Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-2115-GTV
April 9, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Terry Tate filed this lawsuit against her former employer, Defendant Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County, Kansas, alleging that Defendant unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994), and breached an implied contract of employment in violation of Kansas state law. The case is before the court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 30). For the reasons set forth below, the court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's Title VII claim, and dismisses Plaintiff's state law claim without prejudice.
Plaintiff also alleged unlawful retaliation under Title VII. Plaintiff has indicated, however, that she no longer wishes to pursue a claim for retaliation. The court, therefore, considers Plaintiff's claim for retaliation withdrawn.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence presented by the parties demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A "genuine" issue of fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the issue either way. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). An issue of fact is "material" if it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. See id. (citing same). The court must consider the record, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See id.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 670-71 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). If the moving party will not bear the burden of persuasion at trial, that party "may make its prima facie demonstration simply by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim." Id. at 671 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts from which a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party. See id.
II. Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the summary judgment record and are either uncontroverted or viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff's case. Immaterial facts and facts not properly supported by the record are omitted.
Plaintiff began working for Defendant in 1993 in the Human Services and Aging Department (the "HSA Department"). In late 1998, she became a Senior Account Clerk. At that time, Defendant employed three persons as Senior Account Clerks: Plaintiff, Ms. Shirley Cady, and Mr. Dean Guillies.
While Plaintiff, Ms. Cady, and Mr. Guillies each held the position of Senior Account Clerk, their job duties were not the same. For instance, Plaintiff spent approximately fifty percent of her time processing accounts payable and journal vouchers, whereas Mr. Guillies spent only ten percent of his time processing accounts payable, and approximately thirty-five percent of his time acting as the administrative and financial liaison to various teams in the HSA Department, providing financial and budgetary analysis and developing customized reports, and thirty percent of his time preparing payroll.
In January of 1999, Defendant began evaluating the positions of several of its employees. Because it was common for employees with the same job title to perform different duties, and for certain employees' duties to change over time, Defendant believed it was necessary to evaluate each person's duties to determine whether he or she was performing tasks consistent with his or her job title.
Defendant reviewed the duties assigned to the three Senior Account Clerks. Defendant determined that Plaintiff and Ms. Cady were performing tasks consistent with the position of Senior Account Clerk, and were thus properly classified as Senior Account Clerks, with a pay grade level of 7. Defendant determined that Mr. Guillies, however, was not performing tasks consistent with the position of Senior Account Clerk, as his tasks required "more independent direction and a more complex cognitive style." As a result, Defendant reclassified Mr. Guillies to the position of Accounting Assistant, with a pay grade level of 9.
Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Guillies's reclassification was the result of sex discrimination. Plaintiff contends that Mr. Guillies was given preferential treatment in that he was allowed to attend more training classes than she and Ms. Cady. Plaintiff further alleges that, due to this advanced training, Mr. Guillies was afforded the opportunity to perform more complex tasks associated with the position of Senior Account Clerk, and thus to have his position reclassified to Accounting Assistant, with a pay grade level of 9.
III. Discussion
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of sex when it failed to provide her with outside training opportunities, and refused to reclassify her position to one with a higher pay grade level. Because Plaintiff offers no direct evidence of discrimination, the court utilizes the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to evaluate her claim. See Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Plaintiff initially bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See id. (citing Reynolds v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1533 (10th Cir. 1995)). If Plaintiff is successful in doing so, the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. See id. (citing same). If Defendant offers a nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to prove that Defendant's proffered reason is merely pretextual, or unworthy of credence or belief. See id. (citing Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997); Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995)). To establish a prima facie case for her claim of disparate treatment, Plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the training opportunities and pay grade increase at issue, and (3) she was denied the training opportunities and pay grade increase under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1227 n. 6 (10th Cir. 2000). For purposes of this motion, the court will assume without deciding that Plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
The court, therefore, shifts its focus to Defendant's proffered reason for its challenged actions. See Shorter, 188 F.3d at 1208. Defendant states that it provided Mr. Guillies with "different job opportunities, including job duties and training . . . because [it] perceived Guillies to have better training and experience in accounting" and "[h]is job duties required that he receive certain training that was not appropriate for [Plaintiff] given [her] job duties." Defendant states that it reclassified Mr. Guillies's position from Senior Account Clerk to Accounting Assistant because, according to its Hay Classification System, Mr. Guillies's job duties were more consistent with the position of Accounting Assistant (which has a pay grade level of 9). Similarly, Defendant states that it did not reclassify Plaintiff's position because, according to its Hay Classification System, Plaintiff's duties were consistent with the position of Senior Account Clerk (which has a pay grade level of 7).
