Tate v. Tyzzer

9 Citing cases

  1. Cardinale v. Kemp

    274 S.W. 437 (Mo. 1925)   Cited 40 times

    There was sufficient evidence from which an inference of negligence could have been drawn by the jury. Stratton v. Barnum, 263 S.W. 478; Peak v. Taubman, 251 Mo. 390; Enloe v. Am. Car Fdry, Co., 240 Mo. 443; Kelley v. Ross, 165 Mo. App. 475; Ertel v. Warren, 157 Mo. App. 592; Maginnis v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 268 Mo. 667; Troll v. Ehrler Dray, Co., 162 S.W. 185; Krinard v. Westerman, 216 S.W. 940; Eichholz v. Poe, 217 S.W. 282; Sontag v. Ude, 191 Mo. App. 617; Leeright v. Ahrens, 60 Mo. App. 118; Hague v. Threadgill, 236 S.W. 897; Tate v. Tyzzer, 234 S.W. 1040. (2) The court erred in excluding competent, relevant and material testimony of Drs. Shahan and Jacobs, offered in evidence by plaintiff. Cecil v. Wells, 259 S.W. 849; O'Leary v. Scullin Steel Co., 260 S.W. 61; Hague v. Threadgill, 236 S.W. 896.

  2. Hodgson v. Bigelow

    335 Pa. 497 (Pa. 1939)   Cited 67 times
    In Hodgson v. Bigelow, 335 Pa. 497, 511, we quoted with approval from Herzog on "Medical Jurisprudence" (p. 168, sec. 192): " `The accepted rule is that negligence must be proved by expert medical testimony unless the negligence is so grossly apparent that a layman would have no difficulty in recognizing it.

    Causal connection between two facts may be shown by either direct or circumstantial evidence. See the following cases: Kohlmeyer v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 58 Pa. Super. 63; Norwood v. Goeddel, 58 Pa. Super. 500; Cowan v. Bouffleur, 192 Illinois A. 21; Tate v. Tyzzer, 208 Mo. A. 290, 234 S.W. 1038; Fowler v. Scheldrup, 166 Minn. 164, 207 N.W. 177; Kruger v. Bossingham, 152 Minn. 248, 188 N.W. 324; and Pelky v. Kivlin, 199 App. Div. 114, 191 N.Y. S. 428. When a finding is a reasonable inference from the facts and conditions directly proved, it must be classed as legal evidence and not as a mere conjecture, surmise or guess.

  3. Satterlee v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.

    336 Mo. 943 (Mo. 1935)   Cited 14 times
    In Satterlee v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 336 Mo. 943, 82 S.W.2d 69, the court held that a plaintiff to recover under the Boiler Inspection Act must show that the equipment causing the injury was not in proper condition and safe to operate in the service to which it was being put.

    16 F.2d 313; Southern Ry. v. Crockett, 234 U.S. 725; Erie Ry. Co. v. Lindquist, 27 F.2d 98; United States v. Duluth, 281 F. 347; Northwestern Pac. v. Bobo, 54 Sup. Ct. 263; Patton v. Ry. Co., 179 U.S. 658; Railway v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472; N.Y.C. v. Ambrose, 280 U.S. 486; A.T. S.F. Ry. Co. v. Toops, 50 Sup. Ct. 281; State v. Haid, 28 S.W.2d 97; Stewart v. Laclede Co., 241 S.W. 909; Hatchett v. United Rys. Co., 175 S.W. 878; Settle v. Railroad, 127 Mo. 336; Daly v. Pryor, 198 S.W. 91; Curlin v. St. Louis, etc., Co., 232 S.W. 215; Freeman v. K.C. Pub. Serv. Co., 30 S.W.2d 176; Young v. Wheelock, 64 S.W.2d 950; Kimmie v. Railroad Co., 66 S.W.2d 561; Henry v. Ry. Co., 61 S.W.2d 342; Glasco, etc., Co. v. Union, etc., Co., 61 S.W.2d 957; Lobach v. Ry. Co., 172 Mo. App. 278; State v. Ellison, 268 Mo. 239; Brooks v. Mo. Pub. Co., 242 S.W. 433; Burtch v. Railroad Co., 236 S.W. 338; Wecker v. Grafeman-McIntosh Ice Cream Co., 31 S.W.2d 977; Teutenberg v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 41 S.W.2d 956; Tate v. Tyzzer, 234 S.W. 1038; Martin v. Railroad Co., 46 S.W.2d 149; Griggs v. Rys. Co., 228 S.W. 508; Halt v. Railroad Co., 279 S.W. 150; Berkbigler v. Scott, 275 S.W. 599; T. R. Co. v. Cannon, 296 F. 302; State ex rel. v. Bland, 64 S.W.2d 638. STURGIS, C.

