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Tamburo v. Oil Co.

Supreme Court of Mississippi, Division B
Jan 2, 1933
145 So. 107 (Miss. 1933)

Opinion

No. 30322.

January 2, 1933.

1. TAXATION. Description in tax deed, "1 Lot in Sec. 8, T. 14, R. 8, desc. in Bk. 199 Page 53 Town of Glen Allen," assessed to named person held sufficient ( Code 1930, section 3151).

The description was sufficient because abbreviations in deed meant a lot in the designated section, township, and range which lot was particularly described in book 199 at page 53 of the records of the deeds of the named county, wherein the land sold was situated at time of tax sale.

2. TAXATION.

Description in tax deed reasonably certain, or which by aid of statute may be made reasonably certain, is sufficient (Code 1930, section 3151).

APPEAL from circuit court of Washington county. HON. S.F. DAVIS, Judge.

Percy, Strauss Kellner, of Greenville, for appellant.

Parol testimony shall be admissible to apply a description of land in a conveyance for taxes, where such testimony will show what land was sold and there is enough in the description in the conveyance to be applied to the particular tract of land by the aid of such testimony.

Section 3151, Code of 1930.

Judicial notice is taken of the initials and abbreviations used in the description of land in conveyance, judicial sales and assessments for taxes, and other public proceedings.

Jones on Ev., page 829 Note; 89 Am. Dec. 692; A.G.S.R.R. Co. v. Organ Power Co., 92 Miss. 781; Jones County Land Co. v. Fox, 120 Miss. 789.

What book does the tax deed refer to for the description of the lot? It refers to one, and only one book, namely, Book 199 of the land records of Washington County, Mississippi. The deed is signed by the tax collector of Washington County, Mississippi. This fact alone would be sufficient to make reference to the land records of Washington County, Mississippi.

Wasson Wasson, of Greenville, for appellee.

It is judicially known that there are a number of counties in the state created out of and from parts of a number of other counties. For instance, in recent years Humphreys county was created out of and from the counties of Washington, Sunflower, Leflore, Sharkey and Yazoo. A deed in that county, as now existing, might well make reference to the record of deeds recorded, prior to the creation of that county, in one of the counties from which it was created; and if no reference be made to the particular county in which the deed was recorded the reference would be void.

If "desc. in Bk. 199 Page 53 Town of Glen Allen" could be applied to any record, it would be applied to a record in the Town of Glen Allen, for it says "Bk. 199 page 53 Town of Glen Allen."

Well known abbreviations may be used, and are sufficient; but vague, uncertain, and arbitrary abbreviations are not permissible. In tax proceedings perhaps more strictness is required in description than in ordinary conveyance.

1 Am. Eng. Enc. L. (2 Ed.), 99-100; 1 C.J., pp. 276-277.


Appellant instituted an action of ejectment against appellee for the possession of a portion of a lot of land, ownership of which is claimed by appellant under a tax deed executed by the tax collector of Washington county, on the 1st day of April, 1929. There was a peremptory instruction for appellee, on the ground, as we are informed by the briefs, that the tax deed contained no adequate description. The tax deed is in due form in all other respects and no other question is presented.

The description is as follows: "1 Lot in Sec. 8, T. 14, R. 8, desc. in Bk. 199 Page 53 Town of Glen Allen," assessed to Jake Stern. Appellant contends that the terms used in the tax deed mean one lot in section 8, township 14, range 8, described in book 199, page 53, of the records of deeds to lands in said county of Washington; and appellant introduced in evidence the book and page aforesaid which is the record of a deed from Annie W. Spencer to Jake Stern, dated June 17, 1924, and which describes the land sued for in this case. The description in the deed is lengthy, and conveys a lot with several angles and variations in direction of its boundaries. The description is too lengthy to insert in full or at large upon an assessment roll. The assessor did, then, what is often, if not generally, done in cases of irregular lots and complicated descriptions, namely, the assessor put it on the assessment rolls by a reference to the deed which conveyed it to the owner so assessed. We do not think there is any more difficulty or doubt about what is meant by the use of the abbreviations "desc. in Bk 199 Page 53" than there is in the abbreviations Sec. 8, T. 14, R. 8, which means the section, township, and range of the government survey. The abbreviations in the deed mean a lot in said section, township, and range and which lot is particularly described in book 199 at page 53 of the records of deeds of Washington county, the county wherein the land sold was situated at the time of the tax sale, as the tax deed in its opening sentence expressly recites. Certainty beyond all doubt is not required of descriptions in tax deeds, especially in view of section 3151, Code 1930. A description reasonably certain, or which by the aid of the statute may be made reasonably certain is all that is required, so far as the description is concerned.

Reversed and remanded.


Summaries of

Tamburo v. Oil Co.

Supreme Court of Mississippi, Division B
Jan 2, 1933
145 So. 107 (Miss. 1933)
Case details for

Tamburo v. Oil Co.

Case Details

Full title:TAMBURO v. STANDARD OIL CO

Court:Supreme Court of Mississippi, Division B

Date published: Jan 2, 1933

Citations

145 So. 107 (Miss. 1933)
145 So. 107

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