The court determines that Defendant has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its challenged actions. The burden, therefore, shifts back to Plaintiff to prove that Defendant's reasons are merely pretextual, or unworthy of credence or belief. See id. (citing Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323; Randle, 69 F.3d at 451). Plaintiff fails to meet her burden. Plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether Defendant's proffered reasons are pretextual.
Plaintiff first points to the fact that Mr. Guillies "was given somewhat different tasks to perform day-to-day than the two women," and argues that such discrepancy is probative of pretext. The court does not agree.
While the evidence makes clear that Mr. Guillies was assigned tasks different from those assigned to Plaintiff and Ms. Cady, the evidence also makes clear that such circumstances were not unusual. The uncontroverted evidence is that "[i]t is common for [Defendant's] employees who have the same job title to actually perform different job duties." Moreover, Defendant does not deny that Mr. Guillies performed differing tasks. Defendant admits that Plaintiff spent approximately fifty percent of her time processing accounts payable and journal vouchers, while Mr. Guillies spent approximately sixty-five percent of his time acting as the administrative and financial liaison to various teams in the HSA Department, providing financial and budgetary analysis, developing customized reports, and preparing payroll. Defendant maintains, however, that Mr. Guillies was assigned different and more complex tasks because he was perceived as having better training and experience in accounting. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to shed doubt upon this explanation. The uncontroverted evidence is that Mr. Guillies was 12 hours short of a Bachelor's Degree in Accounting from the University of Kansas. Plaintiff, on the other hand, had three years of college education, but with an emphasis on psychology and history. Plaintiff had not taken any courses in accounting. In light of the fact that it was common for employees with the same job title to perform different tasks, and the fact that Mr. Guillies had advanced training in accounting, the court discerns no evidence of pretext from the fact that Mr. Guillies performed job duties that were different from Plaintiff's and Ms. Cady's job duties — even if Mr. Guillies's duties were more complex. This is especially true in light of the fact that Mr. Guillies's primary functions pertained to finances and accounting.
Mr. Guillies spent the other thirty-five percent of his time ordering office supplies and equipment (10%); processing accounts payable (10%); maintaining and repairing office equipment (5%); serving on department committees and attending staff meetings (5%); and assisting an administrative manager with complex or highly technical projects (5%).
Plaintiff next attempts to establish pretext by presenting evidence that "[t]he two female Senior Account Clerks . . . were denied all requests for outside training, while the male Senior Account Clerk, Mr. Guillies, routinely received training opportunities." Plaintiff offers her own affidavit which states in relevant part:
Prior to the reclassification of pay grade status . . . I had sought training opportunities from my supervision. . . . Ms. Cady did so as well. I was always denied such opportunities, as was Ms. Cady. I am aware that Mr. Guillies was granted extra training opportunities, however, prior to receiving his pay grade increase.
Plaintiff also offers the deposition testimony of Ms. Cady which states:
• Prior to the classification that occurred I believe with regard to the job that [Mr. Guillies] held did you believe that there was discrimination in the [HSA Department] against persons based on their gender?
• Yes.
* * * *
• At what point did you perceive that there was favoritism towards [Mr. Guillies]?
• I am not sure if I can pinpoint an exact date. I know that he just kept taking this class and then another class would be available and then . . .
* * * *
. . . it seemed to be that whenever [Plaintiff] and I would want to take a class it was always no. It would be [Mr. Guillies] that was going to it or [insufficient funds in] the budget.
