Opinion
CV184009788S
06-11-2019
Jacek TARASIUK #338147 v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Bhatt, J.
The petitioner, Jacek Tarasiuk, initiated this matter with a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on October 24, 2018. He filed an amended petition on December 3, 2018. In his amended petition, he claims that the punishment he received for committing a disciplinary infraction is in violation of his constitutional rights. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss on February 7, 2019, challenging this court’s jurisdiction on the grounds that the amended petition fails to allege a protected liberty interest. The court conducted a hearing on June 4, 2019 at which both the petitioner and respondent appeared.
For the reasons articulated more fully below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On or about October 26, 2017, the petitioner received a Class A disciplinary ticket for threats. On November 15, 2017, the petitioner had a disciplinary hearing related to this ticket. He was present at the hearing, as was an advisor on his behalf. As a result of that hearing, he was found guilty and several sanctions were imposed: fifteen days punitive segregation; sixty days loss of privileges; thirty days loss of recreation and the forfeiture of fifteen days of risk reduction earned credits. He does not allege any deficiencies in the hearing process.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the petitioner clarified that the basis for his complaint is that he has been informed that he must remain ticket free for a period of one year prior to being able to secure employment in the facility. This, he maintains, is not provided for in any Administrative Directive of the Department of Correction (DOC) and respondent is therefore acting in violation of the constitution.
II. DISCUSSION
A. STANDARD
Practice Book § 23-29 provides in relevant part:
The judicial authority may, at any time, upon its own motion or upon motion of the respondent, dismiss the petition, or any count thereof, if it determines that:
(1) the court lacks jurisdiction;
(2) the petition, or a count thereof, fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted;
(5) any other legally sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition exists.
"A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005). "In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Lebron v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 507, 512, 876 A.2d 1178 (2005), overruled on other grounds by State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d 862 (2014).
This court "lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Green v. Commissioner of Correction, 184 Conn.App. 76, 194 A.3d 857, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 933, 195 A.3d 383 (2018). "In order to invoke the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction in a habeas action, a petitioner must allege that he is illegally confined or has been deprived of his liberty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Joyce v. Commissioner of Correction, 129 Conn.App. 37, 41, 19 A.3d 204 (2011). In other words, "a petitioner must allege an interest sufficient to give rise to habeas relief." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. Commissioner of Correction, 326 Conn. 357, 368, 163 A.3d 597 (2017). "In order to ... qualify as a constitutionally protected liberty [interest] ... the interest must be one that is assured either by statute, judicial decree, or regulation." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fuller v. Commissioner of Correction, 144 Conn.App. 375, 378, 71 A.3d 689, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 946, 80 A.3d 907 (2013).
"In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Abdullah v. Commissioner of Correction, 123 Conn.App. 197, 201, 1 A.3d 1102, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 930, 5 A.3d 488 (2010).
B. COGNIZABLE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
"The principal purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to serve as a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bunkley v. Commissioner of Correction, 222 Conn. 444, 460-61, 610 A.2d 598 (1992), overruled in part on other grounds by Small v. Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 707, 724, 946 A.2d 1203, cert. denied sub nom. Small v. Lantz, 555 U.S. 975, 129 S.Ct. 481, 172 L.Ed.2d 336 (2008). Our courts have upheld the application of the writ to circumstances beyond a direct attack on the underlying judgment or release from imprisonment. See, e.g., Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn. 510, 481 A.2d 1084 (1984) (undue appellate delay); Arey v. Warden, 187 Conn. 324, 445 A.2d 916 (1982) (conditions of confinement); Roque v. Warden, 181 Conn. 85, 434 A.2d 348 (1980) (first amendment issues); Negron v. Warden, 180 Conn. 153, 429 A.2d 841 (1980) (state’s extradition practice); Doe v. Doe, 163 Conn. 340, 307 A.2d 166 (I 972) (custody and visitation disputes).
However, "[i]t is well settled that the courts afford great deference to prison administrators in their operation and management of correctional facilities. Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody ... For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beasley v. Commissioner of Correction, 50 Conn.App. 421, 426-27, 718 A.2d 487 (1998), aff’d, 249 Conn. 499, 733 A.2d 833 (1999); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-83, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).
Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, 39 Conn.App. 674, 667 A.2d 304 (1995), is instructive in this regard. In that consolidated appeal, the petitioner Santiago and several others sought relief from alleged constitutional violations. The petitioners alleged that they suffered "a loss of recreation, school, and work privileges because of his designation as a security risk group member." Id., 680. Two further alleged "that they have suffered a loss of contact visits with their families." Id. In affirming the trial court’s dismissal of these petitions, our Appellate Court concluded that these allegations, even if true, failed to implicated a protected liberty interest because "[a] prisoner has no property or liberty interest in prison employment, increased recreation or educational courses." Id. The trial court’s judgment was reversed only as to one Johnson, who had also alleged a loss of good time credits. This implicated a liberty interest sufficient to invoke the habeas corpus court’s jurisdiction. Id., 682.
C. ANALYSIS
Here, the petitioner seeks to have his ticket vacated because he was not informed that a finding of guilty would result in his being unable to secure employment until he was discipline free for one year. He alleges no error in the hearing process, nor does he allege a deprivation of due process in the manner in which he was issued a ticket and found guilty of that violation. He simply alleges that the ticket creates an unforeseen consequence and that he must be free of that consequence.
The respondent’s motion to dismiss asserts that the court has no jurisdiction because the petitioner has not alleged the deprivation of a liberty interest. The court agrees. The petitioner’s allegation concerns his privilege to work in the facility and this is insufficient to allege a liberty interest.
III. CONCLUSION
Applying the foregoing analysis and discussion to the present matter, the court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The petitioner seeks to have the court intervene in the day to day affairs of DOC by ruling that his ticket be vacated so that he may secure employment in the facility. This court is without jurisdiction to do so. Judgment shall enter dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.