In contrast, traffic stops have been held to be unlawful where the defendants committed no traffic violations, and the stops, though based on drug courier profiles, were not justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Brown v. State, 188 Ga. App. 184 ( 372 S.E.2d 514) (1988); Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853 (1) ( 363 S.E.2d 63) (1987); United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 549 (2) (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Smith, supra. The facts in this case distinguish it from Tarwid where defendants were stopped sometime after midnight because they were driving 45 to 50 mph and traffic was generally moving at 60 to 65 mph; Brown, where defendant's vehicle made a quick lane change to get out of the way of the law enforcement vehicle which had its blue lights activated; Miller, where defendant allowed his right wheels to cross over the lane marker about four inches and drove in that manner for approximately six-and-one-half seconds; and Smith, where the officer observed the right side of the defendant's car weave approximately six inches into the emergency lane and then slightly within the lane in which it was traveling, which was attributed to the driver taking his eyes off the road and looking at the flashing lights of the patrol car as he was being stopped.
"`[I]n determining when an investigatory stop is unreasonably pretextual, the proper inquiry ... is not whether the officer could validly have made the stop but whether under the same circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose.' [ United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986)]" Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853, 854 ( 363 S.E.2d 63). In the case sub judice, the trial court concluded that: "The stop of the vehicle was made because of the quick lane change which would not have occurred except for the deputy's surveillance of the vehicle.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853, 855 (1) ( 363 SE2d 63) (1987). Here, the evidence shows that Officer Donnelly received a radio dispatch directing him to proceed to the scene of the armed robberies.
In this connection we note that the deputy was "part of the ICE team," meaning "Interstate Criminal Enforcement" and was "trained . . . to look beyond the traffic stop for other possible violations." A possibly pretextual stop is considered by looking to what a reasonable officer would do rather than what an officer could do. Brown v. State, 188 Ga. App. 184, 187 ( 372 S.E.2d 514); Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853, 855 ( 363 S.E.2d 63). In this instance, the evidence of record fails to show that the ruling of the superior court is clearly erroneous.
Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 105 (3) (a) ( 475 S.E.2d 580) (1996). See Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853, 855 (1) ( 363 S.E.2d 63) (1987) ("reasonable suspicion may exist based on the collective knowledge of law enforcement officials," citing United States v. Allison, 616 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1980)). "There is no requirement that the officer making the stop have all the information the original officer had about a suspect and the informant.
Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1044. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986); Kehoe v. State, 521 So.2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 1988); Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853, 363 S.E.2d 63, 64-65 (1987); People v. Mendoza, 234 Ill. App.3d 826, 175 Ill. Dec. 361, 369, 599 N.E.2d 1375, 1383 (1992); State v. Izzo, 623 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Me. 1993); State v. Morocco, 99 N.C. App. 421, 393 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1990); State v. Spencer, 75 Ohio App.3d 581, 600 N.E.2d 335, 337 (1991); Limonja v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 416, 375 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1988); see State v. Bunts, 867 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Mo.Ct.App. 1993); People v. Camarre, 171 A.D.2d 1002, 569 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (1991). While objective on its face, the pretext doctrine is ultimately a subjective standard.
State v. Hammang, 249 Ga. App. 811 9549 S.E.2d 440) (2001). Because it is well settled that police may conduct a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle if they have specific, articulable facts that give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853, 854(1) ( 363 S.E.2d 63) (1987), the fact that one of the brake lights on Lancaster's car was not functioning was, in itself, sufficient articulable reasonable suspicion of the illegal operation of his vehicle to authorize a traffic stop. See Jordan v. State, 223 Ga. App. 176, 177(1) ( 477 S.E.2d 583) (1996); Wilder v. State, 192 Ga. App. 891, 892 ( 386 S.E.2d 685) (1989).
See id. See Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853, 856(1) ( 363 S.E.2d 63) (1987). See id; State v. Kwiatkowski, 238 Ga. App. 390, 392-393 ( 519 S.E.2d 43) (1999); compare McGaughey v. State, 222 Ga. App. 477 ( 474 S.E.2d 676) (1996) (after receiving tip regarding drug activity, police approached suspect and received immediate consent to search her).
This was not done in the present case. See State v. Fowler, 215 Ga. App. 524, 525 ( 451 S.E.2d 124) (1994) ("That which is insufficient in its own right cannot be made sufficient by the fact that it is broadcast over a police network."); Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853, 856(1) ( 363 S.E.2d 63) (1987). See McSwain, supra at 63.
Thus, reasonable suspicion was established and the court erred in granting the motion to suppress. Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853, 855 (1) ( 363 S.E.2d 63)(1987); see Cunningham v. State, 231 Ga. App. 420, 422 (1) ( 498 S.E.2d 590)(1998). 267 Ga. 102, 105 (3)(a)( 475 S.E.2d 580)(1996).