The court determines that Plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to establish pretext. Because Plaintiff, Ms. Cady, and Mr. Guillies performed differing tasks, the court can discern no evidence of pretext merely from the fact that Mr. Guillies was allowed to take certain training courses, and Plaintiff and Ms. Cady were not. Notably missing from Plaintiff's evidence is any indication as to the type of training courses that she and Ms. Cady were denied, or that Mr. Guillies was allowed to attend. In light of their differing tasks, it is likely that many training courses would be relevant to one Senior Account Clerk's position, while simply irrelevant or unnecessary with respect to another. Absent evidence that Mr. Guillies was preferred for training courses in areas that were at least relevant to the job duties of either Plaintiff or Ms. Cady, the court finds no evidence of pretext.
The court notes that Ms. Cady also testified to the following in deposition:
• Do you know how many classes Mr. Guillies took —
• No.
• — through the —
• No, I don't.
• Do you know what the classes were?
• No. They were just with accounting and just budget.
Finally, Plaintiff argues pretext because Defendant did not extensively explain the mechanics of the Hay Classification System in its briefing to this court. Plaintiff argues:
Defendant's proffered business reason for denying [Plaintiff] an increase in salary grade (i.e. a higher "Hay system" score than [Plaintiff] and Ms. Cady) does not in any manner establish how, objectively, any salary grade is established. . . . It offers no objective explanation for actually denying the pay grade increase requests of [Plaintiff] and Ms. Cady, but instead asks the Court to accept that Mr. Guillies was the only deserving employee.
The court discerns no evidence of pretext from the fact that Defendant did not thoroughly explain to this court how the Hay Classification System works or what objective criteria is used in assessing the appropriate salary grade for a particular position. At the summary judgment stage, Defendant is faced merely with the burden of proffering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged actions. See Shorter, 188 F.3d at 1208; Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A., 60 F.3d 1486, 1490-91 (10th Cir. 1995). To carry its burden, Defendant need only
articulate through some proof a facially nondiscriminatory reason for the termination; the defendant does not at this stage of the proceedings need to litigate the merits of the reasoning, nor does it need to prove that the reason relied on was bona fide. . . .
Panis, 60 F.3d at 1491 (quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 1992)). Defendant has met its burden. Defendant has stated that it did not reclassify Plaintiff's position because, according to its Hay Classification System, Plaintiff's job duties were consistent with the position of Senior Account Clerk. Similarly, Defendant has stated that it reclassified Mr. Guillies's position because, according to its Hay Classification System, Mr. Guillies's job duties were more consistent with the position of Accounting Assistant as opposed to Senior Account Clerk. At this stage, Defendant is not required to provide evidence to justify its articulated reason or to persuade the court that its reason was correct. See id. It is Plaintiff who now must carry the burden: Plaintiff must persuade the court that Defendant's proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. See id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to do so. Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence indicating that Defendant's proffered reason is either false or unworthy of credence or belief. For instance, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence indicating that Defendant did not, in fact, rely on its Hay Classification System, or that Defendant applied its Hay Classification System in an unfair or inappropriate manner. Absent such evidence, the court is unable to find pretext.
The court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's Title VII claim for discrimination. The only remaining claim before the court is Plaintiff's state law claim for breach of an implied contract. The court's jurisdiction over this case is pursuant to federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Having granted summary judgment on the claim over which this court has original jurisdiction, the court declines to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claim. See § 1367(c)(3); see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conf. Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1237 (10th Cir. 1997); Gullickson v. Southwest Airlines Pilots' Ass'n, 87 F.3d 1176, 1187 (10th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff's state law claim is dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 30) is granted with respect to Plaintiff's Title VII claim for discrimination; Plaintiff's state law claim for breach of an implied contract is dismissed without prejudice.
The case is closed.
Copies of this order shall be mailed to counsel of record for the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated at Kansas City, Kansas, this ___ day of April, 2001.