Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-2477 Section "L"
August 17, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Wayne L. Jones motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, defendants' motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Tracy Tassin was arrested pursuant to a warrant on February 5, 1999 by officers from the St. John's the Baptist Parish Sheriff's Office. The warrant was apparently based upon Tassin's failure to pay a fine of $157 for a charge of contempt of court in January of 1996. See Compl. ¶ 7. An attachment for the fine was issued on May 27, 1997, and plaintiff paid the amount on June 6, 1997. See Pl.'s Ex. A. Although the attachment was recalled, plaintiff was nevertheless arrested for failure to pay. Plaintiff was released on bail and ordered to appear before the court on May 3, 1999. See Defs.' Br. at 2. He failed to appear on that date and an attachment for his arrest was again issued on May 3, 1999. Plaintiff failed to obey a traffic sign on August 24, 1999, and the deputy issuing the citation discovered two outstanding warrants for Tassin's arrest from St. James and St. John's the Baptist parishes. After posting bail, defendant was released into the custody of officers from St. James' parish.
Plaintiff contends that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned on both February 5, 1999 and August 24, 1999 because he had paid his outstanding fine. Plaintiff further alleges that he was denied access to medication, that an officer publicly announced his HIV status during the arrest, and that his car was damaged while being towed. He claims a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, false imprisonment, and respondeat superior liability. Defendant Sheriff Wayne Jones seeks summary judgment against Tassin's claims.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment will be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. If the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact "the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). "[A] dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, no genuine issue exists for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). Therefore, "the mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; Rule 56 requires that the fact dispute be genuine and material." Willis, 61 F.3d at 315.
The burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue is not met by "metaphysical doubt" or "unsubstantiated assertions." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588). The Court must "resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contrary facts." Id. The Court does not, "in the absence of proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Id. If the evidence leads to only one reasonable conclusion, summary judgment is proper. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant first argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff's claims of false arrest and imprisonment related to the February 5, 1999 arrest have prescribed. Louisiana provides a one year prescriptive period for torts such as false arrest beginning on the date of the arrest. See La. Civ. C. art. 3492; Whitsell v. Rodriguez, 351 F. Supp. 1042, 1044 (E.D. La. 1972). Plaintiff was arrested and released from custody on February 5, 1999 but did not file suit until August 21, 2000. Plaintiff's false arrest and imprisonment claims arising from the February 5, 1999 arrest are therefore prescribed. In response, plaintiff suggests that the February 5, 1999 and August 24, 1999 arrests constitute a single continuous tort that did not end until August 24, 1999. The arrests, however, are distinct and unrelated events. The tort for which plaintiff seeks redress is not false record keeping but false arrest which were independent events subject to separate prescriptive periods.
Defendant next contends that plaintiff fails to allege a § 1983 claim sufficient to hold Jones liable either in his personal or official capacity. Defendant explains that there is no evidence that Jones personally participated in the arrest or incarceration or that there existed an official policy or custom on the part of the Sheriff's office sufficient to warrant a claim against Jones in his official capacity. Plaintiff fails to refute these arguments and raises no evidence of a genuine issue of material fact as to Jones's individual or official liability. Accordingly, plaintiff does not sustain his burden for raising a proper § 1983 claim against Jones. See Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1160 (5th Cir. 1992); Grabowski v. Jackson County Public Defenders Office, 79 F.3d 478, 479 (5th Cir. 1996).
Defendant also moves for summary judgment against plaintiffs' state law claims related to the August 24, 1999 arrest. Defendant explains that he cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of his officers because they did not commit tortious acts. See Maze v. Grogan, 694 So.2d 1168 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff's claims for false arrest and imprisonment are ripe for dismissal because Jones's officers acted pursuant to a valid warrant. A claim of false arrest requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the arrest was made without a warrant or with a warrant void on its face. See Duboe v. City of New Orleans, 909 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1990). Although the attachment for Tassin's arrest may have been inappropriate, the warrant itself was not invalid on its face. Morever, plaintiff had an outstanding warrant from St. James Parish that was unrelated to his payment for the attachment. Plaintiff also admits that there was a "legitimate reason" for his arrest. See Defs.' Ex. B. at 45. Jones's officers acted pursuant to warrants valid on their face, and therefore Jones cannot be held vicariously liable for claims of false arrest and imprisonment arising from the August 24, 1999 arrest.
Plaintiff also fails to maintain a cause of action against Jones for the denial of medication. A state official who knowingly deprives a prisoner of vital medical treatment violates his constitutionally protected rights. See Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892 902 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). While mere negligence in giving or failing to supply medical treatment does not support a cause of action, "a knowing and willful failure to provide or permit a prisoner access to needed medical care would violate clearly established constitutional rights." Id.
Plaintiff fails to establish a cause of action for the denial of medication because the actions of the officers and prison officials do not suggest a knowing and willful deprivation. Prison authorities are authorized to remove contraband and drugs from the jail environment. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). Tassin was arrested with a collection of pills that he failed to identify in order not to reveal his HIV status. See Defs.' Ex. B at 40. After speaking with a medic, Tassin was told he would receive his medication but was released shortly thereafter. See id. at 40-43. Plaintiff offers no evidence or raises no material factual question to suggest that prison or law enforcement officials acted unreasonably or willfully. Therefore, on the basis of a respondeat superior claim against Jones, the Court finds no genuine issue of material fact sufficient to preclude dismissal of plaintiffs denial of medication claim.
Defendant alleges that plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Jones also fails because the conduct of the officers was not extreme, outrageous, or designed to inflict severe emotional distress. The unrefuted facts indicate that the officers arresting Tassin on August 24, 1999 acted according to at least one valid warrant for arrest from St. James Parish. Moreover, officials reasonably denied plaintiff access to medication until they knew its use and properties. Plaintiff provides no facts sufficient to demonstrate that the conduct of the officers was extreme and outrageous, that he suffered emotional distress, and that the officers and/or Jones desired to inflict emotional distress on Tassin. See Lawson v. Strauss, 750 So.2d 234, 240 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate for Jones on Tassin's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Sheriff Wayne Jones's motion for summary judgment GRANTED.