Opinion
Civil Action No. 2: 19-cv-0308
05-22-2020
QUINTEZ TALLEY, Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
cc: QUINTEZ TALLEY KT 5091 SCI Fayette 48 Overlook Drive Labelle, PA 15450 (via U.S. First Class Mail) Timothy Mazzocca Office of Attorney General (via ECF electronic notification)
United States District Judge Nora Barry Fischer REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 36) be granted in its entirety and that this case be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
II. Report
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff, Quintez Talley, has brought this lawsuit against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") and approximately twenty-two DOC officials and staff members. Distilled to its essence, Plaintiff's claims all arise from his alleged inability to file Objections to a Report and Recommendation in Talley v. Wetzel, No. 3:15-cv-01170, a case he filed in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff claims he was unable to file timely objections due to a ten day mail freeze throughout the DOC and, as a result, his lawsuit was dismissed. He alleges he has been denied his constitutional rights to access to courts. He also sets forth various claims that attack the constitutionality or legality of the ten-day mail suspension.
Plaintiff alleges that the DOC mail freeze began on August 29, 2019 and lasted until September 6, 2019. According to Defendants, the "day-ten mail freeze throughout the Department of Corrections . . . was the initial response to a situation in which contraband was coming into prisons through the mail making employees ill." Br. at 1. (ECF 37).
Plaintiff filed his original complaint in this case on April 8, 2019 (ECF 3) and, before service was effectuated, filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF 12). Defendants were served with the Amended Complaint and moved to dismiss it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (ECF 24). In response to the motion, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF 35). Presently pending is Defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, which Plaintiff opposes. (ECF No. 38). The matter is ripe for resolution.
The Second Amended Complaint is Talley's operative pleading. "In general, an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity." Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 2020 WL 2515456 (U.S. May 18, 2020). "Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading." Id.
B. Relevant Factual Background
To understand the claims here, it is necessary to understand the procedural history of Plaintiff's case filed in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The docket and filings in that case, of which this Court takes judicial notice, present a slightly different version of events than that which Plaintiff presents through his Second Amended Complaint and in his brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss.
On August 9, 2017, Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick filed a report and recommendation ("R&R") recommending that the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Xue, the sole remaining defendant in the case, be granted in part and denied in part. It was recommended that several of Plaintiff's claims be dismissed with prejudice, that several other claims be dismissed without prejudice, and that two claims be allowed to proceed (an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical need claim and a state law professional negligence claim). Plaintiff was specifically informed that if he intended to pursue his claims, he must file a third amended complaint, which "stands by itself without reference to earlier pleadings," and "[a]ny previously-asserted claims that Talley omits from the forthcoming third amended complaint , including his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and state law professional negligence claims against Dr. Xue, will be deemed abandoned. " (Report and Recommendation, ECF 93) (emphasis in original). The R&R was adopted by Judge James M. Munley on August 28, 2017, and Plaintiff was ordered to file a third amended complaint within thirty days. (ECF 94).
On September 8, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a Notice to the court indicating that he had not "decided as to whether or not [he would] amend [the] complaint," due to an uncertainty as to the status of his claims against Defendant Wortstell. (ECF 95). In response, on October 19, 2017, Magistrate Judge Mehalchick issued an Order clarifying that all claims against Defendant Wortstell were dismissed as moot and granted Plaintiff an extension until November 17, 2017, to file the third amended complaint, specifically stating that if Plaintiff "does not file a third amended complaint, the Court will dismiss his complaint for failure to prosecute. . . ." (ECF 96, emphasis added).
Rather than filing a third amended complaint, Plaintiff filed on November 2, 2017, a Motion for Reconsideration in which he sought to have the claims against Defendant Wortstell reinstated. Magistrate Judge Mehalchick denied the motion for reconsideration on July 19, 2018. (ECF 106). On that same date, Magistrate Judge Mehalchick ordered Plaintiff to file a third amended complaint by August 9, 2018 and again advised Plaintiff that failure to file the third amended complaint may result in dismissal of the case. (ECF 107).
On August 20, 2018, with no third amended complaint being filed, Magistrate Judge Mehalchick issued a R&R recommending that the case be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (ECF 108). Plaintiff's objections were due by September 4, 2018. With no objections being filed and still no third amended complaint being filed, on September 7, 2018, Judge Munley adopted the R&R, dismissed Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, and closed the case. Nothing on the docket indicates that Plaintiff did not receive this Order.
