Provoda maintains the court erred by not requiring strict compliance with the notice requirements, citing Annotation, Sufficiency of Notice of Intention to Discharge or Not to Rehire Teacher, Under Statutes Requiting Such Notice, 52 A.L.R.4th 301, Sections 7, 23 and 24 (1987), and a variety of cases from other jurisdictions. Although not cited by her in this regard, we note that Brininstool v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 319, 466 P.2d 885 (Ct.App. 1970), and Tate v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 323, 466 P.2d 889 (Ct.App. 1970), both appear to require strict compliance with the applicable notice requirements. Brininstool is cited, however, for the propositions that actual notice by the teacher does not meet the notice requirements, and that the notice requirements of the regulation prevail over the laxer requirements of the statute.

We acknowledge that earlier decisions of this Court have allowed the State Board of Education to adopt its own notice period in advance of the end of the year as long as that action is not inconsistent with the statute. See Brininstool, 81 N.M. at 320-21, 466 P.2d at 886-87; Tate v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 81 N.M. 323, 324, 466 P.2d 889, 890 (Ct.App. 1970). But these cases have merely authorized the State Board of Education to create its own administrative remedy for the benefit of tenured teachers who were not notified within 14 days of the end of the school year.

The delay in the conducting of the discharge hearing was not in accord with the mandatory provisions of Section 22-10-17, and the Taos Board's dismissal of Singleton without first according a timely discharge hearing was contrary to law. E.g. Tate v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 323, 466 P.2d 889 (Ct.App. 1970); Brininstool v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 319, 466 P.2d 885 (Ct.App. 1970). Due to the protracted court action following Singleton's initial discharge, the discharge hearing conducted by the Taos Board was not held until March 13, 1984.

Nor do we decide this question. See Maestas v. Christmas, 63 N.M. 447, 321 P.2d 631 (1958); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Beevers, 84 N.M. 159, 500 P.2d 444 (Ct.App. 1972); Tate v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 323, 466 P.2d 889 (Ct.App. 1970). The local rule relied on by Jewell does not appear in the record before us.

We do not need to list the cases affirming the decision in the Blalock case further than to state that this court, in Sherman v. Board of Trustees, 9 Cal.App.2d 262 [ 49 P.2d 350], reaffirmed that decision and cited the cases likewise supporting the doctrine that written notice of dismissal is mandatory."Accord: Tempe Union High School Dist. v. Hopkins, 76 Ariz. 228, 262 P.2d 387 (1953); Reed v. Board of Education, 125 Cal.App. 714, 14 P.2d 330 (1932); Smith v. School District No. 18, 115 Mont. 102, 139 P.2d 518 (1943); Tate v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 323, 466 P.2d 889 (NM App 1970); Blood v. Common School District, 78 S.D. 580, 105 N.W.2d 545, 92 ALR2d 746 (1960). Nor do we believe that the rule announced in Stroh v. SAIF, 261 Or. 117, 492 P.2d 472 (1972), is applicable here.

This failure to follow the regulation deprived the teacher of an opportunity to correct his unsatisfactory work performance and, thus, was prejudicial to him. See Tate v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 323, 466 P.2d 889 (Ct.App. 1970); Brininstool v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 319, 466 P.2d 885 (Ct.App. 1970). The State Board's finding of "no substantial departure from regulations" and "no prejudice to the teacher" is not sustained by the record and, therefore, is unreasonable.

A similar regulation was upheld and applied to a tenure teacher in Brininstool v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 319, 466 P.2d 885 (Ct.App. 1970). See also Tate v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 323, 466 P.2d 889 (Ct.App. 1970). Neither case is applicable here, however, because both cases involved the non-reemployment or termination of the teacher.