  4. Telanus v. Simpson

    12 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. 1928)   Cited 20 times

    The burden was upon him to prove that certain nerves, muscles, etc., had been negligently cut by the defendants. Weber v. Milling Co., 242 S.W. 985; Williams v. Wabash Ry. Co., 175 S.W. 900; Borowski v. Biscuit Co., 229 S.W. 424; 29 Cyc. 597, 600; Williams v. Modern Woodmen, 204 Mo. App. 135; Downs v. Horton, 287 Mo. 432; Menzenworth v. Life Ins. Co., 249 S.W. 115. The jury was left to arrive at its conclusion that the anterior crural nerve had been cut, solely by conjecture, by speculation and by guessing. This the law does not permit. Moon v. Transit Co., 247 Mo. 227; Dyer v. Building Contr. Co., 258 S.W. 48; Courter v. Mercantile Co., 266 S.W. 340; State ex rel. Bush v. Sturgis, 281 Mo. 598; Mullery v. Tel. Co., 180 Mo. App. 128; Rohr v. Gas Lighting Co., 67 So. 361; Cowan v. Brick Co., 222 S.W. 926; Small v. Ice Co., 179 Mo. App. 465; Turnbow v. Durham, 272 Mo. 53; Nevinger v. Haun, 196 S.W. 42; Tate v. Tyzzer, 234 S.W. 1038; Tinke v. Hess, 174 N.W. 466; Taby v. Warta, 196 N.W. 91; Coombs v. Janes, 144 P. 635; Matushka v. Murphy, 180 N.W. 821. If, for any reason, it should be urged that plaintiff's petition alleged general negligence, instead of specific acts of negligence, even under such circumstances no cause of action was made out for the jury. No negligence was shown, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application in malpractice cases of this character.

  5. York v. Daniels

    241 Mo. App. 809 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953)   Cited 14 times
    In York an exhumation and autopsy had been performed upon authorization by a deceased's husband (the party plaintiff), the fact of which was not an issue in the case.

    Eichholz v. Poe et al., (S. Ct.) 217 S.W. 282; Wright v. Stickler, 96 S.W.2d 932, l.c. 938, (11); The State ex rel. American School of Osteopathy v. Charles U. Daues et al., Judges of St. Louis Court of Appeals, 322 Mo. 991, l.c. 999, 18 S.W.2d 487; Foster v. Thornton, 152 So. 667, 113 Fla. 600; Persten v. Chesney, (Mo. App.) 212 S.W.2d 469, 473, 474 (4, 5). E. Dr. Coller's testimony that the examination and treatment of plaintiff's wife could cause the injuries to her spine and that the injuries he found could cause her death within a period of 18 hours, together with all the other evidence made a submissible case. Kimmie v. Terminal R.R. Association of St. Louis (S. Ct.) 66 S.W.2d 561, l.c. 565 (9-11); Tate v. Tyzzer, 234 S.W. 1038, 208 Mo. App. 290 (2) l.c. 301. III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE AUTOPSY REPORT. Key v. Cosmopolitan Life, Health and Accident Insurance Company, 102 SW (2) 797, l.c. 799 (5). A. An original document properly authenticated, and made contemporaneously with transaction it represents and in accordance with regular usage of business is admissible as res gestae. Stephen v. Metzger 95 Mo. App. l.c. 624; Gordon and Koppel Clothing Co. v. N.Y. Central R. Co., 285 S.W. 755; Kuether v. K.C. Light and Power Co. 220 Mo. App. l.c. 460, 276 S.W. 105. B. In criminal cases in prosecution for murder evidence on part of State developing autopsies or post mortem examination on bodies of others shot by defendant at time held admissible as being competent not only as part of res gestae, but as bearing on question of deliberation.

  6. Costello v. Sov. Camp, W.O.W

    162 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942)   Cited 1 times

    o. (Mo. App.), 131 S.W.2d 906, 910; Mills v. American Mutual Assn. (Mo. App.), 151 S.W.2d 459, 460-2; Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America (Mo. App.), 151 S.W.2d 462, 465; O'Ferrall v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 121 S.W.2d 304, 306-7; Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Rolaff (C.C.A. 8), 110 F.2d 491, 492; Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Wickham, 141 U.S. 564, 12 S.C.R. 84, 88; Harrison v. Murray Iron Works Co. (Mo. App.), 70 S.W. 261, 263; Yancey v. Central, etc. (Mo. App.), 77 S.W.2d 149, 154; American Ntl. Ins. Co. v. Reed (Ala.), 160 So. 543; Abercrombie v. Goode, 187 Ala. 310, 65 So. 861; American Workmen v. James, 14 Ala. App. 477, 70 So. 979; Buel v. K.C. Life Ins. Co. (N.M.), 250 P. 635, 638; 5 Joyce on Insurance, art. 3465. (2) There was no error committed by the court in overruling objections made by defendant to the hypothetical question, or questions, asked Dr. Pallett. Wills v. Berberich's, etc., Co. (Mo.), 134 S.W.2d 125; Trusty's Constructing Reviewing Instructions, sec. 19, pp. 78-81; Tate v. Tyzzer (Mo. App.), 234 S.W. 1038, 1040; Gardner v. Turk (Mo.), 123 S.W.2d 158, 163; Langeneckert v. St. L.S. Ch. Co. (Mo. App.), 65 S.W.2d 648; Kimmie v. Ter. R.R. Assn. (Mo.), 66 S.W.2d 561; Schepman v. Mutual, etc. (Mo. App.), 104 S.W.2d 777, 782; Goucher v. Woodmen Acc. Co. (Mo. App.), 104 S.W.2d 289. (3) The court did not err in refusing defendant's Instruction D which offered to submit the issue as to whether a bona fide dispute existed as to death being from accidental means. See authorities under Point (1). (4) The court did not err in permitting the plaintiff, Mrs. Costello, to state that her husband said that he just had a hard fall. Goucher v. Woodmen Acc. Co. (Mo. App.), 104 S.W.2d 289, 293-4; Greenlee v. K.C. Cas. Co. (Mo. App.), 182 S.W. 138, 140; Pryor v. Payne (Mo. en banc), 263 S.W. 982, 985; Landau v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (Mo. en banc), 267 S.W. 370, 375; Landau v. Travelers Ins. Co. (Mo. en banc), 267 S.W. 376, 379.

