We thus find no error in the trial court's failure, sua sponte, to give a lesser-included-offense instruction on reckless conduct. Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 S.E.2d 513) (1991).Rogers v. State, 247 Ga. App. 219, 222 (4) ( 543 S.E.2d 81) (2000).
Assuming without deciding that the evidence supported giving a specific instruction on accident, which does not appear to have been Sears's sole defense, the trial court's decision not to do so would not require reversal under the circumstances presented. SeeTarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 605 ( 409 SE2d 513) (1991) (analyzing whether the trial court's refusal to give a requested jury charge on a sole affirmative defense required reversal because the rest of the charge did not fairly present the defense); Johnson v. State, 253 Ga. 37, 37-38 ( 315 SE2d 871) (1984) (same). Here, the jury was properly and fully instructed that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Sears acted with the requisite malicious intent to commit each of the crimes charged.
Assuming without deciding that the evidence supported giving a specific instruction on accident, which does not appear to have been Sears's sole defense, the trial court's decision not to do so would not require reversal under the circumstances presented. See Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 605, 409 S.E.2d 513 (1991) (analyzing whether the trial court's refusal to give a requested jury charge on a sole affirmative defense required reversal because the rest of the charge did not fairly present the defense); Johnson v. State, 253 Ga. 37, 37–38, 315 S.E.2d 871 (1984) (same). Here, the jury was properly and fully instructed that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Sears acted with the requisite malicious intent to commit each of the crimes charged.
[Cits.]" Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 SE2d 513) (1991). With respect to the affirmative defense of "mistake of fact," "[a] person shall not be found guilty of a crime if the act or omission to act constituting the crime was induced by a misapprehension of fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission."
270 Ga. 151 ( 510 S.E.2d 802) (1998). 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 S.E.2d 513) (1991). Supra, 270 Ga. at 156-157(7).
A trial court must charge the jury on a defendant's sole defense, even without a written request, if the circumstances support the charge. Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 S.E.2d 513). The evidence which authorized defendant Green's conviction reveals that she resisted arrest during a domestic violence investigation at her home.
Boyd argues that the trial court was required to instruct the jury on justification and affirmative defense even without his requests to charge because self-defense was his sole defense. See Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605 ( 409 SE2d 513) (1991). We note, however, that Boyd also requested jury instructions on accident, involuntary intoxication, voluntary intoxication, and insanity.
Hunter did not request that the trial court instruct the jury on the law of justification based upon self-defense. He now contends that justification was his sole defense, and that, even in the absence of a written request, the court was required to give the instruction, asserting that there was some evidence to support it. See Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 SE2d 513) (1991). First, it does not appear that justification was, in fact, Hunter's sole defense; during closing argument, he denied that he was at the scene of the crimes, and argued that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof.
The Court of Appeals's opinion addresses the issue of whether "equal access" was Johnson's "sole defense," requiring that the jury be instructed on the principle. Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 SE2d 513) (1991). The parties also address this issue in this Court.
Smith urges that a written request was unnecessary, because a trial court must charge sua sponte on a defendant's sole defense if it is supported by some evidence. Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 SE2d 513) (1991). However, the law does not recognize "authorized entry" as a separate and discrete defense to the crime of burglary.