Opinion
21-KH-745
01-06-2022
BRANDON TATE v. TIM HOOPER, WARDEN LSP IN RE BRANDON TATE
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE LEE V. FAULKNER, JR., DIVISION "P", NUMBER 09-1743
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, Jude G. Gravois, and Robert A. Chaisson
WRIT DENIED
Relator, Brandon Tate, pled guilty to two counts of attempted second-degree murder and accessory after the fact to second-degree murder on October 13, 2011. The trial court sentenced relator to 25 years imprisonment at hard labor on each of the attempted second-degree murder counts, and five years imprisonment at hard labor on the accessory count, with all terms to run concurrently. Relator did not appeal.
On November 2, 2021, relator filed a "Motion to Challenge the Constitutionality of Petitioner's Guilty Plea," arguing that the Supreme Court's ruling in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ---, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020), rendered his 2011 guilty plea an "absolute nullity" because he was induced to plead guilty by the threat of an unconstitutional jury trial in which a unanimous verdict would not be required. The trial court denied relief, finding that relator actually was seeking post-conviction relief under La. C.Cr.P. art. 924. Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, the trial court determined that relator's APCR was untimely.
In Ramos, the United States Supreme Court found that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial-as incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment-requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense.
La. C.Cr.P. art. 924 provides that an application for post-conviction relief (APCR) "means a petition filed by a person in custody after sentence following conviction for the commission of an offense seeking to have the conviction and sentence set aside."
La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A) provides in pertinent part: "No application for post-conviction relief … shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final."
We find no error in the trial court's determination that relator's challenge to the validity of his guilty plea is time barred. First, relator's convictions and sentences became final in 2011 when he failed to appeal, and he did not seek relief within two years of that date, as required under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A). See State v. Williams, 16-32 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/24/16), 199 So.3d 1205, 1209. Second, to the extent relator relies on Ramos as a "theretofore unknown interpretation of constitutional law" to invalidate his guilty plea pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)(2), relator had one year from the date of that April 2020 decision to seek relief, but he did not file his motion until November 2021, more than one after Ramos was issued.
Additionally, Ramos does not apply because relator pled guilty in accordance with a negotiated plea agreement, and a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings prior to the plea. State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584, 586 (La. 1976); see also Dunn v. State, 21-KH-218 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/20/21) (unpub.), writ denied, 21-891 (La. 12/12/21), 325 So.3d 1069 ("Neither Ramos-which held that a defendant who is tried for a serious crime has a right to a unanimous jury verdict-nor the recently rendered Edwards v. Vannoy, __ S.Ct. __, 2021 WL 1951781, provide that the Ramos decision invalidates a guilty plea or is an exception to the time limitation set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)").
As relator has failed to enunciate valid grounds for post-conviction relief, the writ is denied.
SMC
JGG
RAC