This proposition is simply untenable." Tallman Pools of Ga. v. James, 181 Ga. App. 341, 343 ( 352 S.E.2d 179) (1986). Thus, while it cannot be said that the mound of dirt, under any set of circumstances, could not be the proximate cause of appellant's injuries, it was affirmatively established under the circumstances shown that appellant's injuries were not caused by any negligence on the part of appellee.

Compare Tallman Pools of Ga. v. James , 181 Ga. App. 341, 352 S.E.2d 179 (1986) (physical precedent only), which was cited by the defendants and which held that there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether a driver who braked but could not avoid a collision in his own lane of travel with another vehicle that swerved into his lane. See id. at 342, 352 S.E.2d 179.

We find distinct Thompson v. Walker, 162 Ga. App. 292, 292 ( 290 SE2d 490) (1982), relied upon by Belford, which found a factual issue in a similar scenario based on the evidence that there was nothing obstructing the defendant's view on a "straight and almost level" road. Cf. Tallman Pools of Ga. v. James, 181 Ga. App. 341, 343 ( 352 SE2d 179) (1986) (physical precedent only). 2.

Machiz has failed to produce any evidence rebutting Finney's evidence that she was unable to avoid the collision through no fault of her own. See Tallman Pools of Ga. v. James, 181 Ga. App. 341, 343 ( 352 S.E.2d 179) (1986). Machiz herself cannot contradict the evidence because she has no memory of what happened immediately before, during, and immediately after the accident.

Fort v. Boone, 166 Ga. App. 290, 292 ( 304 S.E.2d 465). Accordingly, material issues of fact remain which must be decided by a jury and, thus, summary judgment was improperly granted to Cowan. Tallman Pools of Ga. v. James, 181 Ga. App. 341, 342 ( 352 S.E.2d 179). This determination, however, should not be construed as authority for the proposition that appellant's evidence would, had it been offered at trial, necessarily be sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict. Winn-Dixie v. Ramey, 186 Ga. App. 257, 258 ( 366 S.E.2d 785); see also Whelchel v. Laing Properties, 190 Ga. App. 182 ( 378 S.E.2d 478) (physical precedent).

We do not agree. "Although negligence cases are not frequently susceptible to final adjudication by motion for summary judgment, nevertheless, in cases of plain, palpable and indisputable evidence, summary judgment may be awarded. [Cits.]" Tallman Pools of Ga. v. James, 181 Ga. App. 341, 342 ( 352 S.E.2d 179) (1986). We find our holding in Fort v. Boone, 166 Ga. App. 290 ( 304 S.E.2d 465) (1983), although a physical precedent case, to be persuasive here. Fort was a wrongful death action arising from an automobile accident in which this court held that summary judgment was improperly denied to the defendant because "[t]here was no evidence showing lack of negligence on the part of [the plaintiff] and there was no factual establishment of probable negligence on the part of [the defendant]."

This proposition is simply untenable." Tallman Pools of Ga. v. James, 181 Ga. App. 341, 343 ( 352 S.E.2d 179) (1986). Where the record contains no evidence of any negligence on the part of the plaintiff, "it is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that plaintiff exercised due care. [Cit.