Opinion
CASE NO. 666 CRD-8-87
AUGUST 9, 1989
The claimant was represented by Tamara Weiner, Esq.
The respondents were represented by Scott Williams, Esq., Maher Williams.
This Petition for Review from the November 23, 1987 Ruling on Claimant's Motion for Interest and Attorneys' Fees of the Commissioner for the Eighth District was heard March 31, 1989 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Darius Spain.
OPINION
Claimant has appealed the Eighth District November 23, 1987 Ruling on Claimant's Motion for Interest and Attorneys' Fees wherein the commissioner granted claimant interest on all unpaid compensation due and payable pursuant to the execution of a voluntary agreement. The commissioner concluded that interest should run from the July 9, 1987 date of the approved voluntary agreement. Additionally he awarded the claimant attorneys' fees in the amount of $2,000.00.
On appeal claimant argues interest should run from the start of his disability. He also contends the full attorneys fees requested ($5,823.63) should have been awarded. A commissioner's authority to grant attorneys' fees and interest is contained in Sec. 31-300: "In cases where, through the fault or neglect of the employer or insurer, adjustments of compensation have been unduly delayed, or where through such fault or neglect, payments have been unduly delayed, the commissioner may include in his award interest at six per cent per annum and a reasonable attorney's fee in the case of undue delay in adjustments of compensation and may include in his award in the case of undue delay in payments of compensation, interest at twelve per cent per annum and a reasonable attorney's fee."
We considered a similar issue under Sec. 31-300 in Carlino v. Danbury Hospital, 5 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev Op. 139, 357 CRD-7-84 (1988). There, we held that where an award for interest was discretionary and the statute was silent as to the time period for which interest should run, the time period set by the trial commissioner would not be disturbed. Similarly here, we will not set aside the time period set. See, Carlino, id., citing Fair v. People's Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 540-41 (1988).
As to the second question posed in the appeal, the trial Commissioner's authority to award attorneys' fees is also derived from Sec. 31-300 C.G.S. The authority to determine and set reasonable attorneys' fees is found in sec. 31-319 C.G.S. The actual amount which a trial commissioner may award for attorneys' fees too is a matter within his discretion. We will not disturb his determination unless the amount set was an abuse of discretion. As noted in Balkus v. Terry Steam Turbine Co., 167 Conn. 170, 179, note 8 (1974) "the reasonableness depends on many factors, including the amount of preparation required, the novelty of the questions presented and the intricacy of the case, customary charges for similar services, and the results actually obtained." Here the commissioner's determination as to the attorneys' fees was not an abuse of discretion. See also, Robinson v. Allied Grocers Cooperative, Inc., 39 Conn. supra 386 (1983) aff'g 1 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 132 (1983); Bode v. Deitsch Plastic Co., 1 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 226, 131 CRD-3-82 (1982).
We, therefore, affirm the trial commissioner's Finding and Award.
Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Darius Spain concur.