  7. Jordan v. Daniels

    27 S.W.2d 1052 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930)   Cited 17 times

    The following authorities make it clear that, under the pleadings and evidence in this case, the terms of the contract between these parties could not be affected or changed by proof of an alleged custom. [Staroske v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 235 Mo. 67; Hayden v. Grillo's Adm'r. 42 Mo. App. 1, 5: Tate v. Tvzzer, 208 Mo. App. 290, 234 S.W. 1038, 1041; Dietz v. Nix, 216 S.W. 791, 793; Kirkland v. Bixby, 222 S.W. 462, 464, 465; Maher v. Donk Bros. Coal Coke Co., 20 S.W.2d 888, 895.] Furthermore, where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous they cannot be varied or contradicted by evidence of custom or usage, and this is true whether the contract be written or verbal.

  8. Pennsylvania Railroad v. Lincoln Trust Co.

    91 Ind. App. 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 1929)   Cited 9 times
    In R.R. Co. v. Lincoln Trust Co. (Ind.), 167 N.E. 721, it appears that an epidemic of typhoid fever occurred in Ft. Wayne in August and September, 1923. The city obtained its water from Marys river into which the bowel excrements of the afflicted were flushed.

    We believe the true rule, when applied to the instant case, is, if two or more possible causes exist, for only one of which a defendant may be liable, and a party injured establishes facts from which it can be said with reasonable certainty that the direct cause of the injury is the one for which the defendant is liable, the party complaining has complied with the rule. Stubbs v. City of Rochester (1919), 226 N.Y. 516, 124 N.E. 137, 5 A.L.R. 1396; Tate v. Tyzzer (1921), 208 Mo. App. 290, 234 S.W. 1038; Gates v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (1926), 255 Mass. 297, 151 N.E. 320. See, also, Hamilton v. Madison Water Co., supra, and authorities there cited, as to burden of proof. Actual notice or knowledge of the unwholesome character of the water was not an essential element to be proved in order to establish liability on the part of the city. It was 7, 8. sufficient if there was evidence tending to show that the city, in the exercise of reasonable care, might have discovered the unwholesome and dangerous character of the water.

  9. Brown v. Grinstead

    253 S.W. 973 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923)   Cited 15 times
    In Brown v. Grinsted, 212 Mo.App. 533, 252 S.W. 973 (1923), under facts similar to those at hand, the court held that the surgeon must know of the presence of the sponge in plaintiff's body before he could be held to be guilty of fraud.

    17 R.C.L., sec. 32, page 686, (5) The question of negligence was one for the jury. Krinard v. Westerman, ___ Mo. ___, 216 S.W. 938, 940; Hague v. Threadgill, ___ Mo. App. ___, 236 S.W. 895, 896-897; Tate et al. v. Tyzzer, ___ Mo. App. ___, 234 S.W. 1038, 1041; Evans v. Clapp, ___ Mo. App. ___, 231 S.W. 79; Gottschall v. Geiger, ___ Mo. App. ___, 231 S.W. 87, 96; Sontag v. Ude, ___ Mo. App. ___, 177 S.W. 659. (6) Respondent's position that no presumptions and inferences can be indulged in in the case at bar is directly contrary to the holdings of the courts of this State. Krinard v. Westerman, ___ Mo. ___, 216 S.W. 938, 940; Sontag v. Ude, ___ Mo. App. ___, 177 S.W. 659, 661; Fields v. Metropolitan Street Railway Company, 169 Mo. App. 624, 633. (7) That the Legislature may change an existing Statute of Limitations and shorten the period of limitations provided a reasonable time is allowed for actions to be brought or extend the period and lengthen the time in which suits may be brought is a well settled principle of law. 17 R.C.L., secs. 11, 12, page 672; Tice v. Fleming, 173 Mo. 49, 55; Lawrence v. Louisville, 27 L.R.A. 560.