Opinion
2008-834 N C.
Decided March 23, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Second District (Howard S. Miller, J.), entered May 24, 2007. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the action.
Judgment affirmed without costs.
PRESENT: MOLIA, J.P., SCHEINKMAN and LaCAVA, JJ.
Plaintiff commenced the instant commercial claims action to recover the sum of $5,000 for damage to its vehicle arising out of an automobile accident. Following a nonjury trial, the District Court found in favor of defendant and dismissed the action. The instant appeal by plaintiff ensued.
The standard of review on appeal of a commercial claims judgment is whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807-A). A commercial claims judgment may not be reversed absent a showing that there is no support in the record for the court's conclusions, or that the court's determination is otherwise so clearly erroneous as to deny substantial justice ( see Forte v Bielecki, 118 AD2d 620; see also Blair v Five Points Shopping Plaza, 51 AD2d 167).
Resolution of issues of credibility is for the trier of fact, since it had the opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses ( see McGuirk v Mugs Pub, 250 AD2d 824; Richard's Home Ctr. Lbr. v Kraft, 199 AD2d 254; Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544), and its decision should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is obvious that said determination could not have been reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Claridge Gardens, 160 AD2d 544). The deference accorded to a trial court's credibility determinations applies with even greater force to judgments rendered in the Commercial Claims Part of the court given the limited standard of review ( see UDCA 1807-A; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126).
Generally, in cases involving rear-end collisions, there is a presumption of negligence on the part of the operator of the rearmost vehicle, and it becomes that operator's burden to provide a non-negligent explanation for the collision ( see 8B NY Jur 2d, Automobiles and Other Vehicles § 953; see also Gaeta v Carter, 6 AD3d 576). In the instant case, the trial court apparently found the defense witness' version of how the collision occurred to be a sufficient non-negligent explanation for the collision, and found said version more credible than plaintiff's witness' version of how the accident occurred, and there is no reason for this court to disturb the trial court's judgment on that basis. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
Molia, J.P., Scheinkman and LaCava, JJ., concur.