Courts have routinely found a period of months between a protected activity and adverse employment action to be too far removed to establish temporal proximity that would support a finding of causation. See e.g., Huitt, 216 F.Supp.3d at 1193 (collecting cases); Redwind v. W. Union, LLC, 2016 WL 3606595, at *19 (D. Or. May 2, 2016) (finding five months insufficient); Talbot v. New Seasons Mkt., LLC, 2012 WL 6738271, at *7 n.4 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 2012) (finding two months insufficient). As such, the timing between Plaintiff's protected activity and his termination does not support a finding that his protected activity was a substantial factor in his termination.
There is no bright-line rule on what constitutes "very close" in time, but a period of months, without other evidence supporting causation, is too long. See Swan v. Bank of America, 360 F. App'x 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (four months too remote); Govan v. Sec. Nat. Fin. Corp., 502 F. App'x 671, 674 (9th Cir. 2012) (six-months too long); Redwind v. W. Union, LLC, No. 3:14-CV-01699-AC, 2016 WL 3606595, at *19 (D. Or. May 2, 2016) (five months insufficient); Talbot v. New Seasons Mkt., LLC, No. 03:12-CV-00141-HZ, 2012 WL 6738271, at *7 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 2012) (two months insufficient). Two months elapsed between when Plaintiff made her first age discrimination complaint and the issuance of her First Written Warning.
Likewise, absent other evidence, neither are her personal impressions sufficient to show a triable issue of fact on causation. Jones v. Nevada ex. rel. Bd. of Regents for Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ. (Jones I), No. 2:14-cv-01930-APG-NJK, 2016 WL 4707987, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 7, 2016) ("Jones's subjective belief is insufficient to survive summary judgment."); see also Talbot v. New Seasons Mkt., LLC, No. 03:12-cv-00141-HZ, 2012 WL 6738271, at *6 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 2012) ("At best, plaintiff's testimony on these issues shows only that she subjectively believed that Rich was unhappy with her periodic sick days. Her subjective belief is not supported by any facts and cannot, by itself, demonstrate causation."); cf. Little v. Cox's Supermarkets, 71 F.3d 637, 643 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hile an inference is enough to establish a prima facie case, this nevertheless may not be created by mere subjective belief or debatable assertions.
360 F. App'x 903, 906 (9 Cir. 2009)(citing Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)). See also Redwind v. W. Union, LLC, No. 3:14-CV-01699-AC, 2016 WL 3606595, at *19 (D. Or. May 2, 2016)(concluding five months between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is insufficient temporal proximity to support a finding of causation); Talbot v. New Seasons Mkt., LLC, No. 03:12-CV-00141-HZ, 2012 WL 6738271, at *7 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 2012)(concluding two months between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is insufficient temporal proximity to support a finding of causation); Kadiyan v. Medtronic, No. CV1005921MMMMANX, 2011 WL 13142145, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2011)(concluding six months between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is insufficient temporal proximity to support a finding of causation). In several cases district courts in the Ninth Circuit have concluded even longer periods such as seven to nine months between the protected activity and the adverse action does not constitute sufficient temporal proximity to establish a causal connection.
Thus, the Court grants OHSU's motion for summary judgment on Mr. Clink's wrongful discharge claim. See Talbot v. New Seasons Mkt., LLC, 2012 WL 6738271, at *7 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 2012) (granting summary judgment to defendant on a wrongful discharge claim "because plaintiff fail[ed] to create an issue of fact indicating that her FMLA leave was a negative factor in the employment decisions made against her"). CONCLUSION