Tarvestad v. State

86 Citing cases

  1. Strozier v. State

    254 Ga. App. 528 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 7 times
    Assuming without deciding that a lesser included offense can constitute a "sole defense" under Tarvestad

    We thus find no error in the trial court's failure, sua sponte, to give a lesser-included-offense instruction on reckless conduct. Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 S.E.2d 513) (1991).Rogers v. State, 247 Ga. App. 219, 222 (4) ( 543 S.E.2d 81) (2000).

  2. Sears v. State

    S11A1194 (Ga. Oct. 17, 2011)

    Assuming without deciding that the evidence supported giving a specific instruction on accident, which does not appear to have been Sears's sole defense, the trial court's decision not to do so would not require reversal under the circumstances presented. SeeTarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 605 ( 409 SE2d 513) (1991) (analyzing whether the trial court's refusal to give a requested jury charge on a sole affirmative defense required reversal because the rest of the charge did not fairly present the defense); Johnson v. State, 253 Ga. 37, 37-38 ( 315 SE2d 871) (1984) (same). Here, the jury was properly and fully instructed that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Sears acted with the requisite malicious intent to commit each of the crimes charged.

  3. Sears v. State

    290 Ga. 1 (Ga. 2011)   Cited 13 times
    Approving instruction that child cruelty involves intent to cause physical pain without justification or excuse

    Assuming without deciding that the evidence supported giving a specific instruction on accident, which does not appear to have been Sears's sole defense, the trial court's decision not to do so would not require reversal under the circumstances presented. See Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 605, 409 S.E.2d 513 (1991) (analyzing whether the trial court's refusal to give a requested jury charge on a sole affirmative defense required reversal because the rest of the charge did not fairly present the defense); Johnson v. State, 253 Ga. 37, 37–38, 315 S.E.2d 871 (1984) (same). Here, the jury was properly and fully instructed that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Sears acted with the requisite malicious intent to commit each of the crimes charged.

  4. Price v. State

    289 Ga. 459 (Ga. 2011)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on mistake of fact in burglary case given evidence that defendant entered the home through an unlocked door because he thought the home was for sale and additional evidence that the defendant saw "for sale" and "open house" signs that led him to believe that he was authorized to enter the house

    [Cits.]" Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 SE2d 513) (1991). With respect to the affirmative defense of "mistake of fact," "[a] person shall not be found guilty of a crime if the act or omission to act constituting the crime was induced by a misapprehension of fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission."

  5. Cowan v. State

    531 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 21 times
    In Cowan, we concluded, after considering the charge as a whole, that there was "no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied a standard of proof less stringent than that required by the state and federal due process clauses or other applicable law."

    270 Ga. 151 ( 510 S.E.2d 802) (1998). 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 S.E.2d 513) (1991). Supra, 270 Ga. at 156-157(7).

  6. Green v. State

    240 Ga. App. 774 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 32 times

    A trial court must charge the jury on a defendant's sole defense, even without a written request, if the circumstances support the charge. Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 S.E.2d 513). The evidence which authorized defendant Green's conviction reveals that she resisted arrest during a domestic violence investigation at her home.

  7. Boyd v. State

    284 Ga. 46 (Ga. 2008)   Cited 11 times
    Emphasizing "that every effort should be made to proffer a photograph of the victim alone"

    Boyd argues that the trial court was required to instruct the jury on justification and affirmative defense even without his requests to charge because self-defense was his sole defense. See Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605 ( 409 SE2d 513) (1991). We note, however, that Boyd also requested jury instructions on accident, involuntary intoxication, voluntary intoxication, and insanity.

  8. Hunter v. State

    281 Ga. 693 (Ga. 2007)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that nothing in the evidence warranted a charge on self-defense where the defendant did not testify, no statement of his was admitted into evidence, no other evidence contained any version of events from his own perspective, and there was no evidence of any threat so as to give rise to a reasonable belief that the defendant must shoot the victim in the back of the head to avoid death or great bodily injury, even though testimony showed that the victim possessed a gun before the shooting

    Hunter did not request that the trial court instruct the jury on the law of justification based upon self-defense. He now contends that justification was his sole defense, and that, even in the absence of a written request, the court was required to give the instruction, asserting that there was some evidence to support it. See Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 SE2d 513) (1991). First, it does not appear that justification was, in fact, Hunter's sole defense; during closing argument, he denied that he was at the scene of the crimes, and argued that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof.

  9. State v. Johnson

    280 Ga. 511 (Ga. 2006)   Cited 37 times
    In State v. Johnson, 280 Ga. 511, 512, n. 2 (630 SE2d 377) (2006), this Court noted that a similar method of submitting requests for jury instructions had been followed, and left unresolved the question of whether it met the direction of USCR 10.3.

    The Court of Appeals's opinion addresses the issue of whether "equal access" was Johnson's "sole defense," requiring that the jury be instructed on the principle. Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 SE2d 513) (1991). The parties also address this issue in this Court.

  10. Smith v. State

    611 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 2005)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that the lack of “an additional explanatory charge” does not amount to a violation of the rule that the trial court must charge sua sponte on a defendant's sole defense if supported by evidence, where jurors were given complete and correct instructions on the defendant's sole defense

    Smith urges that a written request was unnecessary, because a trial court must charge sua sponte on a defendant's sole defense if it is supported by some evidence. Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 ( 409 SE2d 513) (1991). However, the law does not recognize "authorized entry" as a separate and discrete defense to the crime of burglary.