(Citationomitted.) Hubbard v. State, 256 Ga. 637, 638 ( 352 SE2d 383) (1987); accord Tate v. State, 198 Ga. App. 276, 278 (3) ( 401 SE2d 549) (1991). Compare Tate, supra (defendant's conviction under OCGA § 16-11-44 sustained where defendant had encouraged four different minors to drink alcohol in his home on three separate occasions).
However, if Tommy's conduct was negligent when the law enforcement officers stormed his house, then the plaintiff was acting in the capacity of a law enforcement officer at such time and not as a volunteer, because an off-duty officer is always on duty when a crime is committed in his presence; therefore, the plaintiff would not be a volunteer. See generally Wilson v. Waffle House, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 539 ( 510 S.E.2d 105) (1998) (policeman in uniform working off-duty security performing police duties when crime occurs); Sommerfield v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia, 235 Ga. App. 375 ( 509 S.E.2d 100) (1998) (off-duty policeman in uniform directing traffic performing police duties when a crime occurs); Tate v. State, 198 Ga. App. 276, 278(4) ( 401 S.E.2d 549) (1991) (off-duty officer in uniform performing official duties as security when a crime occurs); Duncan v. State, 163 Ga. App. 148 (1) ( 294 S.E.2d 365) (1982) (off-duty officer in uniform performing police duties when a crime occurs). 6. Tommy contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he lost his privilege under OCGA § 24-9-21 by involuntary commitment to a state mental health facility in that he was found not guilty by reason of insanity.
However, if Tommy's conduct was negligent when the law enforcement officers stormed his house, then the plaintiff was acting in the capacity of a law enforcement officer at such time and not as a volunteer, because an off-duty officer is always on duty when a crime is committed in his presence; therefore, the plaintiff would not be a volunteer. See generally Wilson v. Waffle House, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 539 ( 510 S.E.2d 105) (1998) (policeman in uniform working off-duty security performing police duties when crime occurs); Sommerfield v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia, 235 Ga. App. 375 ( 509 S.E.2d 100) (1998) (off-duty policeman in uniform directing traffic performing police duties when a crime occurs); Tate v. State, 198 Ga. App. 276, 278(4) ( 401 S.E.2d 549) (1991) (off-duty officer in uniform performing official duties as security when a crime occurs); Duncan v. State, 163 Ga. App. 148 (1) ( 294 S.E.2d 365) (1982) (off-duty officer in uniform performing police duties when a crime occurs). 6. Tommy contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he lost his privilege under OCGA § 24-9-21 by involuntary commitment to a state mental health facility in that he was found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Moore v. State, 246 Ga. App. 163, 168 (8) (a) ( 539 S.E.2d 851) (2000). See generally Tate v. State, 198 Ga. App. 276, 278-279 (4) ( 401 S.E.2d 549) (1991) (in case of aggravated assault on a police officer, no error in jury charge on requirement that defendant had knowledge that victim was a police officer). JOHNSON, Presiding Judge.
172 Ga. App. at 846. Compare Tate v. State, 198 Ga. App. 276 (1) ( 401 S.E.2d 549) (1991) and Jordan v. State, 207 Ga. App. 710 ( 429 S.E.2d 97) (1993), in which the information was not communicated to other jurors. The extrajudicial law offered to the jury in this case was prejudicial, particularly as it pertained to sentencing.
We held that under these facts, the juror's intentional gathering of extrajudicial law was "so prejudicial as to be inherently lacking in due process," supra at 847, that it required reversal under Watkins v. State, 237 Ga. 678, 685 ( 229 S.E.2d 465) (1976) (involving a juror's intentional gathering of extrajudicial evidence). Compare Tate v. State, 198 Ga. App. 276 (1) ( 401 S.E.2d 549) (1991) (holding that a reversal was not required where a juror read definitions of legal terms in a dictionary, but did not communicate this information to other jurors, and he testified that he could decide the case without being influenced by what he had read). "There is a presumption of prejudice to the defendant when an irregularity in the conduct of a juror is shown and the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm has occurred.
The charge was authorized by the evidence, and "taken as a whole, clearly instructed the jury of the factors it was to consider in its deliberations. . . ." Tate v. State, 198 Ga. App. 276, 279 (4) ( 401 S.E.2d 549) (1991). Judgment affirmed. Sognier, C. J., and McMurray, P. J., concur.
" (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Tate v. State, 198 Ga. App. 276, 279 ( 401 S.E.2d 549) (1991). 3.
Indeed, police officers are considered to be under a duty to respond as police officers 24 hours a day. 16A Eugene McQuillin et al., The Law of Municipal Corporations § 45.15 at 123 (3d ed. 1992). Under the cases, based both on common law and statute, it has been widely held that a police officer is not relieved of his or her obligation to preserve the peace while off duty. See, e.g., Gibson v. State, 316 Ark. 705, 875 S.W.2d 58 (1994); Harris v. City of Colorado Springs, 867 P.2d 217 (Colo. App. 1993); Packard v. Rockford Prof. Baseball Club, 244 Ill. App.3d 643, 613 N.E.2d 321 (1993); Animashaun v. State, 207 Ga. App. 156, 427 S.E.2d 532 (1993); Tate v. State, 198 Ga. App. 276, 401 S.E.2d 549 (1991); Firemen's and Policemen's Civ. Serv. v. Burnham, 715 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App. 1986); Alvarado v. City of Dodge City, 10 Kan. App. 2d 363, 702 P.2d 935 (1985), rev'd in part on other grounds 238 Kan. 48, 708 P.2d 174. In Nebraska, it has long been the case that a police officer may provide security to a commercial establishment while off duty and make arrests or take other authoritative action in connection therewith.
7 N.W.2d 732 (1961), "anterior", Goss v. State, 123 Tex.Crim. 494, 59 S.W.2d 379 (App. 1933); "care, custody, and control", Wilson v. State, 495 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973); "utter", State v. Donald, 90 Utah 533, 63 P.2d 246 (1936); "conspiracy", "conspirator", "concerted", "copyright", "infringement", "plagiarism" and "doubt", United States v. Steele, 785 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1986); "response" and "consummate", United States v. Kupau, 781 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823, 107 S.Ct. 93, 93 L.Ed.2d 45 (1986); "organization" and "organize", United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); "callous" and "wanton", United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1988); "rape", Davenport v. State, 426 So.2d 473 (Ala. Crim.App. 1982); "premeditated", Franks v. State, 306 Ark. 75, 811 S.W.2d 301 (1991); "inference", State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 478 A.2d 227 (1984) cert. denied 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S.Ct. 1749, 84 L.Ed.2d 814 (1984); "aggravate" and "assault", Tate v. State, 198 Ga. App. 276, 401 S.E.2d 549 (1991). The real danger of a jury's dictionary use is that "jurors will use the dictionary to construct their own definitions of legal terms which do not accurately or fairly reflect applicable law."