Opinion
No. 06-03-00150-CR.
Submitted: March 3, 2004.
Decided: May 6, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH.
On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas, Trial Court No. 401-80950-02.
Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.
OPINION
A jury convicted Adonis Renard Tarbutton, a/k/a Adonis Reynard Tarbutton, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court assessed punishment, enhanced by prior felony convictions, at thirty-five years' imprisonment. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Tarbutton now appeals his conviction, challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, and also contending he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment.
Factual and Procedural History
On March 22, 2002, Jeanne Reyes was at work at Armstrong McCall Professional Beauty Supply in McKinney, Texas. At approximately 10:45 a.m., she was behind the counter and in the process of counting money for the delivery driver to carry during his route. She testified the amount she was to include in the delivery bag was approximately $30.00. As she was counting the money, a man hurriedly entered the store wearing a red windbreaker, and a brown or mahogany bandanna was covering his face. The man carried a metal pipe. She testified she could not see most of his face, but could see that his skin was black and that his hair was short, curly, and black. The man, according to Reyes, was of average build. The man muttered something about money to Reyes. Reyes, at first, refused to give him any money. At that point, he approached Reyes in her location behind the counter and mumbled something else to her. As he continued to advance toward her, Reyes threw the money she had been counting at the man. She testified that, as he got closer to her, she became more afraid he would hit her with the metal pipe. The man placed the metal pipe on the floor at this point and, as he scooped up the money from the floor and began to shove it in his jacket, Reyes called 9-1-1. The man left the store, and Reyes, still on the telephone with the 9-1-1 operator, followed some distance behind him and noted the license plate number of the white Ford Ranger in which the man fled the scene. She reported the license number as XFA33A. Officer Robert Henley of the McKinney Police Department heard the broadcast reporting the robbery over his radio and heard Reyes' description and the license plate number of the vehicle in which the suspect fled. Several officers scoured the area searching for a vehicle matching that description. One officer located a white Ford Ranger with a license plate number of XSA338 in the parking lot of a nearby apartment complex. The officer ran the plates, and dispatch reported the vehicle belonged to James Cheek. Henley spoke with the apartment complex manager, who directed him to apartment number 1012. Henley approached apartment 1012 just as Mary Langford was leaving the apartment. Henley asked her whether she was a resident of the apartment, and she replied affirmatively. He then asked whether there was anyone in the apartment, and she replied there was not. She then changed her answer, nervously stuttering she did not think anyone was in the apartment. Finally, when Henley asked for permission to search the apartment, Langford consented. Henley discovered a man hiding in an open bedroom closet, crouching behind some clothing. He removed the man from his hiding place, handcuffed him, frisked him for weapons, and identified the man as Tarbutton. In Tarbutton's right front pocket, Henley found currency in the amount of $32.00. According to Henley's testimony, although Henley did not question Tarbutton at this time or make any promises to Tarbutton in exchange for a confession, Tarbutton stated, "I did it," two to three times very soon after Henley discovered him in the closet. Officer Randy VanDertuin, of the Criminal Investigations Division of the McKinney Police Department, arrived at the scene of the crime, where he took photographs and gathered evidence, including the metal pipe the suspect had used in the robbery. VanDertuin identified the metal pipe as the handle to a hydraulic jack. He spoke briefly with Reyes, whom he described as "pretty upset," and noted that her face was red and that she appeared to have been crying. VanDertuin then returned to the police station, where he was advised Tarbutton had confessed to the robbery. VanDertuin met with Tarbutton in an interrogation room, where he advised him of his rights and had him initial and sign the written warnings. VanDertuin asked Tarbutton for a written statement and described Tarbutton as cooperative when he agreed to give one. At trial, the State introduced evidence of Tarbutton's oral statements and his written confession. Tarbutton's trial counsel did not move to suppress either. Tarbutton presented no evidence.Sufficiency of the Evidence
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). When reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, we are required to determine whether, considering all the evidence in a neutral light, the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, No. 539-02, 2004 Tex.Crim. App. LEXIS 668, at *20 (Tex.Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2004). There are two ways in which we may find the evidence factually insufficient. First, if the evidence supporting the verdict, considered alone, is too weak to support the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then we must find the evidence insufficient. Id. Second, if — when we weigh the evidence supporting and contravening the conviction — we conclude that the contrary evidence is strong enough that the state could not have met its burden of proof, we must find the evidence insufficient. Id. "Stated another way, evidence supporting guilt can 'outweigh' the contrary proof and still be factually insufficient under a beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard." Id. If the evidence is factually insufficient, then we must reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 135 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Tarbutton was charged with aggravated robbery by intentionally and knowingly threatening and placing Reyes in fear of imminent bodily injury and death, and by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). Tarbutton challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he intentionally or knowingly placed Reyes in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. To satisfy this element of robbery, the defendant's actions must threaten violence, creating a fear of injury in the victim. See Green v. State, 567 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Fear of imminent bodily injury or death can be reasonable even if an assailant does not verbally threaten injury or display a weapon. See Welch v. State, 880 S.W.2d 225, 226-27 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no pet.). The fear must be such that it would coerce a reasonable person to part with property against his or her will. See Williams v. State, 827 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). Here, the evidence at trial is legally sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Tarbutton placed Reyes in fear of imminent bodily injury. Reyes testified she witnessed Tarbutton rapidly enter the store wearing a bandanna and carrying a pipe. He mumbled some words regarding money that Reyes could not understand but interpreted as a demand for money. After Reyes initially refused to give Tarbutton money, he came around the corner of the counter toward Reyes. Reyes testified Tarbutton came close enough to hit her with the pipe. Reyes threw the money when Tarbutton came around the counter and muttered something else at her. Viewing the evidence before the Court in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that Tarbutton placed Reyes in fear of imminent bodily injury or death when he hastily entered her place of business wearing a bandanna over his face, and when he approached her carrying a pipe and demanding money. Likewise, a consideration of all the evidence in a neutral light yields the conclusion the jury was rationally justified in finding Tarbutton guilty of aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence supporting the conclusion Tarbutton placed Reyes in fear of imminent bodily injury or death is not too weak to support the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor do we conclude, after weighing the evidence supporting and contravening the conviction, that the contrary evidence is strong enough the State could not have met its burden of proof. In support of his contention, Tarbutton asserts he never said to Reyes he was going to hit her with the pipe. Reyes' testimony supports this specific contention. First, she testified she could not understand Tarbutton's words, presumably due to the bandanna. Second, she testified Tarbutton did not verbally threaten to hit her with the pipe. Tarbutton also points out he stayed at least three feet from her at all times. Additionally, Tarbutton maintains, Reyes initially refused to give the robber the money and demonstrated the capacity to call 9-1-1 and give the operator the truck's license plate number. Therefore, according to Tarbutton's reasoning, Reyes must not have been placed in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Again, a verbal statement is not necessary to effectuate a threat when examining a robbery conviction. See Welch, 880 S.W.2d at 226-27. Tarbutton characterizes the distance he kept from Reyes as evidence Reyes was not placed in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. To the contrary, the rather short distance of three feet between a woman and a masked, pipe-wielding stranger who appears to be demanding money would reasonably lead a jury to conclude Reyes was placed in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. The fact Reyes initially refused to give Tarbutton money is not evidence that would outweigh the evidence supporting the jury's determination. In fact, such behavior supports a conclusion to the contrary. Reyes makes the distinction between how she felt when Tarbutton was on the other side of the store and when he came around the counter and approached her. That, at some point during Tarbutton's movements toward her, she began to fear Tarbutton demonstrates that such fear was sufficient to coerce Reyes to part with the money against her will, her will as expressed by her refusal moments earlier. The evidence that Tarbutton placed Reyes in fear of imminent bodily injury or death is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict.Effective Assistance of Counsel
Both the federal and state constitutions confer a right to effective representation by counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. Tarbutton contends his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a motion to suppress the statements Tarbutton made to police after his arrest and his written statement. We evaluate a claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance under the two-pronged test as set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 54-55 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). First, we must determine whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Then, if we determine the first issue in the affirmative, we must assess whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance of trial counsel, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Id. An appellant must prove both deficiency and harm by a preponderance of the evidence. See Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex.Crim. App. 1998). We employ a strong presumption that counsel's actions fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The appellant must overcome the presumption that his or her attorney's actions were part of a sound trial strategy. Id. Further, in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel argument, the allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). That another attorney might have pursued a different course of action does not necessarily indicate ineffective assistance. Harner v. State, 997 S.W.2d 695, 704 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.). "If counsel's reasons for his conduct do not appear in the record and there is at least the possibility that the conduct could have been legitimate trial strategy, we will defer to counsel's decisions and deny relief on an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal." Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 88-89 (Tex.Crim. App. 2002); see Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 601 (Tex.Crim. App. 2003). In the absence of direct evidence of counsel's reasons for the challenged conduct, an appellate court will assume a strategic or tactical reason for counsel's action or inaction if any can be imagined. Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex.Crim. App. 2001). Additionally, an appellant claiming ineffective assistance for counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress is required to prove that the motion would have been granted. Jackson, 973 S.W.2d at 957; see also Kent v. State, 982 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. ref'd, untimely filed) (counsel not ineffective for failing to take futile actions). The record before us contains no evidence of counsel's rationale for making the decision not to file such a motion. We therefore cannot determine whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether Tarbutton was harmed by such performance. Given the lack of evidence in the record supporting Tarbutton's contention, and given the strong presumption that counsel's assistance constituted reasonable professional representation, we conclude Tarbutton cannot demonstrate that trial counsel's failure to move to suppress Tarbutton's oral statements and written confession was a decision that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Tarbutton cannot prevail on this point of error, and we overrule his contention.Conclusion
We conclude that the evidence at trial was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict convicting Tarbutton of aggravated robbery. Further, we conclude that Tarbutton failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We overrule Tarbutton's points of error contending otherwise. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.The record does not reveal who Langford is or the nature of her relationship to Tarbutton or Cheek. The record speaks on the subject of Cheek only briefly, revealing he was in jail at the time of the robbery and, like Langford, is Caucasian. The record does not show under what circumstances Tarbutton was operating his vehicle or how he had access to apartment 1012.
In his written statement, Tarbutton concedes he put his scarf on and went into the beauty supply store that he walks past every day on his way to work. He states the lady (Reyes) simply threw the money at him when he came in. Because he needed the money for child support and rent, he admits that he "could not help [him]self" and that he picked up the money. According to Tarbutton's account, it was hard for him to find another job at the time because he felt obligated to his job at the church. After he picked up the money, he states, Reyes picked up a metal pipe and chased him out of the store. He then drove to his friend's apartment, where he knew the police would arrive after tracking down the truck owner's name and address. He explains he went there because he did not want his friend to get in trouble for the robbery.
Generally, a direct appeal is not the appropriate vehicle to bring forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 810-11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813-14 nn. 5-6 (Tex.Crim. App. 1999). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that a reviewing court will only rarely be provided with a record capable of providing a fair evaluation of the merits of a claim of ineffective assistance. See Robinson, 16 S.W.3d at 810-11; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813-14 nn. 5-6; Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). The record may be fully developed to support such a claim by way of application for writ of habeas corpus. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 11.07 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
In the absence of such evidence, we may assume counsel acted pursuant to a trial strategy if we can conceive of a rational motivation for the challenged action or omission, here being counsel's failure to move the court to suppress evidence. See Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). With that in mind, while the record does not demonstrate what motivation counsel had for the action or inaction, it seems we may look to the record to determine what it does, in fact, show us. In this case, the record before us suggests that a motion to suppress likely would have been unavailing.
However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals notes that closer scrutiny of the circumstances and our speculation is immaterial to the determination of the issue in cases such as we have here. See Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 64-65 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Since the record does not affirmatively show counsel's motivations for not pursuing a motion to suppress, we need only conclude that Tarbutton cannot satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test. See Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 506 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).