On September 12, 2018, the Court received Plaintiff's objections to the R&R, which were dated August 24, 2018, and postmarked September 6, 2018. (ECF 111). Interestingly, his brief specifically states that "Plaintiff has chosen not to amend his complaint . . . ." (ECF 111 at 3) (emphasis added). There is no activity on the docket until January 3, 2019, when Plaintiff wrote a letter to the Clerk of Court inquiring about the status of two of his cases, including the case filed at 3:15-cv-1170. The docket does not reflect if Plaintiff was sent a response to his inquiry.
The document was docketed as "objections," but the actual title is "Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (ECF 110) and Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration (ECF 111).
C. Standard of Review
The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well settled. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This "'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary elements." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Even so, the court need not accept as true "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences," Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000), or the plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court's role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000). In short, a motion to dismiss should not be granted if a party alleges facts, which could, if established at trial, entitle him to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8.
Courts generally consider the allegations of the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record in deciding motions to dismiss. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Factual allegations within documents described or identified in the complaint also may be considered if the plaintiff's claims are based upon those documents. Id. (citations omitted). In addition, a district court may consider indisputably authentic documents without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004); Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2004) (in resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally should consider "the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters
D. Discussion
With these standards in mind, the Court accepts as true the facts as they appear in the Second Amended Complaint and draws all possible inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). That said, the Court need not accept as true allegations contradicted by matters of public record.
The Court first considers Plaintiff's access to courts claim as the remaining claims are derivative to it in some way. The essence of the Second Amended Complaint is that, as a result of the DOC mail suspension, Plaintiff was unable to file timely objections, which resulted in his case being dismissed.
It is well settled that prisoners have a constitutional right to access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); see also Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) ("prisoners may only proceed on access-to-courts claims in two types of cases, challenges (direct or collateral) to their sentences and conditions of confinement."); Aulisio v. Chiampi, 765 F. App'x 760, 763 (3d Cir. 2019) (same). To sustain such a claim, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing that his "efforts to pursue a legal claim" were prejudiced. Bowens v. Matthews, 765 F. App'x 640, 643 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996))). Moreover, when a plaintiff alleges the loss of an opportunity to present a past legal claim, the underlying claim must be "nonfrivolous" or "arguable," and the plaintiff must "have no other 'remedy that may be awarded as recompense' for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit." Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205 (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). The complaint "must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is 'more than mere hope,' and it must describe the 'lost remedy.' " Id. at 205-06 (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416-17).
The facts alleged in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fail to plausibly suggest that his right of access to the courts was compromised under the standard above. Plaintiff fails to recognize that his case was dismissed not because of any impediment which may have occurred as a result of the mail suspension, but because he refused to follow Court Orders. The public docket reflects that for over a year on several occasions, the Court advised Plaintiff that his failure to file a third amended complaint would result in his case being dismissed for failure to prosecute, yet he refused to comply with the Court Orders:
• In late August 2017, Plaintiff was advised, that he must file a third amended complaint within thirty days and that the third complaint must "stand[]
by itself without reference to earlier pleadings." He failed to comply.
• In October of 2017, Plaintiff was granted an extension until November 17, 2017, to file the third amended complaint, and specifically advised that if he did "not file a third amended complaint, the Court will dismiss his complaint for failure to prosecute." Again, Plaintiff failed to comply.
• On July 18, 2018, Plaintiff was granted a third extension to file the third amended complaint by August 9, 2018 and was again advised that failure to file the third amended complaint may result in dismissal of the case. Again, Plaintiff failed to comply.
And as evidenced by his own words in his objections, which are dated August 24, 2018, Plaintiff had no intention of complying with the Court's Orders as he specifically stated that he was not going to file a Third Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations which show that even if Plaintiff had timely filed timely objections that the result would have been any different than a dismissal.
For all these reasons, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's access to courts claim be dismissed as the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim. Given this recommendation, Plaintiff's remaining claims fall like a house of cards as they are all derivative to the access to courts claim. Thus, these claims require no elaboration.
E. Leave to Amend
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Given that Plaintiff's claims are frivolous, the Court recommends that leave to amend be denied as it would be futile for Plaintiff to amend his claims.
III. Conclusion
For all the above reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the pending motion to dismiss be granted in its entirety and that this case be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff, because he is a non-electronically registered party, may file objections to this Report and Recommendation by June 8, 2020. and Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, may file objections, if any, by June 5, 2020. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe "will waive the right to appeal." Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Dated: May 22, 2020
s/Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
Chief United States Magistrate Judge cc: QUINTEZ TALLEY
KT 5091
SCI Fayette
48 Overlook Drive
Labelle, PA 15450
(via U.S. First Class Mail)
Timothy Mazzocca
Office of Attorney General
(via ECF electronic notification)