That holding is contrary to the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) and is disapproved." Taquechel v. Chattahoochee Bank, 260 Ga. 755, 756 (2) ( 400 S.E.2d 8) (1991). It follows that, under controlling Supreme Court authority, the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment.

Therefore, the court correctly did not consider the opinion of Dr. Markowitz based upon the portions of uncertified medical records. Taquechel v. Chattahoochee Bank, 260 Ga. 755, 756 (2) ( 400 S.E.2d 8) (1991). Absent those records, the depositions of Dr. Elliott and Ms. Lance do not provide sufficient support for the conclusions drawn by Dr. Markowitz, particularly with regard to the professional standard of care and how the acts of Dr. Elliott and AGA varied therefrom.

BIRDSONG, Presiding Judge. This case is a suit to collect on a note and guarantees in the principal sum of $480,017.33. This appeal is from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to appellee bank et al., upon appellees' "renewed" motion for summary judgment with resubmittal of affidavit evidence, following the Supreme Court's decision in a former appeal ( Taquechel v. Chattahoochee Bank, 260 Ga. 755 ( 400 S.E.2d 8) wherein the court held insufficient the affidavit of the bank's loan officer as to bank records not attached to the affidavit. In four enumerations of error, appellants contend summary judgment was error because the new affidavit, submitted by the loan officer on remand of the case to the trial court, showed on its face that the bank charged usurious interest by charging a daily rate based on the annual interest rate divided by 360 days rather than by 365. Held:

The promissory note became in default by its terms when Pruett and Groover failed to pay the defaulted real estate note under their personal guarantees. Appellants claim that two affidavits supporting summary judgment which were relied upon to establish the amounts due on the notes were insufficient because no bank records were attached. See Taquechel v. Chattahoochee Bank, 260 Ga. 755 ( 400 S.E.2d 8) (1991) (affidavit which relied upon and referred to bank records was insufficient to support summary judgment where the records were not attached to the affidavit). The affidavits here do not refer to or rely upon bank or other records. Rather, they show that the affiant is personally familiar with both notes, the repayment history, default, and amounts due. Since this testimony was based on personal knowledge of the facts, it was sufficient, without attachment of records from which the facts may have been generated, to establish a prima facie case in support of summary judgment.

Rather than answer Dixieland's interrogatories and provide evidence to support its claims, International demanded judgment based merely on an assertion of debt, on unsupported and unproved conclusions in affidavits with no original business records, bills, invoices, contracts or other evidence of debt. Conclusory and unsupported affidavits are insufficient to sustain a summary judgment. Taquechel v. Chattahoochee Bank, 260 Ga. 755, 756 ( 400 S.E.2d 8); Pratt v. Tri City Hosp. Auth., 193 Ga. App. 473 ( 388 S.E.2d 69); see Tyner v. Sheriff, 164 Ga. App. 360 ( 297 S.E.2d 114). The unsupported "summary" of policies and premiums is inadmissible hearsay, without probative value at trial or on motion for summary judgment. See E. H. Crump Co. v. Millar, 200 Ga. App. 598, 601 ( 409 S.E.2d 235); Thomasson v. Trust Co. Bank, 149 Ga. App. 556, 559 ( 254 S.E.2d 881).

]" Pratt v. Tri City Hosp. Auth., 193 Ga. App. 473, 474 ( 388 S.E.2d 69) (1989). See also Taquechel v. Chattahoochee Bank, 260 Ga. 755 (2) ( 400 S.E.2d 8) (1991). Therefore, Selective failed to meet its burden as movant for summary judgment and the trial court erred in granting Selective's motion with regard to the amount owed between Selective and Trico.

Although the affidavit did not specify that the figure was derived from financial records, "it is clear from the context that the portion of the affidavit which set out the amount owed by defendant was based on [financial] records." Taquechel v. Chattahoochee Bank, 260 Ga. 755, 756 (2) ( 400 S.E.2d 8) (1991). Although summary judgment was appropriate as to Casey's liability for assessments, there was no competent evidence from which the court could determine the amount owed on those assessments, and the case must be remanded for that determination by a factfinder.

Such note is due immediately after delivery, without further notice or demand. Murphy v. First Nat. Bank, 182 Ga. App. 788 (1) ( 357 S.E.2d 266) (1987), overruled on other grounds, Taquechel v. Chattahoochee Bank, 260 Ga. 755 (1) ( 400 S.E.2d 8) (1991). When this suit was filed in 1991, the UCC provisions concerning the statute of limitation for demand notes were substantially different than at present.

Dreger's affidavit, which identified the complete file of the department, was sufficient. Taquechel v. Chattahoochee Bank, 260 Ga. 755, 756 (2) ( 400 S.E.2d 8) (1991) (citations and punctuation omitted); Pratt v. Tri City Hosp. Authority, 193 Ga. App. 473, 474 ( 388 S.E.2d 69) (1989); see generally OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) ("[s]worn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith"). Nevertheless, the claim fails for want of proximate cause.

Casey v. North Decatur Courtyards c. Assn., 213 Ga. App. 190, 191-192 (2) ( 444 S.E.2d 361) (1994). When records relied upon and referred to in an affidavit are neither attached to the affidavit nor included in the record, the affidavit is insufficient. Taquechel v. Chattahoochee Bank, 260 Ga. 755, 756 (2) ( 400 S.E.2d 8) (1991); Watson v. Ga. State c. Credit Union, 201 Ga. App. 761 (1) ( 412 S.E.2d 286) (1991). In this case, Griffin, Alliant's credit manager, testified in his affidavit that he was familiar with the business records involved in the transaction as shown "by the true and accurate copies attached hereto."