Under Oklahoma law, the legislative intent of a particular statute must be ascertain from language of the statute. Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1228 (Okla. 1992); Hess v. Excise Board of McCurtain County, 698 P.2d 930, 932 (Okla. 1985).

Shephard v. CompSource Oklahoma, 2009 OK 25, ¶ 11, 209 P.3d 288, 292-93. ¶ 6 On the issue of public policy, Brown is also inconsistent with the teachings of Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72, 833 P.2d 1218. The Tate opinion answered a question that was certified by a federal district court concerning the scope of a Burk tort grounded on racial discrimination.

¶ 5 Saint v. Data Exchange, Inc., 2006 OK 59, 145 P.3d 1037 IMPLICITLY OVERRULEDList v. Anchor Paint Mfg. Co., 1996 OK 1, 910 P.2d 1011, AND IT SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. ¶ 6 The Kruchowski plaintiffs argue that Saint clearly abrogated List's holding because List did not address what remedies were required by the Okla. Const. art., § 46.5 The Company contends that Saint was nothing more than a reiteration of this Court's prior limited holdings in cases such as Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72, 833 P.2d 1218 and Collier v. Insignia Financial Group, 1999 OK 49, 981 P.2d 321. According to the parties, courts are not clear as to whether Saint impacted List's holding.

See Duncan v. City of Nichols Hills, 1996 OK 16, 913 P.2d 1303, 1309.See Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72, 833 P.2d 1218, 1222-23. Where in describing limitations on legislative power in the field of employment discrimination the Court noted:

Therefore, we find that a handicap motivated discharge comes within the protection of Burk. In Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1226 (Okla. 1992), we acknowledged that "[w]here the common law gives a remedy, and another is provided by statute, the latter is merely cumulative, unless the statute declares it to be exclusive." We find nothing in § 1901, nor in the rest of the Act which compels the abrogation of the common-law Burk claim.

Recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court laid to rest this question, which had divided federal courts in Oklahoma. In Tate v. Browning-Ferris, 833 P.2d 1218 (1992), the Court clearly held that a Burk action is available notwithstanding the availability of other remedies. Id. at 1223.

In order to avoid potential constitutional problems, that court interpreted the OADA as not providing the exclusive remedies for discriminatory practices based upon race and age, thereby permitting a Burk tort claim for such plaintiffs. See Saint v. Data Exchange, Inc., 2006 OK 59 ¶ 6, 145 P.3d at 1039; Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72 ¶ 18, 833 P.2d 1218, 1229. The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that such a reading of the OADA was necessary because "[w]hen a statute is susceptible to more than one construction, it must be given that interpretation which frees it from constitutional doubt rather than one that would make it fraught with fundamental-law infirmities."

Comments In Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72 , ¶ 10, 833 P.2d 1218, 1225, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the public policy exception was applicable to a racially motivated discharge or one in retaliation for an employee's filing a racial discrimination complaint. Later, in Kruchowski v. The Weyerhauser Co., 2008 OK 105, ¶ 23, 202 P.3d 144, and Shirazi v. Childtime Learning Center, 2009 OK 13, ¶ 12, 204 P.3d 75, the Supreme Court decided that the public policy exception also applied to victims of unlawful discrimination, because victims of all forms of employment discrimination, including race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age and handicap, must receive evenhanded treatment under art. 5, § 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

Comments In Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72, ¶ 10, 833 P.2d 1218, 1225, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the public policy exception was applicable to a racially motivated discharge or one in retaliation for an employee's filing a racial discrimination complaint. Later, in Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 2008 OK 105, H 23, 202 P.3d 144, and Shirazi v. Childtime Learning Center, 2009 OK 13, ¶ 12, 204 P.3d 75, the Supreme Court decided that the public policy exception also applied to victims of unlawful discrimination, because victims of all forms of employment discrimination, including race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age and handicap, must receive evenhanded treatment under art. 5, § 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

In such cases, the employer commits " a tortious breach of contractual obligations, compensable in damages." Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72, ¶ 9, 833 P.2d 1218, 1225 (emphasis and footnote omitted). The latter requirement is different for alleged victims of status-based discrimination, such as Wheat, as discussed in part two of this opinion.