Inasmuch as the trial court's comments reveal a mistaken view of the applicable law of damages, we reverse the trial court's suggestion of additur and remand this case for a new trial. Tennessee has long recognized that a landowner whose easement of access has been taken or impaired by the State may bring an action for inverse condemnation against the State. ShelbyCounty v. Barden, 527 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tenn. 1975); Tate v. MonroeCounty, 578 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tenn.App. 1978). As our supreme court has explained,
Duck River Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Manchester, 529 S.W.2d 202, 207 (Tenn. 1975); Zirkle v. City of Kingston, 217 Tenn. 210, 221, 396 S.W.2d 356, 361 (1965). Thus, for the purpose of condemnation and inverse condemnation actions, a property owner's right to ingress and egress is considered to be a property right. State ex rel. Shaw v. Gorman, 596 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tenn. 1980); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Moriarity, 135 Tenn. 446, 458, 186 S.W. 1053, 1055-56 (1916); Tate v. Monroe County, 578 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). The concept of "taking" in condemnation cases is not limited to situations involving actual dispossession or complete deprivation.
These are the only orders shown in the record from the time the order overruling the motion for summary judgment was entered on January 6, 1995. The defendant seeks relief from the judgment entered against him by reason of mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect as set out in Rule 60.02 of the Tenn. R. Civ. P. In Tate v. Countyof Monroe, 578 S.W.2d 642 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1978) the court held that negligence was "precisely the type of error" Rule 60 is designed to relieve. The setting aside of a default judgment rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge.
See also Campbell v. Archer, supra;Jerkins v. McKinney, 533 S.W.2d 275 (Tenn. 1976); Tate v. County of Monroe, 578 S.W.2d 642 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1979). The court inBarbee set the judgment aside because there was no proof in the record that the defendant's non-appearance in court was willful.Id.
Such lapses have been held to be excusable neglect by Tennessee courts. See, Campbell v. Archer, supra; Jerkins v. McKinney, Tenn., 533 S.W.2d 275 (1976); Tate v. County of Monroe, Tenn. App., 578 S.W.2d 642 (1979). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the trial court's decision to vacate the default judgment and to try this case on its merits is affirmed.
This is exactly the type of evidence courts typically consider when addressing motions to set aside final judgments under Rule 60 and motions to set aside default judgments under Rule 55. See, e.g., Jerkins v. McKinney, 533 S.W.2d 275, 280-281 (Tenn. 1976); Tate v. Monroe County, 578 S.W.2d 642, 643-44 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); Christy v. Christy, No. M2021-00192-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 951254, at *6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022) (relying on affidavits to assess whether counsel received notice of a hearing). The ALJ and the Designee were tasked with deciding whether the reasons for Mr. Patterson's non-attendance constituted "good cause" to set aside the default, and these two affidavits supply the factual predicate for making that determination.
Based on that finding, we conclude the trial court did not err by setting aside and immediately re-entering its final order in this case. See Jerkins v. McKinney, 533 S.W.2d 275, 280-281 (Tenn. 1976); Tate v. Monroe County, 578 S.W.2d 642, 643-44 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
Before addressing the applicability of the cancellation rule in this case, we first note that this Court has long held that '"when the trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment is predicated upon the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact, the overruling of that motion is not reviewable on appeal when subsequently there has been a judgment rendered after a trial on the merits."' Alex Lyon & Son Sales Managers & Auctioneers, Inc. v. Boles, No. M2010-00388-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3895520, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2010) (quoting Arrow Elecs. v. Adecco Emp. Servs., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 646, 650 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)); see also Hobson v. First State Bank, 777 S.W.2d 24, 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Mullins v. Precision Rubber Prods., 671 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Tate v. County of Monroe, 578 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). In the instant case, the trial court entered a judgment approving the jury's verdict and, therefore, the trial court's decision not to apply the cancellation rule at the summary judgment stage is not reviewable.
Similarly, the denial of a summary judgment because of genuine factual disputes is not appealable after a trial on the merits. Hobson v. First State Bank, 777 S.W.2d 24, 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Tate v. County of Monroe, 578 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).Taking a voluntary nonsuit does not render the denial of a summary judgment any more suitable for appellate review.
Id. (citing Jerkins v. McKinney, 533 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Tenn. 1976); Grantham v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization, 794 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Tate v. County of Monroe, 578 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978)). "When such relief is granted, it usually takes the form of vacating the original final judgment and then re-entering it, thus causing the thirty[-]day period within which to file a notice of appeal to begin to run again."