, (certiorari denied, 337 U.S. 79, 93 [69 S.Ct. 955, 93 L.Ed. 1226]) it was held that matters of venue and change of venue are ordinarily mere incidences of procedure, and may have valid retrospective operation.

    Differently put, legislative history simply corroborates the obvious meaning of the language used in the law. See, Taub v. Bowles, 1945, Em.App., 149 F.2d 817, 819-821. To read exceptions into such language is to disregard the evident.