Opinion
CIVIL NO. 03-2243 (FAB).
April 4, 2007
ORDER
Defendant's Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the Opinion and Order of March 9, 2007 (Docket No. 95) is hereby DENIED.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), a party may move the Court "to amend its judgment based on newly discovered material evidence or because the Court committed a manifest error of law or fact."Colon v. Fraticelli, 181 F.Supp.2d 48, 50 (D.P.R. 2002) (citing Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997)). Rule 59(e), however, is "aimed at reconsideration, [and] not initial consideration," and thus is not a proper mechanism to advance arguments that should have been presented before judgment was entered, but were not. See Jorge Rivera Surillo Co., Inc. v. Falconer Glass Indus., Inc. 37 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing F.D.I.C. v. World Univ. Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992)); see also Aybar, 188 F.3d at 16.
Defendant's main argument for reconsideration is that the Court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment after finding that the plaintiff had presented direct evidence of discrimination in support of his discrimination claim. Defendant insisted in its motion for summary judgment, and now reiterates on reconsideration, that the plaintiff only proffered indirect evidence of discrimination, which mandates the application of theMcDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Under this framework, defendant argues that plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because he cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
The Court stands by its prior finding, that the plaintiff has proffered sufficient direct evidence of discrimination to survive summary judgment and have his claims decided by a jury. Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidence does constitute direct evidence of discrimination. The minutes of the Board Meeting clearly show that at the highest levels of the bank the decision was made to get rid of all foreigners. Even if Fonnegra's name was not specifically mentioned in the meeting, it is rather pellucid that he was one of those being targeted for elimination. These were not mere stray remarks by non-decision-makers, as defendant would categorize them. This is evidence of the bank's ultimate decision-maker consciously and deliberately engaging in a course of action that would lead to the termination of all foreigners, Fonnegra among them, for no other reason than because they are foreigners. Evidence of discrimination rarely comes clearer than that.
Therefore, because there is direct evidence of discrimination, the application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is inappropriate and it becomes immaterial whether or not Fonnegra can establish a prima facie case of discrimination.