Opinion
No. 2020-C-00652
10-14-2020
Robert TASSIN v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and Raymond Hebert
PER CURIAM
Writ granted. Plaintiff, Robert Tassin, filed suit against State Farm Automobile Insurance Company and Raymond Hebert ("Defendants") seeking personal injury damages resulting from a car accident allegedly caused by Hebert's failure to yield at a traffic signal. Tassin amended his original petition to add the City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge, alleging fault for failure to properly maintain the traffic signal. Nearly two months prior to trial, but after a joint pre-trial order ("PTO") had been submitted by the parties, the City/Parish was dismissed from the lawsuit. On the eve of trial, Defendants attempted to add Brenda Dawson as a witness, although she was only listed as a witness in the PTO by the City/Parish and not by Defendants (Defendants allege that the language included in their PTO says they may call any witness listed by any other party). Tassin filed a motion to strike Dawson's testimony, which was granted by the district court.
The case proceeded to a bench trial, where conflicting witness testimony was presented concerning which party had the right of way. Defendants also proffered Dawson's testimony that she witnessed the accident and observed Tassin run the red light. Following trial, the district court ruled in Tassin's favor and awarded damages. The district court found the preponderance of the evidence proved the accident was caused solely by Hebert's negligence. The court of appeal vacated the ruling of the district court and remanded the case for new trial finding the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Dawson's testimony, and the exclusion interdicted the fact-finding process. A trial judge has great discretion in conducting a trial, which discretion includes the admissibility of witness testimony. See La. C.C.P. art. 1631 ; Palace Properties, L.L.C. v. Sizeler Hammond Square Ltd. P'ship , 2001-2812 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/02), 839 So. 2d 82, 91, writ denied , 2003-0306 (La. 4/4/03), 840 So. 2d 1219. In this case, the district court excluded Dawson's testimony because defendants failed to identify her "in their discovery responses, witness lists, or on the pre-trial order." Moreover, Dawson's proffered testimony was identical to that of other defense witnesses, and clearly cumulative. Considering the vast discretion given to district courts in conducting trial proceedings and ruling on evidentiary issues, we find the district court did not abuse that discretion in this case.
Given the particular facts of this case, we find the court of appeal erred and therefore reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstate the ruling of the district court.
REVERSED.
Crichton, J., concurs and assigns reasons:
I agree with the majority decision to grant the writ application of plaintiff. I write separately to emphasize my view that the abuse of discretion standard applies in this instance because the underlying ruling was related to admission of evidence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a factual witness where defendants never specifically identified the witness in their discovery responses, witness lists, or on the pre-trial order. See Palace Properties, LLC v. Sizeler Hammond Square Ltd. Partnership , 2001-2812 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/02), 839 So.2d 82, 91, writ denied, 2003-0306 (La. 4/4/03), 840 So.2d 1219 (holding a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence at trial is subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review). Accordingly, I concur with the majority decision to reverse the court of appeal and reinstate the ruling of the district court.
CRAIN, J., dissenting.
The excluded witness was identified in the pre-trial order. Defendants indicated they might call "any witness listed, subpoenaed, or called by any other parties." Dawson was listed by another party dismissed before trial, and her affidavit was submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment. Thus, plaintiff was aware of both the witness's identity and the substance of her testimony. Pre-trial procedure is designed to avoid surprise and to allow orderly disposition of cases. See La. Code Civ. Pro. Art 1551 ; Theriot v. State Dept. of Wildlife and Fisheries , 94-1536 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/7/95), 661 So. 2d 986, 989, writ denied , 95-1617 (La. 10/6/95), 662 So. 2d 1041. Plaintiff cannot reasonably claim "surprise" when the identity and content of testimony of the witness was known in advance of trial. Although, a trial judge has great discretion in deciding whether to receive or refuse testimony objected to on the grounds of failure to abide by the pre-trial order, any doubt must be resolved in favor of receiving the information. Branscum v. Catherine , 2000-0354 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/5/00), 759 So. 2d 234, 236 ; Curry v. Johnson , (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/22/91), 590 So. 2d 1213, 1216. For these reasons, I would affirm the Court of Appeal's opinion.